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This report provides the Final Hazard Categorization (FHC) for the Remediation of Six 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit Burial Grounds. The burial grounds are located in the southeast corner 
of the Hanford Site. Of the 12 waste sites located within the 300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 6 (the 
300-8, 300-18,3OO-VTS, 316-4,600-47, and 600-259 sites) were each given an Initial Hazard 
Categorization of Below Category 3, radiological, and consequently their remediation will not 
receive further analysis within this document. The remediation of the remaining six sites (the 
618-1,618-2,618-3,618-7,618-8, and 618-13 Burial Grounds) are the subject of this analysis. 
These remaining six sites will be referred to from this point forward as the "300-FF-2 Burial 
Grounds ." 
In December 2004, during remediation of the 6 1 8-2 Burial Ground, a deteriorated combination 
safe was discovered. The safe was damaged during excavation and was found to contain several 
containers of liquids and di-y residues. It was later determined that plutonium-239 was the 
predominant radionuclide present in each of the containers. Unrelated to the discovery of the 
safe two radiological control technicians (RCTs) were exposed to airborne plutonium-239. As a 
result of this new information, an Interoffice Memorandum (BHI 200%) was written to cease 
activities at several 300-FF-2 Remedial Action waste sites, including the 6 18-2 Burial Ground 
waste site. A MOC (BHI 2005b) discusses the discovered condition of liquids and 
pureheparated plutonium and the proposed change to commence work specifically in the 
61 8-2 Burial Ground waste site using a work segmented approach. The 61 8-2 waste site was 
segmented into five segments, these being: 
Segment 1,618-2 Staging 
Segment 2, Remainder of the Southern Trench 
Segment 3 , Middle Trench 
* Segment 4, Northern Trench 
* Segment 5 ,  Existing exhumed "safe" in a shipping box; and overpacked "safe" contents, and 
"cups" fi-om the staging pile area. 
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Segment 3 bounds all of the segrnents in the 61 8-2. New special controls were added to allow 
segments to be worked simultaneously in compliance with the inventory limits evaluated in the 
FHC and nuclear criticality controls from the revised criticality evaluation to control spacing 
between items. 
The 618-7 Burial Ground will be segmented into 2 segments. These segments are the two 
Northern Trenches and the Thoria Pit. The special controls added to stay within the inventory 
limits evaluated in the FHC are similar to those in place for the 61 8-2 Burial Ground. 
The analyses in this documentation include the following: 
A description of the remediation activities to be performed at the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds 
An assessment of the inventories of radioactive and other hazardous materials within the 
300-FF-2 Burial Grounds 
Identification of the hazards associated with the remediation activities performed within the 
300-FF-2 Burial Grounds 
Identification of internally and externally initiated accident scenarios with the potential to 
produce significant local consequences during remediation of the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds 
A FHC, based on the physical and chemical form of the radionuclides and the available 
dispersive energy sources for the burial grounds and their hazardous materials 
Identification of the controls necessary to manage the identified hazards and to ensure that 
the FHC remains valid. 
For hazardous chemicals, the sum of the ratios did not exceed 1 (one) for either 29 Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) 191 0.1 19 or 40 CFR 68.130 thresholds. The FHC for the 300-FF-2 
Burial Grounds remediation project was determined based on a comparison of the radiological 
material at risk with adjusted DOE-STD-1027 (DOE 1997) Category 3 threshold quantities. The 
Category 3 threshold quantities were adjusted based on the credible release fractions in 
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accordance with Nuclear Safety Technical Position, NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002). This analysis 
has deterrnined that the FHC for the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation Project is below 
Category 3 (sometimes referred to as “radiological”). To ensure that the conditions assumed in 
the hazard analysis are maintained, the controls, commitments and conditions of approval in the 
SER shall be incorporated into the project’s Readiness Assessment to be completed prior to 
commencement of the work. 
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1.0 
This report provides the final hazard categorization (FHC) for the remediation of six solid waste 
disposal sites (referred to as burial grounds) located in the 300-FF-2 Operable Unit (OU) on the 
Hanford Site, which is located within Grant, Benton, and Franklin Counties in southeast 
Washington (Figure 1-1). These six sites (618-1,618-2,618-3,618-7, 618-8, and 618-13 Burial 
Grounds) were determined to have a total radionuclide inventory (WCH 2005a, WCH 2005d, 
WCH 2005e and WCH 2006b) that exceeds the DOE-STD-1027 Category 3 threshold quantity 
(TQ) (DOE 1997) and are the subject of this analysis. These six sites will hereinafter be referred 
to as the “300-FF-2 Burial Grounds.” 
This FHC document examines the hazards, identifies appropriate controls to manage the hazards, 
and documents the FHC and commitments for the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Project. The FHC is based on an evaluation of a full range of potential hazards associated with 
natural phenomena and remediation activities. The remediation activities analyzed in this FHC 
document are those described in the Record ofDecision for the 300-FF-2 Operable Units 
(EPA 2001). 
.l PURPOSE 
This report accomplishes the following: 
Describes the activities to be performed during remediation of the waste site addressed by 
this FHC document, 
Assesses the inventory of radioactive and other hazardous materials associated with the 
300-FF-2 Burial Grounds, 
Identifies internally and externally initiated accident scenarios and natural phenomena with 
the potential to produce significant local consequences during remediation of the 300-FF-2 
Burial Grounds, 
Determines a FHC based on a comparison of the material at risk (MAR) to DOE-STD-1027 
Category 3 TQs (DOE 1997) adjusted to reflect the credible release fractions in accordance 
with NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002), 
Identifies the necessary controls to manage the hazards and to ensure that the FHC remains 
valid. 
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1.2 DOCUMENT ORGANIZAT 
Section 1.3 describes the project activities that will be authorized by approval of this document. 
Section 1.4 describes how configuration and change control will be managed to maintain the 
requirements based on this document. Section 1.5 sumarizes the conclusions and project- 
specific controls. Section 1.6 describes the overall approach used in the FHC process. 
Section 2.0 provides the background information necessary to understand the hazards that have 
potential consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. Section 3.0 provides the basis 
of operations that are analyzed and authorized under the FHC. Section 4.0 identifies the hazards 
present, analyzes the identified hazards, and provides the FHC. Section 5.0 describes special, 
proj ect-specific, and programmatic controls needed to ensure the FHC remains valid. 
.3 AUTHOR12 ACTIVITIES 
The scope of this document involves evaluating hazards associated with the remediation 
activities at the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds. The Record of Decision (EPA 2001) specifies 
cleanup to industrial standards and identifies the following remediation activities: 
0 Excavation of soils/sedinients, debris, and waste materials 
0 Material handling and transport, including sorting, size reduction, treatment, stockpiling of 
soils and debris, and packaging 
Soil/debris and waste drum characterization and analysis (includes field surveys) 
8 Decontamination 
Placement of backfill. 
These activities are discussed in detail in Section 3.0. 
AL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION AND FINAL 
CATEGORIZAT ON EVALUATION PROCESS 
Established configurationlchange control processes ensure that proposed changes and discovered 
conditions are reviewed in relation to the authorized activities, identified and evaluated hazards, 
and specified commitments. 
If new characterization data become available that are indicative of increased inventories of 
either radiological contaminants or hazardous materials, the Initial Hazard Categorization and 
Final Hazard Categorization Evaluation (IHC/FHC Evaluation) process (see procedure NS- 1-2.1) 
will be used to evaluate the impacts to the FHC. 
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Figure 1-1. 300-FF-2 Operable Unit. 
E991 1049.1 
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The IHC/FHC Evaluation process is similar to the unreviewed safety question (USQ) process for 
hazard category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The purpose of the IHC/FHC Evaluation process is 
not to determine the safety of a change or discovery, but to establish the proper approval 
authority for specific situations. The safety of a proposed change is to be addressed by the 
contractor (before using the IHC/FHC Evaluation process) by analyzing the hazards associated 
with the change. 
The IHC/FHC Evaluation ensures that hazard categorizations are maintained. Discoveries or new 
information that could affect the inventory basis, segmentation (if applicable), or preservation 
controls (if applicable), as delineated below, need to be promptly evaluated. 
A discovery or new information about the radiological inventory having the potential to 
increase the total activity evaluated in an IHC or FHC. 
A discovery or new information that indicates a change in isotopic mixture that has the 
potential to increase the sum of ratios used to determine an IHC or FHC. 
A discovery or new infomation indicating the potential for increased release rates that could 
reduce the threshold quantities used for IHC or FHC. When material form changes (e.g., solid 
to semi-volatile), and/or when new energy sources could be introduced, the hazard category 
could change. 
An FHC could be affected by changes that affect the assumptions or basis for segmentation. An 
example is segrnentation of separate trenches within a burial ground. A discovery that the 
separation distance between two significant trenches has deteriorated could negatively affect 
the FHC. 
A preservation control of a FHC, if found inadequate, has the potential to affect a FHC. If a 
control device, such as a radiation monitor, is relied upon to implement a preservation control 
and that control was found not effective, then the conditions of approval and FHC could be 
affected . 
The IHC/FHC evaluation determines the effect of the discovered condition or change situation 
relative to the accident scenario evaluations in the AB. The IHC/FHC evaluation is used to 
determine if DOE approval of the change is required. 
TU SUMMARY 
Following a detailed analysis of the potential hazards that could be encountered while 
remediating the 3 00-FF-2 Burial Grounds, it was determined that no activity/process authorized 
by this FHC document could credibly result in undue risk to workers, the public, or the 
environment (see Section 4.0). Controls that are special in regard to the assumptions made in the 
FHC are detailed in Section 5.1. Project-specific controls are detailed in Section 5.2, and 
programmatic controls are detailed in Section 5.3. 
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1.6 HAZARD CATEGORIZATI 
The FHC for the remediation of the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds was determined to be below 
Category 3 (sometimes referred to as radiological). The FHC (Appendix D and BHI 2005b) for 
the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation Project was determined using sum of the ratios of the 
total radionuclide inventories and the Category 3 TQs from DOE-STD-1027 (DOE 1997) 
adjusted to reflect the credible release fractions in accordance with NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002). 
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N 
The 300 Area is located along the Columbia River, north of the Richland City limits. It was 
constructed during the 1940s and was operated as a fuel fabrication, test reactor, and laboratory 
complex. These activities released contaminants to the soil surface, the vadose zone, and 
groundwater. Waste fi-om 300 Area operations was also deposited in designated burial grounds 
and discharged to unlined ponds and trenches. 
The six burial grounds to be remediated have been described as “general content burial grounds” 
(DOE-RL 2000) and are representative of the type of burial ground within this OU that operated 
fi-om the mid-1 940s through the mid-1970s. The primary contaminant in the 300 Area is 
uranium from the fuel fabrication processes. However, numerous other chemical and 
radiological hazardous wastes are found throughout the 300 Area. Attributes of general content 
burial grounds, and these 300-FF-2 sites in particular, include the following: 
All sites have an existing cover of soil, with vegetation or asphalt. 
The 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds are adjacent to several 300-FF-1 OU waste sites that have been 
remediated or are currently undergoing remediation. 
The sites contain uranium-contaminated trash, equipment, and soil. 
2.1.1 Background of Operations and Solid Waste Disposal Practices in the 300 Area 
The six 300 Area solid waste burial grounds addressed in this FHC document operated at various 
times during a 30-year span. During this period, the 300 Area facilities were involved in both 
defense and nondefense missions that involved the following: 
Development and fabrication of Hanford production reactor fuels, poisons, and targets 
(including modifications to fuel geometry, cladding, material, inspection, and uranium 
recovery operations) 
0 Development and fabrication of reactor fuels containing plutonium 
* Development, improvement, and pilot-scale testing of chemical separations processes 
(including the bismuth phosphate, metal recovery, Reduction-Oxidation Facility [REDOX] , 
Plutoniuflranium Extraction [PUREX], and others) 
0 Radiochemical, metallurgical, and physics testing to support production reactor operation 
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0 Research and development of processes to extract and/or encapsulate high-heat isotopes 
(i.e., strontium, cesium, cerium, promethium, neptunium) fkom high-level wastes 
0 Early development of waste calcification and vitrification processes 
0 Biological and botanical research, biophysics, and bioassay techniques 
0 Operation of various test reactors 
0 Other research and development activities. 
Although 300 Area activities changed in response to both national needs and the state of nuclear 
technology during this 3 0-year span, the types of waste (contaminated equipment and materials) 
and the family of contaminants (i.e., radionuclides associated with both irradiated and 
unirradiated nuclear hels and chemicals associated with their separatiordextraction processes) 
produced in the 3 00 Area remained relatively constant. 
2.1.2 Changes in Laboratory Wastes 
From 1943 to 1973, each of the six burial grounds addressed in this FHC document had the 
potential to receive wastes fkom any of the 300 Area activities being conducted at the time each 
burial ground was open (see separate burial ground sections for specific time frames). Three 
significant changes to 3 00 Area waste disposal practices during this time span that should be 
noted are: 
. Prior to 1954, fairly small quantities of radioactive wastes generated by radiochemical and 
radiometallurgical tests in the two major 300 Area laboratories (the 321 and 3706 Buildings) 
were disposed of in the 300 Area solid waste burial grounds. 
0 Because of high radiation levels in and near the 61 8-2 Burial Ground, generated by the 325 
and 327 Buildings’ wastes, the 6 1 8- 10 Burial Ground, known as “3 00 North,” opened in 
1954 about 7 km (4.3 mi) northwest of the 300 Area. (WHC 1993). 
The disposal of nearly all 300 Area laboratory wastes was diverted to the 200 Area burial 
grounds by 1968. 
2.2 300-FF-2 QPERABL RIAL GROUNDS 
The 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds (Figure 2-1) are adjacent to (within 200 m of) the Columbia River 
and approximately 3 .O km north of the southern Hanford Site boundary. The 300-FF-2 OU 
includes radioactively and/or chemically contaminated soil, buried waste, and below-ground 
structures (e.g., pipelines and concrete) within and also in close proximity to the 300 Area. 
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Figure 2-1. 300-FF-2 urial Grounds Location. 
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‘ The following sections provide a brief description of each of the burial grounds. Specific 
information about the contents of each of the burial grounds is included in Appendix A. 
Appendix C documents the results of the research conducted to determine the hazardous 
materials inventory for these sites. 
2.2.1 618-1 Burial Ground 
The 618-1 Burial Ground (also known as Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1,318-1) is located in 
the northeast comer of the 300 Area, adjacent to the east side of the 333 Building. It was active 
from 1945 through 195 1 and consists of at least two trenches running north-south that measure 
5 m (16 ft) wide by 61 m (200 ft) long and are 2.4 m (8 ft) deep. The south end of the burial 
ground contains a series of pits that are estimated to be 6.1 m (20 ft) deep and possibly two 
shorter, east-west trenches. The burial ground received waste from early 300 Area facility 
operations, including the 305 Reactor, 3706 Laboratory, and the 3741 Building. The site 
contains uranium, plutonium, and fission products with incidental amounts of additional waste 
from a very small laboratory operation (Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order 
[Tri-Party Agreement] [Ecology et al. 19981). 
Most of the burial ground is marked with yellow, concrete AC-540 markers and a radiation area 
chain. There are five other “Buried Radioactive Material” medallions inserted flush with the 
asphalt pavement along the east side of the 333 Building to mark the western extent of the burial 
ground. In 1998, the burial ground was located within a larger area posted as a Contamination 
Area. Most of the burial ground is covered with gravel, but portions on the south and west sides 
of the burial ground have been paved over with asphalt. 
The 333, 303-M, and 334 facilities were all associated with this burial ground and were 
positioned, at least partially, over this burial ground. The 303-M facility was built over the top 
of the north end of the west trench (Burial Trench 1). The 334 Building, the 334-A Building, 
and the 334 Waste Acid Tanks (aboveground tank farm) are also over a portion of the west side 
of the burial ground. The small sheet metal 303-M Oxide Burner Building, 5 by 7 m 
(1 6 by 24 ft), was placed on a concrete slab in 196 1 over the 61 8-1 Burial Ground. In the 
303-L Building, pyrophoric uranium scraps were burned to an oxide state that would be safe for 
shipment. However, unconventional burning vessels (two cement mixers lined with concrete) 
and poor ventilation soon combined to produce airborne contamination readings that frequently 
exceeded the maximum permissible concentrations for both unrestricted and restricted areas. 
Burning was stopped in 1971 , and the building was removed in 1976. In 1983, the 
303-M Uranium Oxide Facility was constructed on the same site. Hazard categorization and 
remediation planning of these above ground facilities is not within the scope of this document. 
This burial ground is also associated with two acid releases: Waste Information Data System 
(WIDS) Site UPR-300-13 and WIDS Site UPR-300-14. WIDS Site 300-259 (Contaminated Soil 
East of 618-1 Burial Ground) is likely associated with this site as well. 
Other facilities associated with this burial ground include the WIDS Subsite 61 8-1 : 1 (333 East 
Side Heat Treat Salt Storage Area [ESHTSSA]), being immediately adjacent to the 
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burial ground. A waste acid neutralization box (61 8-1 :2, Limestone Neutralization Pit) is also 
located near the south end of the burial ground (see WIDS Site 300-226). The upper wooden 
covers for the Limestone Neutralization Pit have been removed, and the pit has been backfilled 
with soil. It is no longer visible at the surface. The concrete pipe trench branch to the pit is 
visible. The drain line from the concrete pipe trench to the pit was sealed and the neutralization 
pit shut down in 1975 following a large acid spill (WIDS Site UPR-300-14). 
A 1995 ground penetrating radar (GPR) survey (BHI 1995b) identified two or three north-south 
trenches and two east-west disturbances in the south end of the burial ground. The disturbances 
could be a series of pits or a combination of pits and short trenches. This survey also revealed 
several areas containing buried debris. However, surface obstacles (e.g., fences and buildings) 
prevented the clear delineation of all trenches. Older waste site references indicate a series of 
pits in the south end of this burial ground. 
The site reportedly contains large quantities of uranium (-14,500 kg [ 16 tons]) fiom the fuel 
fabrication activities and small quantities of plutonium and fission products fiom laboratory 
operations. It also received some highly contaminated wastes from early 3741 Building 
operations and from the initial cleanout of the 3706 Building during 1946 to 1947. Specific 
items include contaminated gloves, miscellaneous equipment, bronze crucibles, and solid 
laboratory waste. 
Additional waste from unplanned releases (WIDS Site UPR-3 00- 1 3 and UPR-300- 14) from 
facilities that were constructed over the burial ground contributed additional chemicals to the soil 
column as liquid releases. 
2.2.2 618-2 Burial Ground, Solid aste Burial Ground No. 2,318-2 
The 6 18-2 Burial Ground is located just north of 6 18-1 and was active from 195 1 through 1954. 
It consists of three east-west trenches. Most of the contents in this burial ground were destroyed 
by fire on February 17, 1954 (Ecology et al. 1998). 
Before 1954, small quantities of unsegregated radioactive solid wastes, generated mostly by 
radiochemical and radiometallurgical tests in the 321 and 3706 Buildings, were placed in 
300 Area burial grounds. The startup of “hot cell” operations in the 325 and 327 Buildings in 
1953 significantly changed the volume and radioactive material content of 300 Area waste and, 
hence the radiation levels at the 300 Area burial grounds being used for disposal. Hot cell wastes 
included glassware, swipes, equipment parts, and pieces of piping and other structural materials 
contaminated with plutonium, irradiated uranium, and fission products as a result of analytical 
laboratory activities. Engineering judgrnent and process knowledge estimates that 25% of the 
radiological inventory of the hot cell waste was associated with combustible waste and 75% was 
in the form. of contaminated, noncombustible solids. By early 1954, transfers of solid waste 
“chips” from the 327 Buildings hot cells routinely produced readings of several rads per hour 
both during the transfer operation and on the load luggers used for transport to the 61 8-2 and 
61 8-4 Burial Grounds. During the fire that destroyed an estimated 75% of the combustible 
material contents of the 61 8-2 site, a dose rate of 30 m r h  was observed at 3 m (1 0 ft) from 
~ 
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32’7 Building waste, in the southeast corner of this burial ground. According to 300 Area 
Radioactive Liquid Waste Streams Disposal (GE 1954), disposal of high level wastes from 
300 Area laboratory facilities transitioned from the 300 Area trenches (including 61 8-2) to a new 
trench (i.e., 61 8-1 0 Burial Ground) at the 300-N Area in March 1954. This transition was driven 
by the increasing volume and radioactive material content of 300 Area waste and, in all 
likelihood, was hastened by the February 1954 fire within 61 8-2. 
Other deposited forms of waste included uranium-contaminated equipment and solid metallic 
uranium oxides in the form of metal cuttings from reactor fuel fabrication facilities. This burial 
ground also contains “tons” of tin from the triple dip canning process and lead from the lead dip 
process. This site is fenced and posted as an Underground Radioactive Materials site. 
The unit was interim stabilized in 1989 with 0.6 m (2 ft) of clean soil. During interim 
stabilization, two dump truck loads of automotive batteries were discovered. It was decided to 
leave the batteries in place. 
Surface radiological surveys are done annually. In 1994, contaminated Russian thistle was found 
growing in two places on the burial ground. The contamination levels ranged from 20,000 to 
25,000 dpm. The contaminated material was removed. This was the first evidence of a 
contamination “breakthrough” since the area was stabilized in 1989. 
A 1995 GPR survey (BHI 1995b) shows the northernmost trench to be 49 m (1 60 ft) long and 
9 m (30 ft) wide. The southernmost trench is 55 m (1 80 ft) long and 15 m (50 ft) wide. The 
center trench is 54 m (1 75 ft) long and 18 m (60 ft) wide. This geophysical survey also noted 
three high-concentration areas of buried waste in the southern half of the landfill. No major 
concentrations of buried debris were detected in the northern part. 
In December 2004, during remediation of the 61 8-2 Burial Ground (south trench), a deteriorated 
combination safe was discovered and brought to the surface. The safe was damaged during 
excavation and was found to contain several containers of liquids and dry powders. It was later 
determined that (pureheparated) plutonium-23 9 was the predominant radionuclide present in 
each of the containers. Unrelated to the discovery of the safe two days later, two radiological 
control technicians (RCTs) were exposed to airborne plutonium-23 9 while performing surveys in 
the 6 18-2 Burial Ground staging pile area to locate the source of airborne contamination by two 
laborers that were working in the area two days earlier. These events caused the 
US.  Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL) to assess the planning and 
execution of remedial action activities conducted by Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI) at the 6 1 8-2 
Burial Ground. In parallel with the RL assessment activities, BHI performed self-assessments, 
root cause analyses, and developed corrective action plans in response to the RL assessment 
findings. The 300-FF-2 Remedial Action 61 8-2 Self-Assessment Report (BHI 2005d) presents 
the results of the BHI investigation and a detailed response to the RL assessment. The document 
presents the detailed events and specifics about what was found in the burial ground. At the time 
work stopped, it was estimated that 90% of the volume contained in the southern trench had been 
excavated and staged for sorting. The remaining 10% of the volume in the south trench, along 
with the entire volume of the middle and north trenches remained unexcavated at that time. 
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The document also presents a comprehensive evaluation of the 6 1 8-2 Burial Ground inventory 
centered around the presence of separated lutonium, based upon a reevaluation of historical 
summary and historical source documents. The inventory descriptions provided therein 
generally supplement previous inventory descriptions, but supersede previous inventory 
descriptions as related to the presence of plutonium in the 61 8-2 Burial Ground. 
2.2.3 618-3 Burial Ground, Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3,318-3, ry Waste Burial 
Ground No. 3 
The 618-3 Burial Ground was active from 1954 to 1955. The site was primarily used for the 
disposal of uranium waste in the forrn of contaminated building material derived fkom several 
300 Area buildings. It is immediately west of, and adjacent to, the 618-2 Burial Ground, and is 
an expansion of that site. The original surface dimensions were 107 m (350 ft) long by 50 m 
(1 65 ft) wide. In 1954, the 3 13 Building underwent a major remodeling and expansion. At that 
time, much contaminated equipment and other solid wastes from this building and its immediate 
surrounding area and from the 303 warehouses were placed in the 61 8-3 Burial Ground. Wastes 
deposited there included demolition and construction debris, large equipment parts, and 
structural materials resulting from the remodeling of the 3 13, 303-J, and 303-K Buildings and 
from the construction of the 3 1 1 facilities (Ecology et al. 1998). 
During an annual survey in 1983, spotty surface contamination was found in the northwest 
corner of the site. No corrective action was taken at that time. A 15-m (4943) extension to the 
north end of the burial ground has been added to the site. A notation is included on one site 
drawing stating “Extension of Burial Ground, Contaminated material unearthed in vicinity.” 
The unit was interim stabilized in 1989 with 0.6 m (2 ft) of clean soil. The 6 18-3 site currently 
appears as a vegetation-covered area surrounded by a wire fence and 2-m (8-ft) wooden posts. 
The 300 Area perimeter fence bounds its south side. Geophysical investigations (BHI 1995b) 
indicate one continuous, north-south-trending trench, approximately 3 0 m (1 00 ft) wide, 
spanning the length of the enclosed area with continuous areas of debris. 
2.2.4 618-7, Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7, Burial Ground #7,318-7 
The 6 1 8-7 Burial Ground is a vegetation-covered area, with patches of cobbles, surrounded by 
wooden poles and a 2.4-m (8-ft) wire fence. This burial ground operated from 1960 to 1973. A 
locked gate is located on the east side of the fenced area and is posted with Underground 
Radioactive Material signs. The burial ground consists of two east-west-oriented trenches and 
one “V-shaped” pit. Results from the 1995 geophysical investigation (BHI 1995c) provide 
further detailed information. The most southern trench, because of its V-shaped geometry, is 
most likely the V-shaped trench referred to in BHI (1 994) (Ecology et al. 1998). 
The dimensions of this trench are roughly 9 m (30 ft) wide across the top and 137 m (450 ft) 
long. The thickness of fill overlying the buried waste varies from 0.6 to 3 m (2 to 9 ft). The 
middle trench has four square cement monuments that were apparently used to mark its south 
and north boundaries. This trench is the only trench that has such markers. The trench is 
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approximately 30 m (1 00 ft) wide and 158 m (520 ft) long. It contains high concentrations of 
buried waste throughout. The thickness of fill overlying the buried waste varies from 0.6 to 3 rn 
(2 to 9 ft). The most northern trench is very similar in character to the middle trench. It is 
roughly 27 m (90 ft) wide and 162 m (530 ft) long, and also has high concentrations of buried 
debris throughout. The thickness of fill overlying the buried waste varies from 0.6 to 3 m 
(2 to 9 ft). 
Materials buried at this site were primarily from the 321,313,333,3722, and 3732 Buildings. 
Between 1962 and 1973, hundreds of 114-L (30-gal) drums of Zircaloy-2 chips contaminated 
with beryllium and uranium were buried in the trenches. No records were kept to identify the 
exact quantities and locations of these drums. The Zircaloy-2 chips were waste from the process 
of machining the ends of Zircaloy-2 clad fuel elements. They vary in size, but are generally 4 to 
5 mils (0.004 to 0.005 in.) thick and 0.64 cm (0.25 in.) wide. Because the Zircaloy-2 was 
considered pyrophoric, the drums were filled with water to avoid spontaneous combustion. It is 
highly possible the water has leaked out of the drums. Other low-level material, contaminated 
with uranium and thorium, was also buried in the trenches. 
Historical records were researched to write the 61 8-7 integrated hazards evaluation (IHE) (WCH 
2005~). The IHE indicates that the 300 Area processed approximately 150 tons of thoria in each 
of two campaigns, giving a total of 300 tons of thoria. It is anticipated that several drums of 
waste contaminated with thorium oxide (thoria) from the thorium program will be unearthed at 
the 61 8-7 Burial Ground based on the information found during the development of the IHE. 
Thorium nitrate in liquid form was used in experiments in the 300 Area. The liquid thorium 
nitrate may have evaporated leaving behind dried thorium nitrate crystals. The IHE indicates 
that up to four drums of thorium may have been disposed in the 61 8-7 Burial Ground. 
It is assumed that no more than 0.1 % (270 kg) of the total amount processed (300 tons) would 
have been disposed of as waste. Consequently, in addition to the drummed thorium oxide and 
nitrate, the MAR calculation (WCH 2006b) assumed that 0.1% (270 kg) of thorium oxide may 
be present in the 61 8-7 Thoria Pit (243 kg) and Trenches (27 kg) in the form of contaminated soil 
and process equipment. 
The historical research also shows that 5,648-lbs of dep eted uranium were buried in the 61 8-7 
Burial Ground in 1970 (DUN, 1968). 
A surface radiological survey is done annually. The radiological survey conducted with tractor- 
mounted survey equipment during the limited field investigation (DOE-RL 1997) did not 
identify any surface contamination. 
2.2.5 618-8, Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8,318-8, Early Solid Waste Burial Ground 
The 618-8 Burial Ground is reported to be 183 m (600 ft) long, and 30 m (100 ft) wide. It 
reportedly contains uranium and uranium-contaminated solid waste derived from reactor fuel 
manufacturing (Ecology et al. 1998). 
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It appears that this burial ground came into being at about the same time (approximately 1954) 
that the 3 13 Building was expanded to its present size and that it could have been created to 
receive construction debris. This is further confirmed by GPR surveys (BHI 1995a) conducted 
in the area that indicate that construction-type debris are buried here. These surveys did not 
identify a traditional trench configuration for this site. 
The identification of contamination outside the posted boundaries of 61 8-8 led to an 
investigation to determine the nature and extent of contamination in this area. The 1980 
investigation included drilling several test 
radiation surveys, and analysis of soil Sam 
the area north of the established waste site. Contaminated material with levels from 300 to 
1,500 cpm was found in two of the seven holes. 
es, in situ and sample-to-detector measurements, 
. Seven more test pits were dug in June 1987 in 
A parking lot was constructed over the majority of the site. Subsequently, the radiation 
monuments were cut down to grade. Medallions embedded in the asphalt mark the location of 
the burial ground. The original footprint of the burial ground was expanded to the north in 1980. 
Post and chain delineate this area. The site is posted as Underground Radioactive Material. 
Nonintrusive investigations were done as part of the 300-FF-2 OU limited field investigations 
(DOE-RL 1997). A surface radiological survey did not identify any contamination. 
A geophysical investigation (BHI 2002a) was done as part of remedial action design activities to 
finalize the dimensions for contract documents. The results confirmed the results of earlier 
investigations that there is no trench or substantial amounts of buried material within the 
documented area as outlined by the surface monuments. However, there are substantial 
anomalies with the characteristics of buried debris and material in and around the north end of 
the documented trench. The most dominant anomalous zone is a northwest-southeast-trending 
zone immediately north of the pavement that has large amounts of buried metallic debris within 
it that could include storage drums. 
2.2.6 618-13,318-13,303 Building ontamhated Soil Burial Site 
This site consists of a mound of soil approximately 4.6 to 6.1 m (1 5 to 20 ft) high by 3 8 m 
(125 ft) long by 15 m (50 ft) wide, covered with 0.6 m (2 ft) of clean soil. It is located west of 
the 300’Area, across Route 4 South, adjacent to the excavated 618-9 Burial Ground. 
The site was origmally a single-use disposal site for contaminated soil removed from the 
303 Building perimeter in 1950 (Paas 1955). It is believed that this mound of soil later served as 
a safety shield for drums of hexone stored in buildings on the west side of the berm, prior to the 
drums being buried in the 6 18-9 Burial Trench in 1954. A concrete building foundation is still 
present directly west of the mound (Ecology et al. 1998). 
There are railroad tie berms at each of the site’s four corners and along the east side. These 
wooden berm walls are in very poor condition, especially on the east side. The site is posted 
with a “Do Not Disturb, Environmental Test Site’’ warning sign. Carbon steel angle irons 
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protrude fiom the mound on the north side and appear to have once been used as sign posts. On 
the northwest corner, a small, red-handled valve protrudes fiom the mound just inside the 
wooden berm. Adjacent to the west side of the mound is a concrete pad and loading dock. The 
pad and dock were reportedly used for the storage of depleted solvents that were subsequently 
buried in the nearby 61 8-9 Burial Ground. 
Nonintrusive investigations were done as part of the 300-FF-2 OU limited field investigations 
(DOE-RL 1997). A surface radiological survey did not identify any contamination. An 
electromagnetic induction scan (BHI 1995a) done in May 1995 concluded that there were no 
anomalies detected in the mound, suggesting that no debris was present. 
2.3 PROJECT DESC 
The remediation objective for the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds is to remove, treat, and dispose 
hazardous materials to achieve the remedial action goals (EPA 2001). As remediation is 
completed, verification samples will be collected to verify that remedial action goals are met. 
After this verification is complete, the site will be backfilled with clean material. 
2.4 SEGMENTATION 
The six waste sites were previously considered to be five separate facilities for final hazard 
categorization purposes. The distances between the waste sites, except for 61 8-2 and 61 8-3, 
precludes the interaction of the materials in one site fiorn affecting materials in another site. 
Given the proximity of 6 18-2 to 6 18-3, these two sites were considered to be a single facility for 
final hazard categorization purposes. As discussed in BHI 2005c, the 61 8-2 Burial Ground waste 
site has been divided into five segments. Rationalization for the segmentation of the 61 8-2 waste 
site includes the following: 
Geophysical data show horizontal separation between the trenches, approximately 10 ft at the 
surface and increases with depth 
Geophysical data and historical process knowledge of the RARA program indicates at least 
2 ft of previously placed stabilization fill over the trenches and up to approximately 4 to 8 ft 
in certain locations 
The discrete items found in the excavated safe have been stabilized in overpackshpecial 
waste shipping boxes and separated by a minimum of 3 ft per the criticality evaluation 
The 618-2 staging pile material has been stabilized with at least 2 ft of fill material 
The 61 8-7 Burial Ground will be segmented into two segments, the Northern Trenches and the 
Thoria Pit. Each segment of the 6 18-7 Burial Ground has a FHC of less than hazard category 3. 
Geophysical data shows a separation of over 100 ft between the Northern Trenches and the 
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Thoria Pit, allowing for the separation of inventories to preclude bringing the hazardous 
materials together from the two segments. 
Approximately 3 5 to 50 individuals will work on the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Project. Approximately 30 of these individuals are manual workers and 20 are nonmanual support 
personnel. As of 1999, approximately 1,500 prime contractor employees work in the 300 Area. 
An additional 350 enterprise company employees and subcontractors also work in the 300 Area 
(Christensen 1999). 
2.6 SITE FEATURES 
This section contains information on the meteorological and geological characteristics of the 
area. 
2.6.1 Meteorology and 
Temperature extremes vary from -29°C to 46°C (-20°F to 11 5°F) on the Hanford Site (Hoitink et 
al. 2002). Climatological data are available from the Hanford Meteorological Station (HMS) 
(which is located between the 200 East and 200 West Areas on the Hanford Site) and from the 
300 Area meteorological station. The HMS has collected data since 1945. Appendix A states the 
hazards related to heatkold extremes. 
, 
2.6.2 Precipitation 
The mean annual precipitation at the HMS is 16 cm (6.3 in.). Historical data indicate that over a 
period of roughly 80 years, the majority of precipitation has fallen during November, December, 
and January. January is the wettest month, with an average of nearly 100 hours of precipitation, 
producing just over 2.3 cm (0.9 in.) of water. Days with greater than 1.3 cm (0.5 in.) of 
precipitation occur less than 1 % of the year (DOE 1989). Appendix A evaluates water intrusion 
during remediation project activities. Topography within the 300 Area is generally flat, gently 
sloping to the east, with no obvious drainage channels. The flat topography, the lack of well- 
defined drainages, and the arid to semi-arid climate suggest that little (if any) surface water would 
accumulate within the OU (DOE-RL 1 995). Most precipitation is lost through evapotranspiration. 
In addition, the transmissive nature of the surface soils allows rapid infiltration of precipitation. 
Consequently, little water remains to generate surface run-oE. 
2.6.3 Prevailing Winds 
Historical meteorological data collected from the 300 Area Monitoring Station indicate that the 
prevailing winds align themselves with the Columbia River, traveling predominantly from the 
north and northwest. The wind speed averages 10 to 12 km/hr (6 to 8 mph) in winter and 13 to 
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17 h / h r  (8 to 11 mph) in summer. The strongest winds are generally southwesterly, with speeds 
up to 130 krn/hr. More than 90% of the southwesterly winds exceed 30 krn/hr (1 9 mph). The 
daily average wind speed at the 300 Area ranges from 8 to 16 krn/hr (5 to 10 mph). 
High winds are likely to occur during site remediation activities. In the summer, high-speed 
winds from the southwest cause most of the dust storms. There is a remote possibility that high 
winds may also cause airborne missiles (e.g., scrap wood and miscellaneous items at the site). 
Blowing dust occurs at wind speeds higher than 30 km/hr (1 9mph) in areas with limited ground 
cover and low moisture content. An average of eight dust storms per year are recorded at the 
HMS. A storm generally lasts just over 3 hours; however; durations of 18 hours have been 
documented. The maximum wind gust recorded at 15 m (49 fi) above ground surface at the 
HMS was 128 lun/hr (80 mph) (Hoitink et al. 2002). Apeak gust of 138 k m h  (86 mph) was 
calculated with a 100-year return period. The return period for gusts of 11 3 km/hr (70 mph) is 
10 years (Stone et al. 1983). 
2.6.4 Weather Phenomena 
At the Hanford Site, dust storms are a severe weather phenomenon that occur most frequently 
and have the greatest potential effect. 
A severe tornado of the Midwestern type is highly unlikely because of the Pacific Northwest’s 
climatologic and orographic conditions. Only two tornado funnel clouds and one small tornado 
(June 1948) have been observed at the Hanford Site in the 34-year period between 1945 and 
1978. On average, Washington State experiences just over one tornado each year. The 
probability of a tornado striking a point at the Hanford Site is estimated to be 9.6 x 
As stated in the environmental impact statement (DOE 1989), tornadoes are infrequent and 
generally small in the northwest portion of the United States. 
per year. 
Washington State has an annual mean number of thunderstorm days of 10, which is considered to 
be relatively low (IEEE 1991). Thunderstorms occur most frequently from April to September. 
Lightning strikes in the summer occasionally have ignited range fires in the Hanford Site region. 
2.6.5 Hydrologic Des crip tian 
The 300-FF-2 OU is situated within the Columbia River drainage basin. Two major rivers within 
the Columbia River drainage basin border the Hanford Site: the Columbia and Yakima Rivers. 
The 300-FF-2 OU is approximately 120 m above mean sea level (ERDA 1976). 
The maximum historical flood recorded on the unregulated Columbia River occurred on June 7, 
1894. The peak discharge at the Hanford Site was about 22,653 m3/s (29,629 yd3/s), which is the 
best available estimate for the 100-year flood (i.e., the maximum flood event during a 100-year 
period is 21,238 m3/s (27,778 yd3/s) for unregulated flow below Priest Rapids Dam). The largest 
recent flood occurred in 1948 and had an observed peak of 19,595 m3/s (25,629 yd3/s) at the 
Hanford Site. The Grand Coulee Dam and other upstream dams may reduce major flood flows at 
the Hanford Site by as much as 19% to 43%. 
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As discussed in the Phase 111 Feasibility Study Report for the 300-FF-I Operable Unit 
(DOE-RL 1995), a scenario was evaluated that represented flood discharge that may be expected 
from the most severe combination of meteorological and hydrological conditions that are 
reasonably possible for the region. The scenario evaluated a flow of 40,776 m3/s (53,333 yd3/s) 
(ERDA 1976). The water level from this scenario at the 300 Area would be 116 m (381 ft) above 
mean sea level, which is located outside the probable maximum flood (PMF) plain. Figure 2-2 
shows what areas of the southeastern portion of the Hanford Site this scenario would affect and 
represents the PMF. 
Various studies were published during the 1950s to 1970s documenting engineering analyses of 
the dams upriver from the Hanford Site and the consequences from Uniform Building Code 
(UBC) Zone I1 (ICBO 1997) and postulated design basis earthquakes (ERDA 1976). Studies 
were conducted to determine the effects of damage to the Grand Coulee Dam. Results showed 
that the consequences would not be sufficient to cause flow greater than the PMF. The 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has evaluated other flooding scenarios, specifically a flood caused 
by a catastrophic 25% and 50% failure of the Grand Coulee Dam. In the case of a 25% breach of 
the Grand Coulee Dam, several facilities at the Hanford Site could be affected, including most of 
the 300 Area. 
At the 300 Area, the flood level would be approximately 125 m (410 ft) above mean sea level, 
leaving the 300 Area under approximately 6 m (20 ft) of water (ERDA 1976). 
2.6.6 Geology and Seismology 
The Hanford Site lies within the Columbia Intermontane Province, which is bordered on the 
north and east by the Rocky Mountains, on the west by the Cascade Range, and on the south by 
the Basin and Range Province. The dominant geological characteristics of the Columbia 
Intermontane Province have resulted from flood basalt volcanism and deformation processes. 
The Hanford Site is in a Zone 2b, as defined by the UBC (ICBO 1997). Earthquake records for 
the Pacific Northwest extend to the 1850s. A network of seismographs was installed on the 
Columbia Plateau in 1969 (DOE 1989). Seismic activity and related phenomena are not 
anticipated to result in significant radiological consequences to workers and the public from the 
3 00-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation Project because of the low energy of anticipated seismic 
activity and the form and distribution of the hazardous substances. 
The stratigraphic record in the Pasco Basin suggests that tephra is the only primary product of 
Cascade Range volcanism that may reach the Pasco Basin during the next 10,000 years. During 
the May 18, 1980, eruption of Mount St. Helens, about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash was deposited at 
the HMS tower. In the first 9 hours following the eruption, about 1 mm (0.04 in.) of 
uncompacted ash was recorded at the Columbia Generating Station meteorological station. The 
Hanford Site was not in the main path of the ash cloud. 
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2.6.7 Adjacent Facili 
It is unlikely that any accidents specific to facilities outside of the 300-FF-2 (e.g., explosions and 
spills) will impact the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds MAR due to significant distances between this 
OU and surrounding facilities. The most probable impacts would be a release of inventory from 
a nearby facility due to an accident or a fire. No activities are being carried out at the 300-FF-2 
Burial Grounds that would be adversely impacted if an evacuation were required. A release of 
inventory from a nearby facility would not interact with the MAR at the remediation site to result 
in new accident scenarios. Based on the above discussion, no significant adverse impacts on the 
remediation site would occur from other projects within the Hanford Site. 
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PERATIONS 
The following sections describe the project activities that will be needed to remediate the burial 
grounds. These activities are potential sources of energy that could interact with the hazardous 
substances at the burial grounds. 
3.1 PROJECT AC 
The remediation of the 300-FF-2 Burial Ground waste sites involves the removal, treatment (as 
necessary), and disposal (at the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility [ ERDF], as 
baseline) of residual Contamination that does not meet established remedial action goals. 
Remediation projects include three distinct phases: mobilization, operations, and 
demobilizatiodcloseout. Although this FHC document is primarily concerned with the 
identification and evaluation of radiological and chemical hazards associated with the operations 
phase, the mobilization phase introduces potential energy sources that impact the operations 
phase. 
Prior to commencement of the remediation work, Washington Closure Hanford's (WCH's) scope 
includes the following: 
Complete necessary authorizations and permits 
Provide design and subcontract documents as basis for competitive bidding and performance 
of the remediation work, incorporating requirements of authorizations and permits 
0 Manage the awarded subcontractor and work during remediation, to include evaluation of 
specific means and methods proposed by the subcontractor, and manage change. 
Previous characterization and process and historical knowledge associated with the individual 
waste sites are adequate for purposes of bounding inventory and hazard categorization. As 
materials are excavated, the observational approach, in-process field screening, and laboratory 
testing will be performed for purposes of worker health and safety, verifying waste designation, 
and planning for site closeouts. By procedure and program requirements, WCH is obligated to 
the IHC/FHC evaluation process relative to AB and hazard categorization in the event of 
changed conditions during remediation. 
Existing programs, procedures, and qualified representatives in the areas of Radiological 
Controls and Health and Safety will be assigned to the project in current planning and fkture 
remediation work to ensure worker and public health and safety and protection of the 
environment. 
A "  
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The following description is provided to assist the reader in understanding the overall project and 
the construction of the hazard identification and evaluation presented in this document. 
3.2 MOBIL 
Mobilization typically includes the establishment of infiastructure that is needed to support the 
conduct of remediation, such as the following: 
Construction of access or haul roads 
Installation or relocation of electrical utilities (may include diesel- or gasoline-fueled 
electrical generators) 
Inst all ation of personnel changmglsho w er/p ersonal protective equipment, lunchroom, and 
administrative facilities (typically portable trailers), and weigh station 
Siting of radiological survey tent (possibly including propane heaters and small propane 
storage tanks), decontamination facility, container transport area (CTA), Area of 
Contamination (AOC) boundary, contaminated material staging pile area (including run- 
odrun-off control), and clean overburden storage pile areas 
Staging of earthrnoving or other heavy equipment (including water trucks) and diesel, and 
gasoline fuel storage tankshefueling area 
Staging of maintenance equipment, including lubricating oils, hydraulic fluids, flammable 
material storage aredcabinets, and welding and cutting torch cylinder storage areas 
Establishing radiologicalhygiene monitoring areas (air monitors, portal monitors, step off 
pads, boundaries, posting) 
Establishing sample storage areas 
Obtaining excavation perrnit in accordance with Hanford Site procedures. 
3.3 OPERATIONS 
Operations typically include the following activities: 
Removal and stockpiling of noncontaminated overburden. 
Excavation of burial ground debris and contaminated soils, gravel, cobbles. 0 
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Active excavation (generally conducted on one trench or one pit at any given time). Under 
normal conditions, the remediation of a particular area (such as trench or pit) is completed 
prior to commencing excavation of another trench or pit. If excavation activities are 
suspended in a given area due to unknown drumslcontainers, excavation work may be 
initiated at another location. 
Segregation of debris fiom soils/gravel/cobbles (through use of mechanical manipulators, 
screens, hand sorting, magnetic sorting, conveyor beltlscreening, or dump pile methods). 
Segregation and temporary stockpilingktaging of different waste streams, such as different 
colored soils (that may indicate presence of hazardous materials), construction debris ( e g ,  
wood, concrete, roofing, structural materials), contaminated metal (such as equipment), soil 
mixed with soft waste (e.g., paper, plastic) in centralized or discrete areas. 
Treatment or stabilization of waste as required using low energy methods such as adding 
grout, sand, oil or water. 
Sampling of waste stream materials; sampling, handling, packaging, and transporting 
samples conducted under existing environmental, sampling, and transportation programs. 
Application of water or fixatives to stockpiles and excavation areas (including clean 
overburden and gravel roadways) to prevent dust emissions and spread of contamination. 
Size reduction of wastes (i.e., by use of hydraulic shears, cutting torches, grinders, snippers, 
wire saws , mechanical disassembly). 
Volume reduction of wastes (i.e., compaction or crushing). 
Periodic or continuous health and safety monitoring activities as required (health and safety 
plan, radiological protection program), posting, labeling. 
Installation of barricades or radiological shielding, as required. 
Loading waste materials into ERDF containers or other approved packaging for 
transportation and disposal of waste. 
Designating, classifying waste for U. S . Department of Transportation, placarding for 
transport in accordance with waste management and transportation programs. 
Staging of empty and full ERDF containers in CTA. 
Performing radiological surveys and decontamination of ERDF containers (and remediation 
equipment) as needed. 
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Performing geophysical surveys @e., GPR, conductivity), potholing, or slit trenching to 
determine/confirrn presence or absence of debris or contamination. 
Performing evaluations of remediation activities (i.e., potential impacts to proximate 
structures/structural evaluations). 
Location and inactivation of underground utilities, sealing, plugging, or rerouting of piping. 
Post-remediation borehole drilling as necessary to gather data to determine compliance with 
remedial action goals, or gather data for performing RESidual RADioactivity (RESRAD) 
calculations. 
Periodic maintenance and repair of remediation equipment and facilities (generally outside 
AOC, but may be required in AOC [including welding]). 
Backfilling remediated waste sites, regradinghecontouring, revegetation (or other appropriate 
cover such as gravel for future industrial use). 
Typical remediation operations are anticipated to fill 25 or more ERDF containers per day. 
Fixatives will be applied to contaminated soils and debris that will be inactive more than 24 
hours. 
Fixatives will be applied to contaminated soils and debris that will be inactive less than 24 
hours at the end of work operations, if the sustained wind speed is predicted overnight to be 
greater than 32 km/hr (20 mph). 
3.4 DEMO ILIZATIONKLOS 
This activity essentially involves the reverse of the mobilization phase of the project, and the 
hazards associated with the activity are comparable to the hazards of the mobilization phase. 
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Based on the results of WCH (2005a) and WCH (2006b), the total radionuclide inventory of each 
of these sites exceeds the DOE-STD-1027 Category 3 TQ and was assigned a preliminary hazard 
categorization of Category 3. Consequently, a hazard analysis and FHC were performed to 
determine if a FHC of below Category 3 could be established based on the credible release 
Eractions in accordance with NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002). Based on the results of WCH (2005a) 
and BHI (2005c), there were chemicals that exceeded the RQs, however, there were no 
chemicals that exceeded the TQs. This section presents the hazard identification, hazard 
evaluation, and FHC for the remediation of six burial grounds. 
4.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
The objective of the hazard identification process is to provide a basis fkom which to analyze the 
hazards associated with a facility. To achieve this objective, the hazard identification process 
must address the following: 
Characteristics of the inventory of hazardous substances in the facility 
Sources of energy inside the facility capable of interacting with those inventories 
Sources of energy outside the facility capable of interacting with those inventories 
Nonroutine hazards unique to the facility. 
0 
0 
4.1.1 Research 
A number of historical records were obtained and reviewed to identify specific qualitative and 
quantitative information regarding the contents of the burial grounds. Relevant information 
resulting fkom this review was documented in the individual burial ground hazard identification 
tables presented in Appendix A. Because records indicated the presence of Zircalo y-2 metal 
chips at the 61 8-7 Burial Ground, additional research was done regarding the machining 
processes that created these wastes, which is also reflected in Appendix A. 
Subsequent to the approval of Rev. 0 of the predecessor of this FHC document (BHI 2003a), 
additional research and analysis was completed for the 61 8-2 Burial Ground in order to provide 
sufficient basis to discount an inventory record identifying 2,000 curies of beta radioactivity 
within the 6 18-2 site in 1986. The inventory record in question reported 2,000 curies of beta 
without a corresponding inventory of other fission products (e.g., Cs-137) or nuclear materials 
(e.g., irradiated uranium, plutonium). This is inconsistent with wastes disposed from uranium 
fuel fabrication and/or irradiated uranium fuel wastes from analytical laboratories in the 300 
Area between 195 1 and 1954. Most of the additional research and analysis is documented in 
618-2 Burial Ground Spent Fuel Inventoy Calculation Based on Waste Disposal Data (BHI 
2004a) and 61 8-2 Exposure Rate per Mass ofFuel Calculation (BHI 2004b). 
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BHI (2004a) documents the review of waste disposal Radiation Survey Records (RSRs) and 
Special Work Perrnit (SWP) records found for the 300 Area covering the period from 1951 to 
1954. These records document the shipment of waste from 300 Area facilities to the 300 Area 
burial grounds and include dose rate information for the items being disposed. BHI (2004a) also 
estimates the beta inventory for the 6 18-2 Burial Ground circa 1986 assuming the beta 
radioactivity is due to long-lived fission products associated with irradiated (spent) uranium fuel 
residues from analytical laboratory waste disposed in the burial ground. The beta inventory was 
estimated using dose rate information collected from the RSRs/SWPs and the results of BHI 
(2004b), which determined the exposure rate per gram of spent fuel based on previously run 
ORIGEN2 model results. The ORIGEN2 model calculates the activity (i.e., curies) present 
within typical spent fuel produced at Hanford 
decay time. 
ng the 1951-54 time period as a function of 
Research of declassified historical documents also produced several documents addressing 300 
Area radioactive liquid waste disposal activities that provide additional insight into the 
magnitude (i.e., curie quantity) of laboratory waste in the 300 Area in the 1953-54 time period. 
The document providing the most insight is GE (1 954). While this document specifically 
addresses liquid waste, it is understood from process knowledge that the liquid waste originated 
primarily from analytical laboratory activities involving radioactive metals (e.g. , irradiated fuel 
elements). Consequently, infomation about the magnitude of solid waste in the 300 Area can be 
directly correlated to the magnitude of liquid waste. It is important to note again, as was done in 
Section 2.2.2, that GE (1954) indicates that the 300 Area “trenches” did not receive high level 
wastes after March 1954. A new “trench” at 300-N Area @.e., the 618-10 Burial Ground) was 
opened in March 1954 to receive this waste, while the 300 Area “trenches” received only 
uranium. 
Table 4 of GE (1 954) summarizes the volume and radioactive content of moderately 
contaminated liquid waste from the 300 Area laboratories for the time period of July 1953 to July 
1954. The data in Table 4 show that total beta activity associated with this waste stream in 1953 
was about 7.2 x 1 0-3 curies. In March of 1954, the last month that the 61 8-2 Burial Ground was 
used for disposal of high radioactive content waste, about 7.8 x 
associated with this waste stream. In April 1954 the beta activity associated with this waste 
stream was about 3.2 curies, an increase of greater than a factor of four hundred compared to 
March. The average concentration of beta activity in this waste stream increased from 6.2 x 
microcuries/milliliter in March 1954 to 3.4 x 1 Om2 microcuries/milliliter in April 1954. Table 4 
reports beta concentration and total activity values for May, June and July 1954 similar to those 
of April 1954. Additional data provided by Disposal of Radioactive Liquid Wastes from 300 
Area Laboratory Facilities (GE 1960) indicate that by late 1958 the beta activity associated with 
this liquid waste stream had increased to a level of about 100 curies per month. These data 
reflect the increased laboratory activity in the 300 Area in the mid to late 1950’s, well after the 
6 1 8-2 Burial Ground stopped receiving wastes. 
curies of beta activity was 
Considering the above information and analyses, it is apparent that the beta activity associated 
with 300 Area waste was relatively small while the 61 8-2 Burial Ground was receiving high- 
level waste. The radioactive material content of the 300 Area waste increased by orders of 
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magnitude after the 61 8-2 Burial Ground stopped receiving high level waste. This provides 
additional support for concluding that the inventory record reporting 2,000 curies of beta within 
61 8-2 circa 1986 is incorrect. 
300 Area operations and solid waste disposal practices were reviewed for the approximate 
30-year period during which the six burial grounds were receiving wastes, to identify waste 
streams that could be encountered during remediation. 
Historical document reviews identified inventories of hazardous substances that may be 
encountered in contaminated soils, solids, or drumdcontainers to a limited extent. Data were 
available from the remediation of the 61 8-4 Burial Ground, which also received 300 Area wastes 
in this time frarne. The use of 61 8-4 data was evaluated for application to these six burial 
grounds, and was judged appropriate based on the discussion provided in Section 4.1.2. The 
estimated inventories (based on 6 1 8-4 data) of contaminated soils and drums/containers for each 
burial ground are documented in the hazard identification tables. Supplemental inventory data 
for 61 8-2 hot cell waste are identified in calculation 0300X-CA-N0016, Rev. 0, 618-2 
Supplemental Radionuclide Inventory Estimate (BHI 2003b). 
Interviews were also conducted with remediation personnel to identify hazards (e.g., 
flammable/combustible liquids) and equipment that would be introduced to conduct remediation. 
This inforrnation was also captured in the hazard identification tables. 
4.1.2 Inventory 
The inventories of hazardous materials (based on historical records, estimates from 6 1 8-4 data, 
and discussions with remediation personnel as described above) are presented in Appendix A. 
61 8-13 is considered to contain only contaminated soil. Four of the other waste sites (61 8-1, 
618-3, 618-7, and 618-8) are assumed to have a mixture of soil, drums, and debris. For 618-2 
there is a supplemental inventory associated with hot cell waste. [Note: The hot cell waste 
referred to is irradiated uranium fuel waste resulting from analytical laboratory work in the 
300 Area.] This is in addition to the other calculated inventories associated with soilldrums. The 
activity associated with hot cell waste was in tially estimated based on dose rate data reported for 
the February 1954 fire that destroyed a major portion of the 6 18-2 site contents. This estimate is 
documented in BHI (2003b). BHI (2004a), using the results from BHI (2004b), also estimated 
part of the inventory (i.e., uranium, plutonium, and total beta) associated with this waste stream 
based on dose rate inforrnation on items disposed in the burial ground. The estimated inventories 
using these two approaches are in close agreement, with both estimating a current total beta 
inventory of less than 2 curies. For 61 8-2 there is no other calculated debris inventory (see 
Appendix D for details). 
Small volumes of contaminated, non-combustible liquids have been discovered in two (6 1 8-2 
and 61 8-3) of the burial grounds during remediation. As a result, MOC-2005-0002 and 
MOC-2005-0011 (BHI 2005a, 2005b) have been completed to evaluate the presence of liquids at 
618-2,618-3, 618-7, 618-8, and 618-13. 
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4.1.2.1 Use of 618-4 Soil and Drum Data. In 1997, action was taken to remediate the 
61 8-4 Burial Ground (which was operational from 1955 to 196 1). During its remediation, 
contaminated soils, debris, and drums were excavated, sampled, and subsequently disposed. As 
noted above, both the waste types and the family of contaminants produced in the 300 Area 
remained relatively constant during the 30-year span that the 300 Area solid waste burial grounds 
were in operation. This FHC document uses the 618-4 soil and drum data (Appendix D) to 
estimate the inventories of contaminated soils and drumskontainers for the six burial grounds of 
this FHC document. The use of the data is judged appropriate for the reasons explained below. 
Soil: The peak concentration for each contaminant present in 61 8-4 soil was used to establish a 
bounding soil contamination concentration profile for application to the five of the six burial 
grounds. Site-specific soil concentrations were used for 61 8-8. This bounding profile was then 
used to estimate the inventories of contaminated soils that would be present at the six burial 
grounds, based on volume of materials to be remediated. Except for 61 8-1 3 and 61 8-2,67% of 
the waste volume is assumed to be contaminated soil. The use of a profile based on 61 8-4 data 
(which operated from 1955 to 1961) for estimating inventories at the six burial grounds (which 
operated at various periods between 1943 and 1973) is appropriate for the following reasons: 
The 61 8-4 Burial Ground received wastes during a period of significant defense mission 
activity in the 300 Area. 
All of the above-noted missions were being conducted during 61 8-4 operation, producing 
solid wastes for disposal at 61 8-4. 
General descriptions of the waste materials received at the six burial grounds addressed in 
this FHC document are consistent with the description of materials disposed at 61 8-4. 
0 'WHC-MR-0388 (WHC 1992) reflects ongoing activities to modify, replace, or maintain process 
equipment, indicating each burial ground would receive contaminated equipment and materials. 
0 Use of peak concentrations to establish a bounding concentration profile is conservative. 
Soil concentration data reflected in this FHC document were taken from a previous calculation 
(BHI 2001) that increased the peak concentrations of radionuclides identified by the 61 8-4 
laboratory analysis by a factor of 2.5 to establish a bounding case. The 61 8-4 uranium oxide 
powder and uranium metal drum inventories used in this FHC document were the maximum 
concentrations identified from laboratory analysis for the 61 8-4 drums. The total number of 
drums assumed at the 61 8-4 Burial Ground exceeded the actual excavated number of drums by 
about a factor of two. However, the higher assumed number was used to develop the estimates 
for these six burial grounds. 
For 61 8-2 it is assumed that 100% of the waste site volume is contaminated soil. The hot cell 
solid waste is conservatively assumed to not decrease the volume of contaminated soil. 
Approximately 19 % of the hot cell inventory is associated with the soil. This is a calculated 
value from the assumption that 25% of the initial inventory was associated with contaminated 
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combustibles, of which 75% was consumed during the burial ground fire and became part of the 
soil matrix (BHI 2003b). This inventory is added to the soil inventory. 
Drums: Although historical records do not indicate the presence of uranium powder or uranium 
metal chips at any of the six burial grounds, records do indicate that drums of Zircaloy-2 chips 
were buried at 618-7, and WHC-MR-0388 (WHC 1992) does mention transfer of solid waste 
“chips” to the 6 1 8-2 Burial Ground. 
The 6 1 8-7 Burial Ground integrated hazards evaluation (WCH 2005c) indicates that experiments 
were done in the 300 Area with a thorium nitrate-tetra hydrate (Th(N03)4-4H20) solution to 
calcine the thorium nitrate into thorium oxide. The thorium nitrate solution was shipped to 
Hanford in 55-gallon drums. 
from the experiments in the 321 Building and that these drums may have been buried in the 
61 8-7 Burial Ground. It is probable that by now the nitrate solution has corroded through the 
sealed drums and leaked into the soil. If the solution has not corroded through the drums, then 
there is a possibility of finding liquid thorium nitrate solution. Some of the buried drums may 
contain thorium oxide. 
he IHE indicates that up to four 55-gallon drums were left over 
For five of the six waste sites, it was assumed that drums would be found; 61 8- 1,618-2,6 18-3, 
and 61 8-8 were assumed to contain a number of drums having uranium chips, black uranium 
oxide powder, and yellow uranium oxide powder in proportion to the area of the 61 8-4 Burial 
Ground. For the 61 8-7 waste site, 90% of the drums were assumed to contain Zircaloy-2 chips, 
and 10% of the drums were assumed to contain uranium powders or chips (Appendix D) with an 
additional four drums of thorium. 
For 6 18-1 3 Burial Ground, no drums were assumed. The 61 8-1 3 waste site does not have the 
same physical configuration as the other sites that were assumed to contain drums. The 61 8-1 3 
site consists of a large mound of soil. 
Use of the estimated number of uranium powder and uranium metal chip drums and the 
inventory of these drums, based on actual numbers excavated from 61 8-4, is appropriate because 
the uranium enrichments used in the fabrication of production reactor fuels did not significantly 
change during the 1943 to 1973 time frame. Uranium powder drum contents may consist of 
black or yellow oxides. The black uranium oxide values are higher than the yellow oxide; 
therefore, all uranium powder values use the inventory for the black uranium oxide forrn. Use of 
the estimated number of Zircaloy-2 drums is consistent with records regarding the numbers of 
drums (i.e., “hundreds”) that were buried in 61 8-7. Assuming the radionuclide inventory of the 
Zircalo y-2 drums is negligible is consistent with historical records indicating the presence of 
“slight contamination.” A summary of the four drum types, and their assumed contents, is 
presented in Table 4-1. 
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Drum Drum Drum 
Type3 Type4 Type5 
138 0 0 
Table 4-1. Summary of Assumed Num er of Drums by Type and Burial Ground. 
6 18-2 
6 18-3 
Waste Site 
Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 
Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 
170 
228 
I 618-1 I Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 I 179 
52 
20 
176 0 0 
66 773 4 I 618-7 I Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 I 863 
I 618-8 I Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 I 118 
I 61 8-13 I Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 I 0 
41 I 131 I 0 I 0 
27 I 9 1  I O  I O  
Drum Type 1 = black uranium oxide powder 
Drum Type 2 = yellow uranium oxide powder 
Drum Type 3 = uranium metal chips in oil 
Drum Type 4 = Zircaloy-2 metal chips 
Drum Type 5 = thorium dr-urns 
4.1.2.2 Noncombustible Debris Inventory. Debris will be managed in accordance with the 
programmatic controls discussed in Section 5.3. For waste sites other than 618-13 and 618-2, 
there is assumed to be 33 % debris (by volume) associated with the waste site. Ten percent of 
the debris is assumed to be combustible and 90% is assumed to be non-combustible. This means 
that 30% of the total inventory is non-combustible debris. For 618-2,75 % of the hot cell 
inventory is assumed to be associated with noncombustible waste. 
A waste tracking form will be used by the project to track solid waste materials that have been 
excavated froin the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds. Other than the four types of waste drums 
identified in the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds, the majority of anomalous waste generally consists of 
sinal1 pieces of contaminated solid waste (e.g., glass, plastic, metal shavings, transite, panels, and 
fabric). This solid waste is typically screened, packaged, and removed from the site as it is 
found. 
4.1.2.3 Combustible 
received combustible materials associated with laboratory waste, packaging, or personal 
protective equipment. As discussed previously, 10% of the debris is assumed to be combustible, 
which equates to 3% of the total inventory. For 6 18-2 it is assumed that approximately 6% of 
the hot cell inventory is associated with the remaining combustible material. 
nventory. Other than 61 8-1 3, all of the waste sites may have 
4.1.3 Hazards Identified 
The hazard types that could affect the inventory of hazardous substances associated with the 
300-FF-2 sites are tabulated by individual burial ground in Appendix A. The 61 8-7 hazard 
identification table was reviewed during the hazard evaluation workshop that was attended by 
DOE and contractor personnel. The workshop participants agreed that the 61 8-7 hazard 
identification table was representative of the other five burial grounds. 
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Ammonia is the only non-radioactive hazardous substance identified for the burial grounds that 
has listed threshold quantities in either 29 CFR 191 0.1 19, Appendix A, or 40 CFR 68.130, 
Table 1. The maximum inventory of ammonia in any of the burial grounds is more than two 
orders of magnitude- below either of the threshold quantities. In addition, the ammonia (and 
other non-radionuclide hazardous substances) is dispersed throughout the soil matrix. 
Consequently, no further evaluation of the hazards associated with non-radionuclide hazardous 
substances is necessary. 
4.2 HAZARD EVALUATION 
This section presents the evaluation of hazards associated with the remediation of the burial 
grounds and the internal, external, and natural phenomenon hazard events that could lead to a 
potential release. The hazard evaluation process involved the identification of initiating events, 
development of a description of event, and assignment of unmitigated frequency, consequence, 
and risk rankings in accordance with the guidance of Engineering Guide 0000X-EG-0004. The 
hazards evaluation also identified Structures, Systems, and Components and administrative 
controls that would prevent or mitigate releases of hazardous substances. 
The hazard evaluation was reviewed by a multi-disciplinary team of DOE and contractor 
personnel at a meeting on February 19,2003. The minutes of that meeting are documented in 
BHI (2003~). Appendix B reflects the hazard evaluation with these changes incorporated. Based 
on the assigned risk rankings (all were ranked IV) and the guidance of the Engineering Guide, 
none of the events merited additional hazards evaluation from a risk perspective. In addition, all 
of the events identified were assessed as having negligible consequences to the public and the 
workers. 
The team identified the high wind, drops, and fire events as the initiating events that were likely 
to result in the most significant consequences to the public, workers, or environment. The 
unmitigated releases that would result fiom these events were assessed to bound potential 
unmitigated releases from all other types of events. The FHC is based on comparison of the 
facility inventory to TQs adjusted to reflect the airborne release fractions due to the stresses 
associated with entrainment, shock-impact, and combustion. 
4.3 FINAL AZARD CATEG 
The FHC for the remediation of the burial grounds was established based on an evaluation of the 
unmitigated consequences of three events: high wind, drops, and fire. 
The FHC was established using the adjusted TQ approach described in the DOE’S Office of 
Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy, Nuclear Safety Technical Position (NSTP 2002-2) entitled 
Methodology for  Final Hazard Categorization for Nuclear Facilities from Category 3 to 
Radiological (DOE 2002). The basis for adjusting the TQs and the FHC calculation is 
documented in WCH (2005b) for the 618-1 and 618-3 Burial Grounds; WCH (2006a) for the 
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61 8-7,618-8, and 61 8-1 3 Burial Grounds; and BHI (2005g) and BHI (2005h) for the 
618-2 Burial Ground. The sum of the ratios value for each of the facilities is as follows: 
618-1 2.78 E-01 
6 1 8-216 1 8-3 
61 8-7 
9.60 E-01 (for the bounding segment) 
8.55 E-01 (for the bounding segment) 
618-8 1.94 E-01 
618-13 3.87 E-03 
Therefore, the FHC for each facility addressed in this FHC document is “Below Category 3.” 
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5.0 CONTROLS AND C ~ M I T ~ E N ~ S  
5.1 SPECIAL CONTROLS 
Special controls are derived fi-om the assumptions made in the FHC that are required to ensure 
the FHC remains valid. The adjusted TQ approach used to establish the FHC depends on the 
material forms considered, the inventory of each material form assumed in the analysis, and the 
defined facility Segments. Accordingly, the following special controls are established: 
The waste forms encountered at these sites are limited to contaminated soil, miscellaneous 
contaminated combustible and non-combustible solids, including depleted uranium scrap or 
slugs (except for 618-13), miscellaneous liquids (except for 618-l), drums of uranium oxide 
(except for 61 8-1 3), drums containing uranium tailings and oil (except 61 8-1 3), drums 
containing thorium nitrate (6 1 8-7 only), drums containing thorium oxide (6 1 8-7 only), drums 
of depleted uranium scrap (61 8-7 only) and drums containing Zircaloy-2 (61 8-7 only). 
The inventory of each waste form is less than the inventory assumed by the Final Hazard 
Categorization. 
The 618-7 Burial Ground waste site will be divided into two segments: 
- Segment 1 , 6 18-7 Northern Trenches (two trenches) 
- Segment 2,618-7 Thoria Pit 
The 618-2 Burial Ground waste site will be divided into five segments: 
- Segment 1 , 61 8-2 Staging Pile Materials 
- Segment 2, Remainder of 61 8-2 Southern Trench 
- Segment 3,618-2 Middle Trench 
- Segment 4,618-2 Northern Trench 
- Segment 5 ,  Existing exhumed "safe" in a shipping box; and overpacked "safe" contents, 
and "cups" fiom the staging pile area discovered in the 61 8-2 Burial Ground waste site 
Work being conducted in any 300-FF-2 segment will meet the following requirements: 
- More than one segment may be worked simultaneously provided that (a) the exposed 
material fi-om each segment is kept segregated by physical barriers and (b) the sum of the 
ratios of the adjusted threshold quantities for exposed material from all segments is less 
than that of the bounding segment of the waste site (see Section 4.3, Final Hazard 
Categorization). Once the material for a segment has been stabilized (e.g., by the 
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application of 1 ft  of overburden, a soil fixative, or an equivalent method), it is no longer 
considered exposed materi a1 . 
- Discrete items associated with a segrnent may be stabilized by placing the item in a 
covered nonflammable storage container (e.g. steel drum overpack special waste box, 
13-25 box) and placed in a storage area away fiom other work activities (e.g., excavation 
of a waste site, sorting and loading activities in the staging areas) 
- Initiation of work on individual segrnents or switching work activities between segrnents 
will be performed only upon authorization by WCH via subcontract limited notice(s) to 
proceed, with concurrence fiom the WCH Field Remediation Project, 300-FF-2 Project 
Engineer, or delegate. 
- There is no specific order in which segrnents need to be remediated. 
- Until material is transported offsite for disposal, the material will remain material at risk 
for that segrnent (unless the material has been stabilized). 
- No other waste sites or facilities (addressed in this FHC document ) located east of 
highway 240 using the same sortinglstaging area as 61 8-2 will be remediated while a 
6 1 8-2 segrnent is being remediated (this precludes inventories fi-om different waste sites, 
facilities, or segrnents comingling in the 6 1 8-2 sortinghtaging area. 
- During remediation, the radiological inventory of a site will be tracked and compared to 
that site’s bounding segrnent inventory. Changes will be managed/evaluated through the 
IHC/FHC evaluation process, and self-authorized up to the bounding segment’s limit for 
the adjusted TQ sum of the ratios. 
- Multiple waste sites can be remediated simultaneously. However, material from different 
waste sites shall not be mixed and will be maintained in separated stockpiles marked by 
physical boundaries such as rope or temporary fencing. 
The following Field Verification Requirements are required for safes and containers: 
1. Each safe discovered shall be separated by at least 3 ft edge-to-edge from all other potential 
accumulations of fissionable materials exceeding 1 g. After characterization, a safe may be 
handled without further criticality safety controls only if the sum of the fiactions of the 
Threshold Screening Limits is less than one. 
2. Single containers with potential fissionable materials other than safes, or multiple containers 
in a single handling event whose contents do not exceed 4.5 L in volume, may be 
approached, handled, and if elected or required to do so by the project, crushed remotely and 
the absorbent material sampled, or solidified for stabilization and subsequent disposition. 
After characterization, the crushed containers and absorbent may be handled without further 
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3. 
criticality safety controls only if the sum of the fractions of the Threshold Screening Limits is 
less than one. 
Single containers with potential fissionable materials whose contents may exceed 4.5 L 
(other than safes) or multiple containers whose contents may exceed 4.5 L in a single 
handling event shall be separated by at least 3 ft edge-to-edge fi-om all other potential 
accumulations of fissionable materials exceeding 1 g. After separation, review and consult 
with the Criticality Safety Engineer or designee to provide recommendations for handling the 
segregated container or containers. 
If conditions are encountered that do not meet any of these criteria, they shall be treated as 
discoveries under the IHC/FHC evaluation process described in Section 5.3.5. 
FIC CONTROLS 
Proj ect-specific controls are established for the protection of workers that apply specifically to 
the activity under consideration. These controls are derived from the hazard evaluation and 
engineering judgment. Based on the hazard evaluation, the following proj ect-specific controls 
have been identified: 
Noncombustible overpacks will be used for deteriorated drumskontainers of liquids or 
pyrophoric solids. 
Overpacks used for drums of pyrophoric material will be filled with blanketing or stabilizing 
material (e.g., sand, water, grout) to prevent exposure to air. 
Noncombustible materials (e.g., pallets) will be used for staging drumskontainers of liquids 
or pyrophoric solids. 
Staging areas for drumslcontainers of flammable liquids will be protected on all sides by 
dikes or berms with a minimum height sized to contain at least the total volume of 
drumskontainers staged in the area. The number of drums staged in the area shall be as 
determined by the fire protection program. A section of the berm or dike may be removed 
for handling drums provided that section is reconstructed at the end of the work shift. 
Staging areas will be separated from each other by a minimum distance determined by the 
fire protection program. Staging areas will be kept clear of combustible vegetation. 
Nonsparking tools will be used to open sealed drums or containers. 
Size reduction, decontamination operations, and electrical supply lines will be placed away 
from heavy traffic areas. 
Preventive maintenance consistent with vendor recommendations will be performed on 
portable generators and portable exhausters. 
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Drums, containers, overpacks, tanks, and vent relief valve will be periodically inspected for 
deterioration or degradation. 
Flammable liquid storage tanks will be grounded, as required, and periodically inspected. 
Waste streams will be separated, as necessary, to prevent the contact of incompatible 
materials. 
Remediation will be suspended during high winds. 
Excavation laybacks will be used to prevent slope shifts. 
Graded and graveled roadways will be used. Roadways will be kept fiee of obstructions. 
Roadways will be separated fiom the area being actively remediated and separated fiom 
staging areas. 
Storage tanks, cylinders, or cabinets containing flammable material will be located away 
from heavy traffic areas, away from the area being actively remediated, in unconfined 
outdoor areas, and in areas cleared of vegetation. 
Staged drums shall not be stacked. 
Dust suppressants or fixatives will be used on contaminated soils and debris. 
Air monitoring will be performed, as required, by the approved air monitoring plan for the 
project. 
5.3 PROGRAM ATIC CONTROLS 
5.3.1 Conduct of Operations 
Conduct of operations is imposed to ensure that work is performed in a controlled and organized 
manner, that all facets of work activities have been considered, and that necessary documentation 
is maintained. 
The Remedial Action Conduct of Operations Matrix (BHI 2005e) presents a graded approach to 
DOE Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirementsfor DOE Facilities. The performance 
of field activities and soil remediation is governed by the Remedial Action Project Manager j .  
Implementing Instructions (PMII) (BHI 2005f), applicable field support instructions, and specific 
work instructions. The PMII is based on a graded approach to the conduct of operations 
authorized by DOE Order 5480.19. The PMII are applicable to all WCH personnel, assigned or 
matrixed, who perform activities under the responsibility and direction of the Remedial Action 
(RA) Project Manager. The applicability matrix is issued and maintained by the RA Project 
Manager and identifies elements of the DOE order that apply to project activities, the 
implementing documents, and any deviations or exceptions to the DOE orders and guidelines. 
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Conduct of operations strongly emphasizes technical competency, workplace discipline, and 
personal accountability to ensure a high level of performance during all activities. Project 
personnel must fully comply with the PMII. If conflict arises with other instructions or 
directions, work shall be safely stopped until resolution is achieved. Safety is the first priority, 
and all planning shall include appropriate safety analyses to identify potential safety and health 
risks and the methods to appropriately mitigate these risks. Workers will not start work until 
approved safety procedures, instructions, and directions are provided for nonroutine operations. 
Conduct of operations requires workers to be alert and aware of conditions affecting the job site. 
Operators and workers conducting field activities should be notified of changes in the work area 
status, abnormalities, and difficulties encountered in performing project operations. Similarly, 
operators and workers shall notify the chain of command of any unexpected situations. 
In accordance with the severity of a finding (i.e., emergency condition), notification 
requirements will be expanded to include upper-tier management and regulatory agencies. 
5.3.2 Radiological Protection 
The radiological controls and protection program is defined in DOE-approved programs and 
Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) approved procedures. This program implements RCC 
Contract policy to maintain radiological exposures to levels that are as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA) and to ensure adequate protection of workers. The WCH Radiological 
Protection Program meets the requirements of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 835. 
Appropriate dosimetry, radiological work permits, personal protective equipment, ALARA 
planning, periodic surveys, and Radiological Control (RadCon) technical support will be 
provided. 
Standard WCH controls for work in radiological areas are assessed as being adequate to control 
RA project activities. These controls support the planning that identifies the specific conditions 
and govern the specific requirements for an activity, periodic radiation and contamination 
surveys of the work area, radiological material handling, and periodic or continuous observation 
of the work by RadCon. The ALARA planning process will identify shielding requirements, 
contamination control requirements (including local ventilation controls), radiation monitoring 
requirements, and other RadCon requirements for the individual tasks conducted during the 
course of the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation Project. 
Measures are also taken to minimize the possibility of releases to the environment. Near-field air 
monitoring and commitments with the Washington State Department of Health will address the 
radionuclide inventory and activities that could cause potential release of this inventory, but not 
to the exclusion of 10 CFR 835 requirements. 
5.3.3 Occupational and Safety Controls 
Remediation activities at the 3 00-FF-2 Burial Grounds will be controlled by the site-specific 
health and safety plan (SS HASP), as required by established WCH/RCC procedures. 
A SS HASP will be written for the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation Project to address the 
health and safety hazards of each phase of site operation and will include the requirements of a 
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site HASP for hazardous waste operations and/or construction activities? as specified in 
29 CFR 1910.120. 
Before work begins, a pre-job briefing is held with the affected workers. This briefing will include 
reviews of the hazards that may be encountered and the associated requirements. Thoughout an 
activity? daily briefings may also be held, as well as special briefings before major evolutions. 
Operations during the 3 00-FF-2 Burial Grounds remediation project that involve potentially 
significant nonradiological hazards include the following: 
Asbestos cleanup 
Hot work 
Lead cleanup 
Cleanup of polychlorinated biphenyls 
Biological (insect bites and snakes) 
Temperature extremes 
Working in close proximity to moving equipment 
Possible exposure to organic and inorganic chemicals 
Uneven working surfaces 
Excavation 
Noise. 
5.3.4 Training Requirements and 
The experience and capabilities of the operating staff are extremely important in maintaining 
worker and environmental safety. The 3 00-FF-2 Burial Grounds remediation requires the 
employment of workers dedicated to the project for the duration of the radiological efforts. 
Day-to-day knowledge of ongoing operations, month-to-month understanding of conditions 
encountered? and ongoing understanding of lessons learned is vital to continued safe operation. 
Training requirements will ensure that personnel have been instructed in the technologies to 
work safely in and around radiological areas and to maintain their individual radiation exposure 
and the radiation exposures of others ALARA. Standardized core courses and training material 
will be presented? and site-specific information and technologies will be added to adequately 
train workers. 
Radiological Control Technicians (RCTs) must complete and be current in qualification training. 
Non-RCT radiological workers must meet the training (i.e.? General Employee Radiological 
Training, RadWorker I, RadWorker 11) requirements stipulated in applicable RadCon 
procedures; this is based on areas to be entered and the types of activities performed. These 
training courses require the successful completion of examinations to demonstrate understanding 
of theoretical and classroom material. 
Safety of crane operations is enhanced by operator training (only trained and qualified operators 
that meet the subcontractor 's safety plan and training requirements are allowed to operate the 
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cranes) and periodic maintenance and inspection of the cranes in accordance with the site safety 
plan and procedures. 
Specialized training will be provided, as needed, to insti-uct workers in the use of nonstandard 
equipment, in the performance of abnormal operations, and in the hazards of specific activities. 
Specialized training may be provided by on-the-job training activities, by classroom instruction 
and testing, or by pre-job briefings. The depth of training in any discipline will be 
commensurate with the degree of hazard involved and the knowledge required for task 
performance. 
Some site remediation project activities will require the acquisition of expert services, as 
opposed to project staff training. The assaying of waste packages by specialized methods are 
examples of activities requiring expert assistance. 
The WCH Environmental Safety and Health Training Program provides workers with the 
knowledge and skills necessary to safely execute assigned duties. A graded approach is used to 
ensure that workers receive a level of training commensurate with their responsibilities that 
complies with applicable requirements. 
5.3.5 Configuration Control 
Established configuratiordchange control processes ensure that proposed changes are reviewed in 
relation to the specified commitments. Discovered conditions will be evaluated under the 
IHC/FHC evaluation process so that stabilization and/or recovery actions may be identified and 
implemented, as appropriate. WCH off-normal event procedures describe the reporting process 
and protocol applicable to such a discovery. 
5.3.6 Quality Assurance 
The WCH Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP) consolidates the quality program 
requirements of the WCH prime contract and applicable regulation and DOE orders. It also 
describes how the quality program requirements are implemented through a system of manuals 
and procedures. The QAPP has been reviewe and approved by DOE as meeting the 
requirements of 10 CFR 830.120. 
5.3.7 Fire Protection 
The WCH Fire Protection Program complies with the appropriate requirements of applicable 
CFR and National Fire Protection Association criteria, as well as the additional requirements of 
DOE Headquarters and the Richland Operations Office directives included in the WCH contract. 
The WCH Fire Protection Program was developed to the guidance of the DOE Fire Protection 
Handbook (DOE 1996). The fire protection implementing procedures are grouped into the 
following major areas: management and administration, fire protection design, fire protection 
systems, fire prevention procedures, and special hazard protection procedures. 
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Each major area contains individual implementing procedures that address the full range of 
hazards and controls in accordance with the appropriate guidance of the DOE Fire Protection 
Handbook. 
5.3.8 Emergency Management 
The WCH Emergency Management Program (including preparedness, planning, and response) 
contains the administrative responsibilities for compliance with the Hanford Emergency 
Management Plan (DOE-RL 1998). The program contains emergency action plans for 
WCH-managed projects. An emergency action plan will be developed to include the 300-FF-2 
Burial Grounds and will be part of Vol. 2 when developed. The emergency response actions 
within the emergency action plan will be provided to recognize incidents and/or abnormal 
conditions, initiate initial protective actions, and make the proper notifications. The emergency 
action plan will be consistent with Hanford Site emergency procedures and will meet the 
requirements of DOE-RL (1 998), applicable DOE orders, and state and Federal regulations. 
All emergency planning and preparedness activities for the 300-FF-2 OU project will be 
consistent with planning and preparedness actions undertaken by other Hanford Site contractors 
and similar projects. Activities will be in a manner that ensures the health and safety of workers 
and the public and the protection of the environment in the event of an abnormal incident or 
emergency at the 300-FF-2 OU. 
Project response to any emergencies (project or neighboring project incident) will be to evacuate 
personnel to a safe location and initiate the required responsibilities of the Building Emergency 
Director and other project personnel in support of the Incident Command System. 
The WCH Emergency Management Program is based on a graded approach and is 
commensurate with the hazards and consequences associated with the proj ectdfacilities and 
activities managed by WCH (involving radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous materials) 
and/or neighboring facilities. 
5.3.9 Access Control 
Because of the nature of activities conducted at the 300-FF-2 OU, various administrative controls 
will be implemented to ensure public health and safety. Personnel who have unescorted access 
to the 3 00-FF-2 Burial Grounds remediation site must meet special training requirements 
@.e., 24-Hour Hazardous Worker Training, Radiological Worker I1 training, pre-job briefing, and 
required site and activity-specific reading). These training requirements provide adequate 
assurance of worker safety. 
Drums containing uranium and thorium will be staged within a controlled and posted area. It is 
anticipated that the material contained within the drums will not be classified as accountable 
special nuclear material or as classified material. 
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Hazard Type 
Ladiological 
Table A-1. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 (618-1) and 
Associated Unplanned Release Sites UPR-300-13 and UPR-300-14.a (18 Pages) 
Form 
2ontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding contaminated gloves, 
niscellaneous equipment, 
xonze crucibles, lead sink 
raps, and solid laboratory 
vastes. 
Quantity 
ZO-60: 1.77E-03 Ci 
3-137: 8.13E-03 Ci 
Pu-239: 6.21E-02 Ci 
Ra-226: 7.60E-03 Ci 
9-90 : 3.82E-02 Ci 
Th-228: 1.68B-02 Ci 
U-234: 6.76E-tO0 Ci 
U-235: 5.87E-01 Ci 
U-238: 1.05Et-01 Ci 
Zn-65: 3.53E-03 Ci 
Total curies from all waste forms. 
Uranium: approx. 14,500 kg (-16 tons). 
1 bronze crucible measured 5.5 rnr/hr @ 
10 cm (August 1946). 
Lead sink traps measured 6,000 dpm 
alpha, 15 rnr/hr - beta/gamma (1946). 
3 lb (0.0005 Ci) of uranium. 
Pu-239: 0.06 Ci 
Pu-240: 0.017 Ci 
Remar ksb 
Soil data from 6 18-4 
ASAFHC MOC are used here 
as analogous site data for the 
6 18-1 site soil. The 6 18-4 data 
were taken from Appendix A 
of DOE-RL (1995). Soil 
inventory based on 
concentration from 6 18-4 
times the soil volume. 
Justification of use of this 
inventory is provided in 
Section 4.1.2 of the ASA. 
Uranium contained in spent 
process acid was leaked to this 
burial ground on July 3 1, 1973 
(UPR-300-13). Extent of 
spread of contamination 
unknown. 
References' 
DOE-RL, 1995 
BHI, 200 1, 61 8-4 Burial 
Ground ASA/FHC, 
BHI, 2003 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, p.65 
WIDS, General Summary 
Report, p. 4 
Stenner et al., 1988, Hazard 
Ranking System Evaluation 
3tf CERCLA Inactive Waste 
Sites at Hanford, PNL-6456, 
p. 255 
WIDS, General Summary 
Report 
Table A-1. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 (618-1) and 
Associated Unplanned Release Sites UPR-300-13 and UPR-300-14." (18 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
tadiological 
continued) 
Zriticality 
Toxic material 
Form 
2ontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding contaminated gloves, 
niscellaneous equipment, 
xonze crucibles, lead sink 
raps, and solid laboratory 
vastes. (continued) 
179 drums of the following: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings, fines, and oils (Type 3). 
Soil, drums, and contaminated 
lebris, including contaminated 
=loves, miscellaneous 
:quipment, bronze crucibles, 
lead sink traps, and solid 
laboratory wastes. 
Lead sink traps. 
Quantity 
'u-239: 0.06 Ci (on 04/01/86) (Ref. A). 
)u-239: 96 Ci (on 04/01/86) (Ref. B). 
J-234: 7.61E-01 Ci 
J-235: 3.55E-02 Ci 
U-238: 4.48Et-00 Ci 
No. of Type 1 & 2 drums: 41 
No. of Type 3 drums: 138 
U-235: 5.87-01 Ci 
Pu-239: 6.21E-02 Ci 
Unknown. 
Remarksb 
Xef. C refers to the 
liscrepancy between these two 
mentory numbers for Pu-23 9. 
During the operational life of 
5 18- 1, 300 Area projects were 
mly bench-scale analytical 
;hemistry experiments. 
]Therefore, only minimal 
zmounts of plutonium would 
3e expected, and the smaller 
xtimate of plutonium content 
is considered to be the correct 
3stimate. 
Drum inventory data from 
5 18-4 used as analogous site 
data for drums. 
The maximum uranium oxide 
zoncentration (black) was used 
for all uranium oxide drums. 
Criticality screening concluded 
"No Criticality Impact." 
From the 321 Laboratory. 
Lead in a monolithic form is 
not readily dispersible. 
References' 
A. CERCLA: Phase1 
Installation Assessment of 
Inactive Waste Disposal 
Sites at Hanford (Hanford 
Inactive Site Survey 
Database) 
B. DOE, 1987, Hanford 
Defense Waste EIS: 
Volume 2, Appendix A, 
Table A. 1 1 
C. UNC, 1986, Draft 
Environmental Impact 
Statement Disposal of 
Hanford Defense High- 
Level, Transuranic, and 
Tank Wastes, letter to 
R. A. Holten 
BHI, 200 1, 61 8-4 Burial 
Ground ASA/FHC, MOC- 
BHI, 2003 
2001-001 1, p.65 
BHI, 2003c 
WID S, Waste Information 
section 
Table A-1. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 (618-1) and 
Associated Unplanned Release Sites UPR-300-13 and UPR-300-14.a (18 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Zarcinogens 
Form 
Zontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding contaminated gloves, 
niscellaneous equipment, 
ironze crucibles, lead sink 
raps, and solid laboratory 
vastes. 
3rums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
As: 3.6 E+01 kg (3.5Et-00 mg/kg). 
Be: 3.4 E+OO kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Cd: 1.6 Et-01 kg (1.5Et-00 rng/kg). 
Cr: 6.4 E+03 kg (6.2Et-02 mg/kg). 
Ni: 3.8 Et-03 kg (3.7E+02 mg/kg). 
Pb: 3.4 Et-03 kg (3.3E+02 mg/kg). 
PCBs: 9.5Et-00 kg 
(9.2E-01 mg/kg). 
As, 7.4OE-03 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
7.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/L) 
-- 
Remar ksb I References‘ 
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
RAHC (if present as chloride, 
fluoride, hydroxide, oxide, 
phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
beryllium-aluminum alloy). 
RAHC (if present as chloride, 
oxide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
KHC (if present in hexavalent 
state). 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001 
RAHC (if present as acetate, 
carbonate, c arbony 1, 
hydroxide, nickelocene, oxide, 
or subsulfide). 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
Table A-1. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 (618-1) and 
Associated Unplanned Release Sites UPR-300-13 and UPR-300-14." (18 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Z arc inog ens 
:continued) 
Form 
3rums of uranium: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Cd, 4.9E+01 kg total, distributed as 
Follows: 
4.8E+01 kg (4.6Et-03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8E+O1 mg/kg) 
1.4E-t.OOkg (3.6E+02 rng/kg) 
2.2E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/kg) 
_- 
Cr, 1.3OEi-01 kg total, distributed as 
Follows: 
-- 
1.3E+01 kg (3.3Et-03 (rng/kg) 
7.1E-03 kg (8.OE-01 mg/L) 
-- 
Se, l.lE+Ol kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
-- 
1.1Et-01 kg (2.9E+03 mg/kg) 
-- 
-- 
Pb, l.l1E+O4 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
l.lE+04 kg 
8.OE-02 kg 
8.3Et-01 kg 
2.4E+OO kg 
-- 
Remarksb 
RAHC (if present as chloride, 
oxide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
KHC (if present in hexavalent 
state). 
RAHC (if present as sulfide). 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as lead 
chromate). 
References' 
BHI, 2004c 
Drum data from 618-4 
Burial Ground ASA/FHC, 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1 , Table 3, 
p. 67 (BHI ZOOl), are used 
9s analogous site data for 
these drums 
DHHS, 2001 
Table A-1. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 (618-1) and 
Associated Unplanned Release Sites UPR-300-13 and UPR-300-14." (18 Pages) 
Quantity Re marks Referencesc Form 
Drums of uranium: 
Hazard Type 
zarcinogens 
continued) 
RAHC BHI, 2004c 
Drum data from 618-4 
Burial Ground ASA/FHC, 
MOC-2001-0011, Table 3, 
p. 67 (BHI 2001), are used 
as analogous site data for 
these drums 
DHHS, 2001 
Arochlor-1254,4.2E+OO kg total, 
distributed as follows: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
-- 
4.2E+00 kg (5.4B+02 mg/L) 
-- 
Drums of uranium: Benzene, 6.6E-01 kg total, distributed as 
€allows: 
KHC 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
_- 
6.6E-01 kg (7.5Et-01 mg/L) 
-- 
3iohazards Insectkodent bites and dust 
from excrement. 
Undefined quantities. These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
isphyxiates Heavier-than-air gasses. Estimated maximum quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal). 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
Activities will be carried out in 
outdoor, well-ventilated areas. 
Chemical Inventory 
Database for 1 00-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA 
projects 
Vegetation. Surface of burial ground essentially 
devoid of vegetation. 
A range fire would not cause a 
significant release of 
hazardous substances due to 
the lack of combustibles, 
especially vegetation, within 
the remediation site. Minimal 
amounts of vegetation have 
been encountered at other 
nearby burial grounds (6 1 8-4 
and 6 18-5). 
'lammable materials 
Table A-1. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 (618-1) and 
Associated Unplanned Release Sites UPR-300-13 and UPR-300-14.” (18 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
; lamable materials 
continued) 
?lammable materials 
:continued) 
Form 
Lliscellaneous combustibles, 
;enera1 construction waste. 
Fuels and oils. 
Drums of uranium tailings, 
fines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
Drums of uranium tailings, 
fines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
(continued) 
Quantity 
Unknown quantity of combustible waste, 
3xpected to be relatively small, given 
:xistence of “burning pits” in other 
300 Area sites. 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support the 
project. Estimated quantities (total): 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 7,600 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake fluid: 19 L 
Hydraulic/transmission fluid: 760 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Benzene, 6.3E-01 kg, distributed over 
138 Type 3 drums gives 
4.6E+OO g/drum. 
2-butanone, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed over 
138 Type 3 drums gives 5.1E-02 g/drum. 
Remarksb 
Buried miscellaneous 
combustible materials include 
pieces of plastic, cardboard, 
wood, cloth, and other types 
generated during remediation. 
Containers with oil, paint 
chips, and waxy material. 
Powdedsalts, batteries, 
asbestos, fabric belting 
material, and used rags may 
also be found during site 
remediation activities. 
Fuels and oils are found in 
vehicles, spare drums, and 
mineral oil staged for 
stabilization of the drums. 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
References‘ 
BHI, 1994 
Estimated quantities based 
3n ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-K RA 
projects 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Online 
WIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Chemical Hazards, and 
Other Databases, 
Publication No. 2000-130 
Table A-1. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 (618-1) and 
Associated Unplanned Release Sites UPR-300-13 and UPR-30044.” (18 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Zorrosives 
Form 
Jranium metal. 
Zontaminated soil. 
Quantity 
I‘etrachloroethene, 8.3E-0 1 kg, 
3istributed over 13 8 Type 3 drums gives 
5.OEt-00 g/drum. 
rrichloroethene, 1.7Et-0 1 kg, distributed 
3ver 138 Type 3 drums gives 
1.2Et-02 g/drum. 
4pproximately 14,500 kg 
[16 tons) 
2,010 kg (4,432 lb) of nitric acid. 
44 kg (96 lb) of fluoride. 
870 kg (1,910 lb) of caustic (chemical 
species of caustic not specified), 
intentionally allowed to leak into the soil 
to neutralize the nitric acid. 
Remarksb 
Noncombustible but 
decomposes in a fire to 
hydrogen chloride and 
phosgene gas. 
Combustible, bums with 
difficulty. 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Uranium metal is a 
combustible solid, especially 
as turnings or powder. Size of 
uranium pieces not docu- 
mented. As a contaminant 
mixed with soil, it would not 
be expected to pose a signifi- 
cant flammability hazard. 
This release was to an open- 
bottomed limestone pit (Waste 
Acid Neutralization Box) that 
was positioned over the 6 1 8- 1 
Burial Ground. 
~ ~~~ 
References‘ 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
9perable Unit Technical 
easeline Report, 
BHI-00012, Rev. 0 
WIDS , Waste Information 
section 
9perable Unit Technical 
easeline Report, 
BHI-00012, Rev. 0, 
section 5.9, “UPR-300- 13 ,” 
2nd Section 5.10, 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
‘UPR-300- 14” 
Table A-1. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 (618-1) and 
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Hazard Type 
3xplosive materials 
Reactive hazards 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
2anisters and bottles of 
rcetylene, propane, oxygen, 
;asoline in equipment fuel tanks 
tnd in other approved storage 
:ontainers. 
Jranium metal. 
Quantity 
2,010 kg (4,432 lb) of NO3 and 216 kg 
:477 lb) of copper, both in solution as 
?art of UPR-300-13. 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support the 
project. 
Estimated total quantities: 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Oxygen: 45 kg 
Propane: 380 L. 
Approximately 14,500 kg (-16 tons). 
Remarksb 
Nitrates can react severely with 
sulfuric acid. Copper can react 
severely with acetylene and 
hydrogen peroxide, if copper is 
present as metal dustdmists. 
As a soil contaminant, it is not 
expected to be an explosive 
hazard. Addition of caustic 
was intended to neutralize 
nitric acid. 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to the 
site. Gasoline and diesel is 
present in various vehicles on 
site (e.g., heavy machinery 
used for excavation or 
transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount of 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air, becoming 
readily breathable to a 
downwind receptor. 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
contaminant in soil it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
ReferencesC 
Sterner et al., 1988, Hazard 
yanking System Evaluation 
f CER CLA Inactive Waste 
iites at Hanford, PNL-6456, 
I. 255 
NIDS, Waste Information 
;ection 
Mimated quantities based 
in ERC Chemical Inventory 
latabase for 1 00-BE, 
100-N, and 100-K RA 
Irojects 
3H1, 1994,300-FF-2 
9perable Unit Technical 
Saseline Report, 
3HI-000 12, Rev. 0 
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Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
Quantity 
ig :  9.9E+02 kg (9.6Et-01 mg/kg). 
9s: 3.6E+01 kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg), 
Ba: 3.9Et-02 kg (3.8E+O1 mg/kg). 
Be, 3.4E+00 kg (9.6E+O1 mg/kg). 
Remar ksb 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, hydrogen 
peroxide, bromoazide , chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, tartaric acid. As a 
soil contaminant, it would not 
be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers and bromine azide. 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. As 
a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Barium chloride incompatible 
with acids and oxidizers; 
barium nitrate incompatible 
with acids, oxidizers, and 
aluminum-magnesium alloys. 
As a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. As a 
soil contaminant, it would not 
be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
~~ 
References' 
NIOSH, 2000, Online 
NIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Chemical Hazards, and 
Other Databases, 
Publication No, 2000-130 
BHI, 2004c 
~ 
NIOSH, 2000, Online 
NIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Chemical Hazards, and 
Other Databases) 
Publication No. 2000-130 
BHI, 2004c 
Table A-1. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 (618-1) and 
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Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
2-Butanone: 7.4E-03 kg 
C8.4E-01 mg/L). 
Cd: 1.7E+01 kg (lSE+OO mg/kg). 
Co: 3.7E+02 kg (3.6E+O1 mg/kg). 
Cr: 6.4Et-03 kg (6.2Et-02 mg/kg). 
Cu: 2.OE+03 kg (1.9E+OO mg/kg). 
Remarksb 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, amines, ammonia, 
inorganic acids, caustics, 
isocyanates and pyridines. As 
a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulhr, 
selenium and tellurium. As a 
soil contaminant, it would not 
be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, amrnonium nitrate. 
As a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
hydrogen peroxide) or alkalis. 
As a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
form). As a soil contaminant, 
it would not be expected to be 
a reactive hazard. 
References' 
NIOSH, 2000, Online 
NIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Chemical Hazards, and 
Other Databases, 
Publication No. 2000-130 
BHI, 2004c 
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Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
3g: 4.6t-01 kg (4.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Vi: 3.8E+03 kg (3.7E+02 mg/kg). 
Pb: 3.4E+03 kg (3.3E+02 mg/kg). 
Zn: 2.9E+03 kg (2.8E+02 mg/kg). 
Remar ksb 
Varies with chemical form, 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, chlorine dioxide, 
azides, calcium (amalgam 
formation), sodium carbide, 
lithium, rubidium, copper. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). As a 
soil contaminant, it would not 
be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Nickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfur, 
selenium, wood and other 
combustibles, nickel nitrate. 
As a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. As a soil contaminant, it 
would not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Combustible, but solid form is 
difficult to ignite; however, 
powder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
continue burning under water. 
As a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
References' 
NIOSH, 2000, Online 
VIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Chemical Hazards, and 
Other Databases, 
Publication No. 2000- 130 
BHI, 2004c 
Table A-1. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 (618-1) and 
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Hazard Type 
ieactive hazards 
:continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
:continued) 
179 Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
179 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
4pproximately 4,92 1 L of spent process 
icid was spilled (UPR-300-13). The acid 
-eleased included the following: 
2opper: 217 kg (477 lb ) 
2austic: 866 kg (1,9 10 lb) 
Zn: 2.9E+03 kg. 
YO3: 2,010 kg (4,432 lb) 
Ag, 2.4Et-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.6E+Ol kg (1.5E+03 mg/kg) 
1.8E-01 kg (1.7E+03 mg/kg) 
7.6E+00 kg (2.0E+03 mg/kg) 
2.5E-03 kg (2.8E-01 mg/kg) 
_- 
As, 7.4E-03 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
_- 
_- 
-- 
7.4E-03 kg (2.8E-01 mg/L) 
-- 
Remarks 
Nitrates can react severely with 
sulfuric acid. Copper can react 
severely with acetylene and 
hydrogen peroxide. 
Combustible, but solid form is 
difficult to ignite; however, 
powder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
continue burning under water. 
Acid was neutralized with 
caustic at time of spill. As soil 
contaminants, these chemical 
species would not be expected 
to be highly reactive. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, and tartaric acid. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers and bromine azide. 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. 
Referencesc 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI- 
30012, Rev. 0, Section 5.9, 
,‘UPR-300- 13 ,” and 
Section 5.10, “UPR-300-14” 
S tenner et al., 19 8 8, Hazard 
Ranking System Evaluation 
r>f CERCLA Inactive Waste 
Sites at Hanford, PNL-6456, 
p. 255 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
BHI, 2004c 
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Associated Unplanned Release Sites UPR-300-13 and UPR-300-14." (18 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
.eactive hazards 
:ontinued) 
Form 
179 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
179 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
179 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
179 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
!-Butanone, 7.4E-03 kg (total for all 
imrns) distributed as follows: 
7.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/L) 
Zd, 4.9E+01 kg (total for all drums) 
iistributed as follows: 
1.8E+01 kg (4.6Et-03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8E+Ol mg/kg) 
1.4E+00 kg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
!.2E-03 kg (2.5E-Olmg/kg) 
Cr, 1.3E+01 kg (total for all drums) 
listributed as follows: 
1.3E+01 kg (3.3Et-03 mg/kg) 
7.1E-03 kg (8.OE-01 mg/kg) 
-- 
Hg, 6.1E-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
_- 
1.3E-03 kg (1.2Et-0 1 mg/kg) 
6.OE-01 kg (1.5E+02 mg/kg) 
1.2E-02 kg (1.4E+00 mg/kg) 
-- 
Remarksb 
[ncompatible with strong 
3xidizers; elemental sulfur, 
;elenium, and tellurium. 
[ncompatibility varies with 
;ompound, includes strong 
oxidizers or alkalis. 
Reactivity varies with 
chemical form, incompatible 
with acetylene, ammonia, 
chlorine dioxide, azides, 
calcium (amalgam formation), 
sodium carbide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper. Mercury 
alkyl compounds incompatible 
with strong oxidizers (e.g., 
chlorine). 
References' 
3HI,2004c 
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Hazard Type 
{eactive hazards 
continued) 
3lectrical energy 
Tinetic and potential 
mergy 
Form 
179 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Supply lines outside of the 
excavation fence for office 
trailers and analytical needs. 
Heavy equipment/ machinery/ 
vehicle impacting the 
contaminated soil, combustible 
or noncombustible solids, or 
drums of waste materials. 
Quantity 
Pb, 1.1Et-04 kg (total for all drums) 
Jistributed as follows: 
1.1E+O4 kg (l.lE+06 mg/kg) 
3.OE-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
3.3E+01 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
2.4E+00 kg (1.4E+OO mg/kg) 
-- 
Electrical service is estimated at 13.8 Kv, 
400 amp service. 
A similar project (1 18-K-1 Burial 
Ground remediation) estimate includes 
the following heavy equipment 
allocation: 
Dozer: 1 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Grader: 1 
Water truck: 1 
Shuttle truck: 3 
Scrapers: 3 
Backhoe: 1 
Fuel truck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5.  
Remar ksb 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. 
High-voltage lines shorting to 
ground could result in sparks 
that could initiate a brush fire 
in adjacent areas. See remarks 
for flammability and 
kinetic/potential energy hazard 
types. 
Heavy machinery may collide 
with contaminated soil causing 
a “puff’ release of 
contaminated material. Heavy 
machinery may collide with 
drums containing retrieved 
wastes, rupturing the drums 
and causing particles to 
become airborne. 
References‘ 
3HI,2004c 
~~ 
3ased on 300-FF-1 and 
1 O O - N R -  1 designs 
3ased on STRs for lOO-B/C, 
LOO-N, and 100-F RA 
xojects 
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Hazard Type 
h e t i c  and potential 
nergy (continued) 
Form 
?levated waste acid tanks over 
,ortion of west side of burial 
:round. 
Zompressed gas bottles. 
;ailing loads/equipment used 
iuring remediation activities. 
4ircraft collision. 
Quantity 
:4) tanks. 
~ 
Such materials will be kept to the 
minimum needed to support the project. 
Compressed gasses, estimated quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb in seven 
; ylinders) 
Propane: 3 80 L (1 00 gal in ten 1 0-gal 
tanks) 
Oxygen: 45 kg (1 00 lb in four 
Gylinders) . 
179 drums total (estimated) during the 
course of the project. 
Traffic as defined in DOE-STD-3014-96 
(DOE 1996). 
Remarksb 
3eavy machinery could collide 
Nith the tanks causing collapse 
ind potential struck-by hazard, 
is well as “puff’ release of 
:ontaminated soil. 
rhese tanks will be removed 
xior to remediation activities. 
4 pressurized missile could 
;trike a patch of contaminated 
;oil or drums, resulting in a 
‘puff’ release of contaminated 
;oils. 
4 falling drum could strike 
;ontaminated soil, or another 
killed drum, resulting in a 
‘puff’ release. 
The probability of this type of 
went is extremely low (per 
DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
Frequency would be below 
1.OE-06). The Hanford Site is 
subject to very limited aircraft 
aaffic due to relative location 
2f airports and normal air 
raffic patterns. 
References‘ 
WIDS, Associated 
Structures section 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA 
projects 
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Referencesc Rernar ksb 
It is assumed that a drop would 
be of sufficient velocity to 
rupture the drum causing a 
"puff-type" airborne release. 
Hazard Type ' Quantity Form 
4 drum being dropped a vertical 
lis tance. 
Cinetic and potential 
:nergy (continued) 
179 drums. 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
ulachinery/equipment. \Joke Undefined quantities. 
IOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Teasibility Study for the 
rOO-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
IOE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic activity 
have occurred at the Hanford 
Site. This could result in 
coating of exposed surfaces at 
the excavation site; however, it 
would not result in a release of 
material. 
qatural phenomena ish fall resulting from volcanic 
Lctivity. 
Undefined quantities. During the 
May 18, 1980 eruption of Mount St. 
Helens, about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash 
was deposited at the Hanford Site. This 
resulted in a wet ash loading of only 
20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 lb/ft2). 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
River (more so for the 
Columbia) is not anticipated to 
inundate the 300-FF-2 
OPerable Unit. 
'looding from the Columbia 
River. 
The probable maximum flood (PMF) is 
estimated to produce a Columbia River 
elevation at the 300 Area of 116.5 m 
(382 ft) above mean sea level. 
Lightning could initiate a brush 
fire. See remarks for 
flammability and kinetic/ 
potential energy hazard types. 
Ioitink et al., 2002, 
ranford Site Climatological 
lata Summary 2001 With 
ristorical Data, 
"NL- 1 3 8 5 9 
3ghtning. Mean thunderstorm frequency is low, 
averaging 1O/yr, with the highest 
likelihood of occurrence during the 
months of June, July, and August. 
ranford Generic Interim 
'afety Basis, WHC-SD-GN- 
SB-30001, Rev. 0 (WHC 
994) 
seismic event resulting in 
;round motion. 
For the 300 Area, peak ground 
accelerations range from 0.1 to 0.3 g, 
have a corresponding annual mean 
frequency from 4.OE-03 to 2.OE-04. 
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Hazard Type 
4atural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
3xtreme temperatures. 
Xigh winds. 
lainwater/snow and ice. 
Quantity 
Undefined quantities. 
In the 300 Area, the annual average wind 
speed is 12.1 km/hr (7.5 mph). 
Peak gusts have occurred as high as 
129 km/hr (80 mph). 
Winds in excess of 40 km/hr (25 mph) 
occur slightly more than 1% of the time, 
on an annual basis. 
Maximum amount of precipitation over a 
12-hour period is 2.72 cm (1.07 in.), with 
a return period of 25 years (design basis). 
Remarksb 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115" F). 
Drums that are staged or are 
exposed during excavation are 
considered at risk. Drums 
would have to be open for 
dispersion of the drum contents 
to occur. 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause debris 
to be thrown (a missile), 
causing a kinetic energy 
hazard, or causing a "puff' 
release if this material strikes 
contaminated soil. 
Spread of contamination could 
occur. The arid-to-semiarid 
climate suggests that little, if 
any, surface water will 
accumulate within the 
excavation. Most precipitation 
is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration of 
precipitation. Consequently, 
little water remains to generate 
surface runoff. 
References' 
Hoitink et al., 2002, 
Hanford Site Climatological 
Data Summary 2001 With 
Historical Data, 
PNNL- 1 3 8 59 
DOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
DOE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 ,  
Section 2.2.3 
Hoitink et al., 2002, 
Hanford Site Climatological 
Data Summary 2001 With 
Historical Data, 
PNNL- 13 8 59 
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Hazard Type 
qatural phenomena 
:continued) 
Form 
Seismic event resulting in 
;round motion. 
Quantity 
Xanford Site is located in Zone 2B, a 
cone of moderate seismicity. 
Remarksb 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors deterrnined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant 
(DOE 1989). 
During a seismic event, a 
heavy load could be dropped 
onto the staged or exposed 
drums causing an airborne 
(puff) release. Shifting of 
drums would have a minimal 
impact. 
It is assumed that the energy of 
a seismic event would be 
insufficient to directly rupture 
drums. Drums that are staged, 
or are exposed during 
excavation, are considered at 
risk. Drums holding powder 
would have to be open for 
dispersion of the drum contents 
to occur. 
References' 
DOE, 1989, Draft 
Environmental Impact 
Statement; 
Decommissioning of Eight 
Surplus Production 
Reactors at the Hanford 
Site, Rich land, Washington , 
DOE/'EIS-0 1 19D 
'At the time this document was prepared, Bechtel Hanford, Inc. was not yet the responsible contractor for the 61 8-1 site (it currently falls under the purview of Fluor Hanford, Inc.); 
however, it is being included here in response to U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office preferences. 
bA key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
NC 
= Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
= Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
'Complete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR .= subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Inforrnation Data System 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
iadiological 
Form 
Zontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding uranium-contaminated 
:quipment and materials, plutonium 
md fission products, and uranium 
ixide metal cuttings 
Quantity I Rernar ksa 
Am-24 1 : 1.42E-02 Ci 
C-14: 1.02E-04 Ci 
CO-60: 2.81E-03 Ci 
Cs-137: 8.24E-01 Ci 
Eu-152: 6.12E-06 Ci 
Eu- 154: 2.28E-04 Ci 
Eu-155: 5.93E-05 Ci 
H-3: 4.95E-03 Ci 
Ni-59: 2.04E-05 Ci 
Ni-63: 1.43E-03 Ci 
Pa-234111: 5.96E-05 Ci 
Pu-238: 1.89E-03 Ci 
Pu-239: 5.10E-02 Ci 
Pu-240: 1.07E-02 Ci 
Pu-241: 4.73E-02 Ci 
Ra-226: 1.20E-02 Ci 
Sr-90 /Y-90: 7.43E-0 1 Ci 
Tc-99: 3.57E-04 Ci 
Th-228: 2.66E-02 Ci 
U-234: 1.02Et-01 Ci 
U-235: 9.09E-01 Ci 
U-238: 1.38E+01 Ci 
Zn-65: 5.60E-03 Ci 
Total curies from all waste forms. 
Soil data froin 61 8-4 ASNFHC 
MOC are used here as analogous 
site data for the 61 8-2 site soil. 
The 6 18-4 data were taken from 
Appendix A of DOE-RL (1 995). 
Soil inventory based on 
concentration from 6 1 8-4 times 
the soil volume. Justification of 
use of this inventory is provided 
in Section 4.1.2 of the ASA. 
Referenced' 
Page 65. 
DOE-RL, 1995 
BHI, 2001, 618-4 Burial Ground 
p. 65 
4SA/FHC, MOC-200 1-00 1 1, 
DOE-RL, 1995 
BHI, 2003 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Radiological 
:continued) 
Form 
The original waste form was 
issumed to be from hot cell 
[Le., analytical laboratory) 
ztivities with 75% 
sombustibles and 25% non- 
sombustibles. A fire destroyed 
sn estimated 75% of the 
sombustible material. 
Quantity 
H-3: 4.95E-3 Ci 
C-14: 1.02E-4 Ci 
Ni-59: 2.04E-5 Ci 
CO-60: 4.11E-6 Ci 
Ni-63: 1.43E-3 Ci 
Sr-90: 6.82E-1 Ci 
Tc-99: 3.57E-4 Ci 
(3-137: 8.11E-1 Ci 
Eu-152: 6.12E-6 Ci 
Eu-154: 2.28E-4 Ci 
Eu-155: 5.93E-5 Ci 
Pa-234m: 5.96E-5 Ci 
U-234: 3.57E-4 Ci 
U-235: 1.53E-5 Ci 
U-238: 3.57E-4 Ci 
Pu-238: 1.89E-3 Ci 
Pu-239: 5.10E-2 Ci 
Pu-240: 1.07E-2 Ci 
Pu-241: 4.73E-2 Ci 
Am-24 1 : 1.42E-2 Ci 
Remar ksa 
Hot cell debris (Le., 
analytical laboratory spent 
fuel waste) is assumed to 
have had up to 25% of its 
radiological inventory 
associated with combustible 
materials. A fire reduced this 
to 6.25% of the inventory 
assuming 75% of the 
combustibles were 
consumed. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2001, 618-4 Burial 
Ground ASA/FHC, 
BHI, 2003a, 618-2 
Supplemental Radionuclide 
Inventory Estimate, Calc. No. 
Page 5 of 5 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1 , p. 65 
0300X-CA-NO0 16 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type Form 
Jranium-contaminated 
:quipment and materials, 
ilutonium and fission products. 
Jranium waste typically solid 
netallic uranium oxides in the 
brm of metal cuttings from 
-eactor fuel fabrication facilities 
n the 300 Area. 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
tailings, fines and oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
2,000 Ci of “beta” activity reported 
nventory in April 1986 according to 
Stenner et al.. Stenner et a1 indicates the 
.nventory of all other radionuclides is 0 
3 ,  including Sr-90, Cs-137, Pu-239 and 
U-23 8. 
U-234: 7.23E-01 Ci 
U-235: 3.37E-02 Ci 
U-238: 4.26E+00 Ci 
No. of Type 1 & 2 drums: 39 
No. of Type 3 drums: 13 1 
Rernar ksa 
Process knowledge of 300 
Area operations in the time- 
period that 6 18-2 was active 
(1 95 1-54) indicates that large 
amounts of long-lived beta 
activity would not have been 
disposed in 6 18-2. Any long- 
lived beta radioactivity 
would have been associated 
with analytical laboratory 
wastes containing sample 
residues of irradiated (spent) 
uranium fuel. 
Dose rate information from 
(1) the 1954 fire and (2) 
radiological survey records 
and special work perrnit 
records for waste shipments 
to 300 Area burial grounds in 
195 1-54 has been used (BHI 
2003a, BHI 2004a and BHI 
2004b) to show that the 
current beta inventory 
estimate for 618-2 is 1 to 2 
Ci. Therefore, it is believed 
that the inventory estimate in 
Stenner et a1 is incorrect and 
can be dismissed. 
Drum inventory data from 
6 18-4 used as analogous site 
data for drums. 
The maximum uranium oxide 
concentration (black) was 
used for all uranium oxide 
drums. 
Referencesb 
Stenner et al., 1988, Hazard 
Ranking System Evaluation of 
CERCLA Inactive Waste Sites 
at Hanford, PNL-6456, Vol. 
[I, p. 667 
WIDS, General Summary 
Report 
BHI, 2003a, 618-2 
Supplemental Radionuclide 
lnventory Estimate, Calc. No. 
0300X-CA-NO016 
BHI, 2004a, 618-2 Burial 
Ground Spent Fuel Inventory 
Calculation Based on Waste 
Disposal Data, Calc. No. 
0300X-CA-NO019 
BHI, 2004b, 618-2 Exposure 
Rate per Mass of Fuel 
Calculation, Calc. No. 0300X- 
CA-NO0 18 
BHI, 2003b, Hazard 
Categorization of the 618-2 
and 61 8-1 3 Waste Sites, Calc. 
No. 0300X-CA-N0015, Rev. 1 
BHI, 2003 
Table A-2. Hazard Id 
Hazard Type 
Criticality 
Toxic material 
Carcinogens 
ntification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Form 
Soil, drums, and contaminated 
debris, including contaminated 
gloves, miscellaneous 
equipment, bronze crucibles, 
lead sink traps, and solid 
laboratory wastes. 
Lead-acid automotive batteries, 
lead from “lead-dip” process, 
and tin from “triple-dip” 
process. 
Contaminated soil and debris 
including contaminated gloves, 
miscellaneous equipment, 
bronze crucibles, lead sink 
traps, and solid laboratory 
wastes. 
Quantity I Remar ksa 
U-235: 9.09E-01 Ci Criticality screening 
concluded “No Criticality 
Impact.” 
‘Two dump-truck loads’.’ (of batteries). 
Unknown quantities of lead and tin from 
the lead-dip and triple dip processes. 
As: 3.9 E+Ol kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg). KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
Be: 3.60 E+OO kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). RAHC (if present as 
chloride, fluoride, hydroxide, 
oxide, phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
beryllium-aluminum alloy). 
Cd: 1.7 E+O 1 kg (lSE+OO mg/kg). RAHC (if present as 
chloride, oxide, sulfate, or 
sulfide). 
Referencesb 
3H1, 2003d, Remediation: 
51 8-2 Burial Ground, 
2riticality Screening No. 
13 00X-CE-NO005 
JVIDS, Environmental 
Gonitoring Description 
;ection, p. 1 
?perable Unit Technical 
Saseline Report, BHI-00012, 
Lev. 0 
3H1, 1994,300-FF-2 
3HI,2004c 
IHHS, 200 1, Report on 
:arc in ogens, Ninth Edit ion 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
3arcinogens 
:continued) 
Carcinogens 
(continued) 
Form 
zontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding contaminated gloves, 
niscellaneous equipment, 
xonze crucibles, lead sink 
:raps, and solid laboratory 
wastes. 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Cr: 7.0 E+03 kg (6.2Et-02 mg/kg). 
Yi: 4.2 E+03 kg (3.7E+02 mg/kg). 
Pb: 3.9 E+03 kg (3.3E+02 mg/kg). 
PCBs: 1.OEt-01 kg (9.2E-01 mg/kg). 
As, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed as follows: 
-- 
7.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/L). 
Cd, 4.7Et-01 kg, distributed as follows: 
4.6E+01 kg (4.6Et-03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8E+O1 mg/kg) 
1.3Et-OOkg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.1E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/L). 
Rernar ksa 
KHC (if present in 
hexavalent state). 
RAHC (if present as acetate, 
carbonate, carbonyl, 
hydroxide, nickelocene, 
oxide, or subsulfide). 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as chromate). 
RAHC 
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
RAHC (if present as 
chloride, oxide, sulfate, or 
sulfide). 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Drum data from 618-4 Burial 
Ground ASA/FHC, 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, Table 3, 
p. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
analogous site data for these 
drums 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Drum data from 618-4 Burial 
Ground ASA/FHC, 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, Table 3, 
p. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
analogous site data for these 
drums 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edit ion 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Zarcinogens 
[continued) 
Form 
170 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
170 drum of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Cr, 1.2Ei-01 kg, distributed as follows: 
.- 
1.3E+O1 kg (3.3Et-03 (mg/kg) 
7.1E-03 kg (8.OE-01 mg/L). 
Se, l.lE+Ol kg, distributed as follows: 
_- 
l.lE+Ol kg (2.9Et-03 mg/kg) 
_- 
Pb, 1.1E+04 kg, distributed as follows: 
1 .OE+04 kg (1 .OE+04 mg/kg) 
8.OE-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
7.8E+01 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
2.4E+00 kg (2.8E+02 mg/L). 
Arochlor-1254,4.OE+OO kg, distributed 
as follows: 
-- 
1.OE+OO kg (5.4E+02 mg/L). 
Benzene, 6.3E-01 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
6.3E-01 kg (7.5Ei-01 mg/L). 
Remar ksa 
UHC (if present in 
iexavalent state). 
M C  (if present as sulfide). 
RAHC (if present as lead 
ncetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as lead 
:bromate). 
RAHC 
KHC 
Referencesb 
Irum data from 618-4 Burial 
?round ASA/FHC, 
CIOC-2001-0011, Table 3, 
1. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
malogous site data for these 
Srums 
3HI,2004c 
IHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Zarcinogens, Ninth Edition 
3HI,2004c 
IHHS, 2001, Report on 
Zarcinogens, Ninth Edition 
3HI,2004c 
IHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Zarcinogens, Ninth Edition, 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Biohazards 
Asphyxiates 
Form 
Ensecthodent bites and dust 
from excrement. 
Heavier-than-air gasses. 
Quantity I Rernar ksa I Refereneed’ 
Undefined quantities. These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
Estimated quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (1 00 lb) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal). 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
Activities will be carried out 
in outdoor, well-ventilated 
areas, 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
?lammable materials 
Form 
Vegetation. 
Miscellaneous combustibles, 
general construction waste, 
including pieces of plastic, 
cardboard, wood, cloth, and 
other types generated during 
remediation. Containers with 
oil, paint chips, and waxy 
material. Powderhalts, 
batteries, asbestos, fabric 
belting material, and used rags 
may also be found during site 
remediation activities. 
Quantity 
Surface of burial ground essentially 
ievoid of vegetation. 
Unknown quantity of combustible waste, 
expected to be relatively small, given the 
fire that destroyed a “major portion” of 
the contents of this burial ground in 
February of 1954. 
Approximately 75% or more of the 
hot cell waste volume was in the form 
of combustible, soft waste. 
The remaining 25% consists of 
noncombustible solids such as 
irradiated fines and equipment parts. 
75% of the total radionuclide 
inventory is attributable to the 
noncombustible solids. 
The fire destroyed 75% of the burial 
ground combustible contents, 
dispersing the contamination to 
surrounding soils. 
Rernar ksa 
4 range fire would not cause 
1 significant release of 
iazardous substances due to 
;he lack of combustibles, 
=specially vegetation, within 
;he remediation site (the site 
Nil1 have been cleared of 
2ombustibles prior to 
initiation of remediation 
ctivities). Minimal amounts 
nave been encountered at 
Dther burial ground 
remediation sites (6 1 8-4 and 
5 18-5). 
Referencesb 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
9perable Unit Technical 
Saseline Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
BHI, 2003a, 618-2 
Yupplemental Radionuclide 
hventory Estimate, Calc. No. 
3300X-CA-NO0 16, Rev. 0 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
;lammable materials 
continued) 
Form 
>rums of uranium tailings, 
ines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
kels  and oils used by project. 
Quantity 
Benzene, 6.3E-01 kg, distributed over 131 
Type 3 drums gives 4.8E+OO g/drum. 
2-butanone, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed over 
13 1 Type 3 drums gives 5.3E-02 g/drum. 
Tetrachloroethene, 8 .350 1 kg, distributed 
over 13 1 Type 3 drums gives 
6.OEt-00 gldrum. 
Trichloroethene, 1.7E+O 1 kg, distributed 
over 13 1 Type 3 drums gives 
1.2E+02 g/drum. 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support the 
project. Estimated quantities (per 
vehicle) : 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 7,600 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake fluid: 19 L 
Hydraulic/transmission fluid: 760 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Remar ksa 
:lass IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
?oiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
poiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Noncombustible but 
decomposes in a fire to 
hydrogen chloride and 
phosgene gas. 
Combustible, burns with 
difficulty. 
Fuels and oils are found in 
vehicles, spare drums, and 
mineral oil staged for 
stabilization of the drums. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
YIOSH 2000, Pocket Guide to 
Chemical Hazards, and Other 
Oatabases, Publication No. 
2000- 130 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 1 00-N, 
2nd 100-K RA projects 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
:lammable materials 
continued) 
2 orro s ive s 
3xplosive materials 
Form 
Uranium oxide metal cuttings. 
Contaminated soil. 
Soil and debris. 
Canisters and bottles of 
acetylene, propane, oxygen, 
gasoline in equipment fuel tanks 
and in other approved storage 
containers. 
Quantity 
See Radiological Hazard Type. 
Fluoride: 3.6E+O1 kg. 
N03: 9.4E-t-02 kg 
Copper: 2.1E+03 kg. 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support the 
project. 
Estimated quantities: 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Grease, paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Oxygen: 45 kg 
ProDane: 380 L. 
Remarksa 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Uranium metal is 
a combustible solid, 
especially as turnings or 
powder. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
contaminant mixed with soil, 
it would not be expected to 
pose a significant 
flammability hazard. 
Corrosive nature assumed 
mitigated by mixing with 
soil. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. Copper 
can react severely with 
acetylene and hydrogen 
peroxide if present as metal 
dust/mist. If mixed with soil, 
explosive potential negated. 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to 
the site. Gasoline and diesel 
is present in various vehicles 
on site (e.g., heavy 
machinery used for 
excavation, or transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount ol 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air. 
Referencesb 
WIDS, Waste Information 
gection 
Stenner et al., 1988, Hazard 
lianking System Evaluation of 
LlERCLA Inactive Waste Sites 
xt Hanford, PNL-6456, 
Vols. 1,2, and 3 
BHI, 2004c 
BHI, 2004c 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 1 00-N, 
md 100-K RA projects 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Ceactive hazards 
Form 
Jranium metal cuttings. 
3attery acid. 
Soil and debris. 
Quantity 
Jnknown. 
‘Two dump-truck loads’’ of automotive 
3atteries. 
4g: 1.1Et-03 kg (9.6E+01 mg/kg). 
4s: 3.9Et-01 kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Remarksa 
~ 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
contaminant in soil it would 
not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Battery acid reacts violently 
with water. Incompatible 
with organic materials, 
chlorides, carbides, 
fulminates, and powdered 
metals. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, 
hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, tartaric acid. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can 
react with inorganic arsenic 
to form the highly toxic gas 
arsine. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
WIDS, Site Comment section 
3perable Unit Technical 
Vaseline Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
3H1, 1994,300-FF-2 
WIDS, Site Comment section. 
\TIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Wazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
BHI, 2004c 
2000-130 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Leactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
:continued) 
Quantity 
3a: 4.2E+02 kg (3.8E+O1 mg/kg). 
3e: 3.6Et-00 kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Zd: 1.76E+01 kg (1.5E+00 mg/kg). 
20: 3.74E+02 kg (3.6Et-01 mg/kg). 
Rernar ksa 
Barium chloride 
incompatible with acids and 
oxidizers; barium nitrate 
incompatible with acids, 
oxidizers, and aluminum- 
magnesium alloys. In the 
form of a soil contaminant, it 
would not be expected to be 5 
reactive hazard. 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium and tellurium. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, arnrnonium nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
3HI,2004c 
VIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Docket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other 
gatabases, Publication No. 
2000-130 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
$oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
3: 7.OEt-03 kg (3.6Et-01 mg/kg). 
Cu: 2.lE+03 kg (3.6E+O1 mg/kg). 
Hg: 5.OEt-01 kg (3,6E+01 mg/kg). 
Ni: 4.2E+03 kg (3.6Et-01 mg/kg). 
Remar ksa 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
hydrogen peroxide) or 
alkalis. In the form of a soil 
;ontaminant, it would not be 
cxpected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
tncompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
form). In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with chemical form. 
Incompatible with acetylene, 
arnmonia, azides, calcium, 
chlorine dioxide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper, sodium 
carbide. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Nickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfur, 
selenium, wood and other 
combustibles, nickel nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
Contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Frlazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000-1 30 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
continued) 
170 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3) 
3ils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Pb: 3.7E+03 kg (3.6E+01 mg/kg). 
~~ 
Zn: 3.1E+03 kg (3.6E+O1 mg/kg). 
NOS: 9.4Et-02 kg (2.1E+03 lb). 
Ag, 2.2E+O1 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.5Et-01 kg (1.5E+03 mg/kg) 
1.7Et-03 kg (1.7E+03 mg/kg) 
2.OEt-03 kg (2.OE+03 mg/kg) 
2.4E-03 kg (2.8E-01 mg/L. 
As, 7.OE-03 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
7.OE-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/kg). 
Remar ksa 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Combustible, but solid form 
is difficult to ignite; however, 
powder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
continue burning under 
water. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. As a soil 
contaminant, this chemical 
species would not be 
expected to be highly 
reactive. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, hydrogen 
peroxide, bromoazide, 
chlorine trifluoride, 
ethyleneimine, oxalic acid, 
tartaric acid. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can 
react with inorganic arsenic 
to form the highly toxic gas 
arsine. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
YIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Wazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000-1 30 
Table A-2. Hazard L 
Hazard Type 
Leactive hazards 
continued) 
lent fication Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Form 
.70 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
fellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
3a, 2.7E+02 kg (total for all drums) 
listributed as follows: 
1.5Et-01 kg (1.6E+03 mg/kg) 
3.8E-02 kg (3.5E+02 mg/kg) 
!.5E+02 kg (6.9E+04 mg/kg) 
3.8E+OO kg (1.2E+03 mg/kg). 
l-Butanone, 7.OE-03 kg (total for all 
Irums) distributed as follows: 
_- 
7 .OE-03 kg (8.4E-0 1 mg/kg). 
Cd, 4.7Et-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.6E+01 kg (4.6E-t-03 mg/kg) 
3.8E-02 kg (3.5E+02 mg/kg) 
1.3E-t-00 kg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.1E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/L). 
Cr, 1.2Et-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
4.6E+01 kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8Et-01 mg/kg) 
1.3E+OO kg (3.6Et-02 mg/kg) 
2.1E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/kg). 
Remar ksa 
Barium chloride 
incompatible with acids and 
Dxidizers; barium nitrate 
incompatible with acids, 
Dxidizers, and aluminum- 
magnesium alloys. 
Encompatible with strong 
oxidizers, amines, ammonia, 
inorganic acids, caustics, 
isocyanates and pyridines. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulhr, 
selenium, and tellurium. 
Incompatibility varies with 
compound, includes strong 
oxidizers or alkalis. 
Referencesb 
3HI,2004c 
\TIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
>ocket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other 
3atabases, Publication No. 
!OOO- 130 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Xeactive hazards 
:continued) 
Electrical energy 
Natural phenomena 
Form 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Supply lines outside of the 
excavation fence for office 
trailers and analytical needs. 
Lightning. 
Quantity 
~~ ~~ 
Hg, 5.7E-01 kg (total for all drums) 
iistributed as follows: 
1.3E-03 kg (1.2Et-01 mg/kg) 
5.6E-01 kg (1.5E+02 mg/kg) 
1.2E-02 kg (1.4E+00 mg/L). 
Pb, l.OE+04 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.OE+O4 kg (1.1E+06 mg/kg) 
8.OE-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
7.8E+01 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
2.3E+OO kg (2.8Et-02 mg/L). 
Electrical service is estimated at 13.8 kV, 
400 amp service. 
Mean thunderstorm frequency is low, 
averaging lO/yr, with the highest 
likelihood of occurrence during the 
months of June, July, and August. 
Remar ksa 
Varies with chemical form, 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, chlorine dioxide, 
azides, calcium (amalgam 
format ion), sodium carbide , 
lithium, rubidium, copper. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide 
acids. 
High-voltage lines shorting 
to ground could result in 
sparks which could initiate a 
brush fire in adjacent areas. 
See remarks for flammability 
and kinetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
Lightning could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks for 
flammability and 
lunetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Hazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000-130 
Based on 300-FF-1 and 
1 O O - N R -  1 designs 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With Historica 
Data, PNNL- 1 3 8 59 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
gatural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
seismic event resulting in 
:round motion. 
Extreme temperatures. 
High winds. 
Ash fall resulting from volcanic 
activity. 
Quantity 
The Hanford Site is located in Zone 2B, a 
cone of moderate seismicity. For the 
300 Area, peak ground accelerations 
ranges from 0.1 to 0.3 g, have a 
=.orresponding annual mean frequency 
from 4.OE-03 to 2.OE-04. 
Undefined quantities. 
In the 300 Area, the annual average wind 
speed is 12.1 Whr (7.5 mph). 
The maximum peak gust wind speed at 
Hanford was 129 Whr (80 mph) (1972). 
The annual average for number of days 
with peak gusts in excess of 80 Whr 
(50 mph) is 4.7 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 Mhr (25 mph) 
occur slightly more than 1% of the time, 
on an annual basis. 
Undefined quantities. During the May 18, 
1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens, about 
7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash was deposited at 
the Hanford Site this resulted in a wet ash 
loading of only 20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 lb/ft2). 
Remar ksa 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant. 
During a seismic event, a 
heavy load could be dropped 
onto contaminated soil 
causing an airborne (puff) 
release. 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115" F). 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause 
debris to be thrown (a 
missile), causing a kinetic 
energy hazard, or causing a 
"puff' release if this material 
strikes contaminated soil. 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic 
activity have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of exposed 
surfaces at the excavation 
site; however, it would not 
result in a release of material. 
Referencesb 
90E, 1989, Draft 
Ynvironmental Impact 
Ytatement, Decommissioning 
7f Eight Surplus Production 
Teactors at the Hanford Site, 
Tich land, Washington , 
I)OE/EIS-0 1 19D 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With Historicai 
Data, PNNL- 1 3 8 5 9 
I 
w 
m .  
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Jatural phenomena 
continued) 
~~~~~~ 
Cinetic and potential 
mergy 
Form 
;looding from the Columbia 
tiver. 
iainwater/snow and ice. 
Heavy equipment/machinery/ 
vehicle impacting the 
contaminated soil, 
combustible/noncombustible 
solids or drums of waste 
materials. 
Quantity 
The probable maximum flood (PMF) is 
:&mated to produce a Columbia River 
:levation at the 300 Area of 116.5 m 
:382 ft) above mean sea level. 
blaximum amount of precipitation over a 
12-hour period is 2.72 cm (1.07 in.), with 
1 return period of 25 years (design basis). 
A similar project (1 18-K- 1 Burial Ground 
remediation) estimate includes the 
following heavy equipment allocation: 
Dozer: 1 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Grader: 1 
Water truck: 1 
'3huttle truck: 3 
Scrapers: 3 
Backhoe: 1 
Fueltruck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5. 
Remarksa 
~~ ~ 
4s discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximurn 
Yood of either the Columbia 
2r Yakima Rivers (more so 
For the Columbia) is not 
inticipated to inundate the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit. 
- 
Spread of contamination 
sould occur. The arid-to- 
semi-arid climate suggests 
that little, if any, surface 
water will accumulate within 
the excavation. Most 
precipitation is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration of 
precipitation. Consequently, 
little water remains to 
generate surface runoff. 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with Contaminated 
soil causing a "puff' release 
of contaminated material. 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with drums 
containing retrieved wastes, 
rupturing the drums and 
sausing particles to become 
airborne. Heavy machinery 
may collide with 
zontaminated combustible/ 
noncombustible solids 
Gausing particles to become 
airborne. 
Referencesb 
IOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Teasibility Study for the 
iO0-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
IOERL-99-40, Rev. 0 
IOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Teasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
Section 2.2.3, DOE/RL-99-40, 
Lev. 0 
3oitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With Historica, 
!lata, PNNL- 1 3 8 59 
3ased on STRs for lOO-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA projects 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Linetic and potential 
:nergy (continued) 
Form 
:ompressed gas bottles. 
Falling loads/combustible/ 
ioncombustible waste items, 
irums/equipment used during 
:emediation activities. 
Aircraft collision. 
Quantity 
Such materials will be kept to the 
ninimum needed to support the project. 
Clompressed gasses, estimated quantities: 
4cetylene: 45 kg (100 lb in seven 
; ylinders) 
Propane: 3 80 L (1 00 gal in ten 1 0-gal 
[ads)  
3xygen: 45 kg (100 lb in four cylinders). 
170 drums (estimated). 
Traffic as defined in DOE-STD-3014-96 
(DOE 1996). 
Remar ksa 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of 
contaminated soil or drums, 
resulting in a “puff’ release 
of contaminated soils. Heavy 
machinery could collide with 
the tanks causing rupture and 
potential struck-by hazard 
(missile), as well as “puff’ 
release of contaminated soil. 
It is assumed that a drop 
would be of sufficient 
velocity to rupture the drum 
causing a “puff-type” 
airborne release. 
A falling combustible/ 
noncombustible item could 
cause an airborne release due 
to impaction stress. 
A falling drum could strike 
contaminated soil, or another 
filled drum, resulting in a 
“Duff” release. 
The probability of this type 
of event is extremely low 
(per DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1 .OE-06). The Hanford Site 
is subject to very limited 
aircraft traffic due to relative 
location of airports and 
normal air traffic patterns. 
References 
3RC Chemical Inventory 
Iatabase for lOO-B/C, 1 00-N, 
md 100-F RA projects 
3HI,2003 
IOE, 1996, DOE-STD-3014- 
36 
Table A-2. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid W 
Hazard Type 
ste Burial Ground No. 2 (618-2). (20 Pages) 
~~ 
Form Quantity Remarksa Referencesb I 
“A key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC = Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 200 1) 
NC = Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
bCornplete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Radiological 
Criticality 
Form 
Zontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding uranium- 
;ontaminated equipment and 
naterials, plutonium and fission 
xoducts, and uranium oxide 
netal cuttings. 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1)) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2)) 
:ailings, fines, and oils (Type 3). 
Soil, drums, and contaminated 
debris, including contaminated 
:loves, miscellaneous 
=quipment, bronze crucibles, 
lead sink traps, and solid 
laboratory wastes. 
Quantity 
CO-60: 4.3 1 E-03 Ci 
Cs-137: 1.98E-02 Ci 
Ra-226: 1.85E-02 Ci 
Sr-90 : 9.31E-02 Ci 
Th-228: 4.1 OE-02 Ci 
U-234: 1.56E+01 Ci 
U-235: 1.39E+00 Ci 
U-238: 2.03E+O1 Ci 
Zn-65: 8.62E-03 Ci 
Total curies from all waste forms 
U-234: 9.66E-01 Ci 
U-235: 4.52E-02 Ci 
U-238: 5.70E+00 Ci 
No. of Type 1 & 2 drums: 52 
No. of Type 3 drums: 176. 
U-235: 1.39E+00 Ci 
Remar ksa 
Soil data from 6 18-4 
4SNFHC MOC are used 
iere as analogous site data 
For the 6 18-3site soil. The 
5 18-4 data were taken from 
4ppendix A of DOE-RL 
:1995). Soil inventory based 
3n concentration from 6 18-4 
:imes the soil volume. 
Justification of use of this 
inventory is provided in 
Section 4.1.2 of the ASA. 
Contaminated Russian thistle 
was found in two locations at 
this site in 1994. 
Drum inventory data from 
5 18-4 used as analogous site 
data for drums. 
The maximum uranium oxide 
soncentration (black) was 
used for all uranium oxide 
drums. 
Criticality screening 
soncluded “No Criticality 
[mpact.” 
Referencesb 
DOE-RL, 1995, Phase III 
Feasibility Study Report for 
the 300-FF- 1 Operable Unit, 
DOE-94-49, Rev. 0 
BHI, 2001, 618-4 Burial 
Ground ASA/FHC, 
BHI, 2003 
WIDS, Environmental 
Monitoring Description 
section 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1 , p.65 
BHI, 2003 
BHI, 2003d, Remediation: 
61 8-2 Burial Ground, 
Criticality Screening No. 
0300X-CE-NO005 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
As: 8.7 E+Ol kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Hazard Type 
roxic material 
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms. 
Zarcinogens 
Be: 8.20 E+OO kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Form 
RAHC (if present as 
chloride, fluoride, hydroxide, 
oxide, phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
beryllium-aluminum alloy). 
Zontaminated soil. 
Cd: 3.8 E+01 kg (1.5Et-00 mg/kg). 
Zontaminated soil, and debris 
including contaminated gloves, 
miscellaneous equipment, 
bronze crucibles, lead sink 
traps, and solid laboratory 
wastes. 
RAHC (if present as 
chloride, oxide, sulfate, or 
sulfide). 
Quantity 
Cr: 1.6 E+04 kg (6.2E+02 mg/kg). 
4s: 3.9 E+Ol kg 
Benzene: 6.3E-01 kg 
Pb: 3.9 E+03 kg 
retrachloroethene: 8.3E-0 1 kg 
rrichloroethene: 1.7Et-01 kg. 
KHC (if present in 
hexavalent state). 
Rernar ksa 
Ni: 9.3 E+03 kg (3.7Et-02 mg/kg). RAHC (if present as acetate, 
carbonate, carbonyl, 
hydroxide, nickelocene, 
oxide, or subsulfide). 
Referencesb 
WIDS, Environmental 
Monitoring Description 
section, p. 1 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-00012, 
Rev. 0 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (1’7 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
zarcinogens (continued) 
Form 
Zontaminated soil and debris 
including contaminated gloves, 
miscellaneous equipment, 
bronze crucibles, lead sink 
traps, and solid laboratory 
wastes. 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Pb: 8.4 E+03 kg (3.3E+02 mg/kg). 
PCBs: 2.3E+O1 kg (9.2E-01 mg/kg). 
As, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed as follows: 
-- 
9.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/L). 
Cd, 4.7E+01 kg, distributed as follows: 
6.2E+01 kg (4.6Et-03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8E+01 mg/kg) 
1.8E+OOkg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.9B-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/L). 
Cr, 1.6E+O1 kg, distributed as follows: 
-- 
1.6E+01 kg (3.3Et-03 (mg/kg) 
9.OE-03 kg (8.OE-01 mg/L). 
Se, 1.4E+01 kg, distributed as follows: 
-- 
1.4Et-01 kg (2.9E+03 mg/kg) 
-- 
Remarksa 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as 
chromate). 
RAHC 
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
RAHC (if present as 
chloride, oxide, sulfate, or 
sulfide). 
KHC (if present in 
hexavalent state). 
RAHC (if present as sulfide). 
Referencesb 
Drum data from 618-4 Burial 
Sro un d ASA/FHC, 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, Table 3, 
3. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
malogous site data for these 
lrums 
3HI,2004c 
IHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Zarcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Zarcinogens (continued) 
3iohazards 
lsphyxiates 
Form 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Insectkodent bites and dust 
from excrement. 
Heavier- than-air gasses. 
Quantity 
Pb, 1.4E+04 kg, distributed as follows: 
1 .OE+04 kg (1.1Et-06 mg/kg) 
8.OE-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
1.lE+02 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
3.1E+00 kg (2.8E+02 mg/L). 
Arochlor-1254, 5.4E+00 kg, 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
5.4E+00 kg (5.4Et-02 mg/L). 
Benzene, 8.4E-0 1 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
8.4E-01 kg (7.5E+01 mg/L>. 
Undefined quantities. 
Estimated quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Propane: 380 L. 
Remarks' 
M C  (if present as lead 
2cetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as lead 
Axomate). 
RAHC 
KHC 
These hazards are routinely 
mcountered in industry. 
rhese hazards are routinely 
mcountered in industry. 
4ctivities will be carried out 
.n outdoor, well-ventilated 
ireas. 
Referencesb 
]rum data from 618-4 Burial 
Sround ASA/FHC, 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, Table 3, 
3. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
inalogous site data for these 
Srums 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
; lamable materials 
Form 
Vegetation. 
Miscellaneous combustibles, 
general construction waste, 
including pieces of plastic, 
cardboard, wood, cloth, and 
other types generated during 
remediation. Containers with 
oil, paint chips, and waxy 
material. Powder/salts, 
batteries, asbestos, fabric 
belting material, and used rags 
may also be found during site 
remediation activities. 
Drums of uranium tailings, 
fines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
Quantity 
Surface of burial ground essentially 
levoid of vegetation. 
Jnknown quantity of combustible 
waste, expected to be relatively small. 
Benzene, 8.4E-0 1 kg, distributed over 
176 Type 3 drums gives 
3.7E+OO g/drum. 
Remar ksa 
2 range fire would not cause 
i significant release of 
iazardous substances due to 
he lack of combustibles, 
:specially vegetation, within 
he remediation site (the site 
will have been cleared of 
;ombustibles prior to 
nitiation of remediation 
ictivities). Minimal amounts 
lave been encountered at 
ither burial ground 
-emediation sites (6 18-4 and 
3 1 8-5). 
:lass IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
Doiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-00012, 
Rev. 0 
BHI, 2004c 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Flammable materials 
(continued) 
Form 
Drums of uranium tailings, 
fines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
(continued). 
Fuels and oils used by project. 
Quantity 
2-butanone, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed 
over 176 Type 3 drums gives 
3.1 E-02 g/drum. 
Tetrachloroethene, 1.1 E+OO kg, 
distributed over 176 Type 3 drums 
gives 4.8E+OO g/drum. 
Trichloroethene, 1.7E+O 1 kg, 
distributed over 176 Type 3 drums 
gives 7.5Et-01 g/drum. 
Quantities of such materials will be 
kept to the minimum needed to support 
the project. Estimated quantities (per 
vehicle): 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 7,600 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 2.8Et-04 L 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake fluid: 19 L 
Hydraulidtransmission fluid: 760 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Remar ksa 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Noncombustible but 
decomposes in a fire to 
hydrogen chloride and 
phosgene gas. 
Combustible, burns with 
difficulty. 
Fuels and oils are found in 
vehicles, spare drums, and 
mineral oil staged for 
stabilization of the drums. 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 1 00-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-K RA 
projects. 
Referencesb 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Hazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000-130 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
;lammable materials 
continued) 
orro s ive s 
2xplosive materials 
Form 
Jranium oxide metal cuttings. 
Zontaminated soil. 
Soil and debris. 
2anisters and bottles of 
icetylene, propane, oxygen, 
Zasoline in equipment fuel tanks 
ind in other approved storage 
;ont ainers. 
Quantity 
See Radiological Hazard Type. 
’luoride: 8.2E+O 1 kg. 
YO31 2.1E+03 kg 
Zopper: 4.8E+03 kg. 
&antities of such materials will be 
sept to the minimum needed to supporf 
;he project. Estimated quantities: 
sasoline: 190 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Srease, paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 860 L 
4cetylene: 2.8 E+04 L 
3xygen: 1.4E+O4 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Remar ksa 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Uranium metal is 
a combustible solid, 
especially as turnings or 
powder. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
contaminant mixed with soil, 
it would not be expected to 
pose a significant 
flammability hazard. 
Corrosive nature assumed 
mitigated by mixing with 
soil. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. Copper 
can react severely with 
acetylene and hydrogen 
peroxide if present as metal 
dusvrnist. If mixed with soil, 
explosive potential negated. 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to 
the site. Gasoline and diesel 
is present in various vehicles 
on site (e.g., heavy 
machinery used for 
excavation or transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount of 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air. 
References 
WIDS, Waste Information 
gection 
Sterner et al., 1988, Hazard 
Tanking System Evaluation of 
ZERCLA Inactive Waste Sites 
xt Hanford, PNL-6456, 
Vols. 1,2,  and 3 
3HI72O04c 
3HI,2004c 
3stimated quantities based on 
3RC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 1 00-N, 
ind 100-K RA projects 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Leactive hazards 
Form 
Jranium metal cuttings. 
Soil and debris. 
Quantity 
J n k n O W n .  
i g :  2.4E+03 kg (9.6Et-01 mglkg). 
4s: 8.7Et-01 kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Ba: 3.8E+O1 kg (3.8E+O1 mg/kg). 
Remarksa 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
contaminant in soil it would 
not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, 
hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, tartaric acid. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can 
react with inorganic arsenic 
to form the highly toxic gas 
arsine. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Barium chloride 
incompatible with acids and 
oxidizers; barium nitrate 
incompatible with acids, 
oxidizers, and aluminum- 
magnesium alloys. In the 
form of a soil contaminant, it 
would not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Referencesb 
WIDS, Site Comment section. 
3perable Unit Technical 
Saseline Report, BHI-00012, 
iev. 0 
3H1, 1994,300-FF-2 
3HI,2004c 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
3e: 8.2E+00 kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Zd: 3.8Ei-01 kg (1.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Co: 9.1E+02 kg (3.6E+Ol mg/kg). 
Cr: 1.6E+04 kg (6.2Et-02 mg/kg). 
Cu: 4.8E+03 kg (1.9E1-02 mg/kg). 
Remar ksa 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium and tellurium. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, ammonium nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
Contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
hydrogen peroxide) or 
alkalis. In the form of a soil 
Contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
form). In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
~ 
Referencesb 
3HI72O04c 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
keactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
loil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
Ig: 1.1E402 kg (4.5E+OO mg/kg). 
Vi: 9.3E+03 kg (3.7Et-02 mg/kg). 
Pb: 8.4E403 kg (3.3E402 mg/kg). 
Remarks‘ 
Varies with chemical forrn. 
[ncompatible with acetylene, 
zmmonia, azides, calcium, 
;hlorine dioxide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper, sodium 
:arbidea 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
3xidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Nickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfur, 
selenium, wood and other 
combustibles, nickel nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. Varies with chemical 
forrn, incompatible with 
acetylene, ammonia, chlorine 
dioxide, azides, cium 
(amalgam formation), 
sodium carbide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper. Mercury 
alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). As 
a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
3H1,2004c 
d 
d 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (1'7 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
.eactive hazards 
; ont inued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Cn: 7.OE+03 kg (2.8E+02 mg/kg). 
V 0 3 :  2.1E+03 kg (8.4E+O1 mg/kg). 
Ag, 2.9E+O1 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
2.OE+01 kg (1.5E+03 mg/kg) 
1.8E-0 1 kg (1.7E+03 mg/kg) 
9.7Ei-00 kg (2.OE+03 mg/kg) 
3.2E-03 kg (2.8E-01 mg/L). 
As, 9.4E-03 kg(tota1 for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
9.4E-03 kg (8.4E-0 1 mg/kg). 
Ba, 3.7E+02 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
2.1E+01 kg (1.6E+03 mg/kg) 
3.8E-02 kg (3.5E+02 mg/kg) 
3.4E+02 kg (6.9E+04 mg/kg) 
1.3E+O1 kg (12E+03 mg/kg). 
Remar ksa 
Zombustible, but solid form 
s difficult to ignite; however, 
jowder form may ignite 
;pontaneously and can 
;ontinue burning under 
water. In the form of a soil 
;ontaminant, it would not be 
:xpected to be a reactive 
iazard. 
Nitrates can react severely 
Nith sulfuric acid. As a soil 
sontaminant, this chemical 
species would not be 
zxpected to be highly 
reactive. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, hydrogen 
peroxide, bromoazide, 
chlorine trifluoride, 
ethyleneimine, oxalic acid, 
tartaric acid. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can 
react with inorganic arsenic 
to form the highly toxic gas 
arsine. 
Barium chloride 
incompatible with acids and 
oxidizers; barium nitrate 
incompatible with acids, 
oxidizers, and aluminum- 
magnesium alloys. 
Referencesb 
3H1, 2004c 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
!28 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
fellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
!-Butanone, 9.4E-03 kg (total for all 
irums) distributed as follows: 
3.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/kg). 
Cd, 6.4E+O1 kg (total for all drums) 
listributed as follows: 
5.2E+01 kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
7.8E-03 kg (6.8E+Ol mg/kg) 
1.8E+OO kg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.9E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/L). 
Cry 1.6Et-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
1.6E+01 kg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.9E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/kg). 
Hg, 5.7E-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.3E-03 kg (1.2Et-01 mg/kg) 
7.6E-0 1 kg (1.5E+02 mg/kg) 
1.6E-02 kg (1.4E+00 mg/L). 
-- 
Remar ksa 
hcompatible with strong 
ixidizers, amines, ammonia, 
norganic acids, caustics, 
socyanates and pyridines. In 
;he form of a soil 
;ontaminant, it would not be 
3xpected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
[ncompatible with strong 
3xidizers; elemental sulhr, 
selenium and tellurium. 
[ncompatibility varies with 
compound, includes strong 
oxidizers or alkalis. 
Varies with chemical form, 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, chlorine dioxide, 
azides, calcium (amalgam 
formation), sodium carbide, 
lithium, rubidium, copper. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Referencesb 
3HI,2004c 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Referencesb Hazard Type Form Quantity Remar ksa 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
228 drums of uranium as: Pb, 1.OE+O4 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. 
BHI, 2004c 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
1 .OE+04 kg (1.1E+06 mg/kg) 
8.OE-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
l.lE+O2 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
3.1Et-00 kg (2.8E+02 mg/L). 
__ 
Based on 300-FF-1 and 
100-NR- 1 designs 
3ectrical energy Supply lines outside of the 
2xcavation fence for office 
trailers and analytical needs. 
Electrical service is estimated at 
13.8 kV, 400 amp service. 
High-voltage lines shorting 
to ground could result in 
sparks which could initiate a 
brush fire in adjacent areas. 
See remarks for flammability 
and kinetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
~~ 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With 
Historical Data, PNNL- 13 8 59 
qatural phenomena Lightning. Mean thunderstorm frequency is low, 
averaging lO/yr, with the highest 
likelihood of occurrence during the 
months of June, July, and August. 
Lightning could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks for 
flammability and 
kine tic/po tential energy 
hazard types. 
Seismic event resulting in 
ground motion. 
The Hanford Site is located in 
Zone 2B, a zone of moderate 
seismicity. For the 300 Area, peak 
ground accelerations ranges from 0.1 
to 0.3 g, have a corresponding annual 
mean frequency from 4.OE-03 to 
2 .OE-04. 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant. 
During a seismic event, a 
heavy load could be dropped 
onto contaminated soil 
causing an airborne (puff) 
release. 
DOE, 1989, Draft 
Environmental Impact 
Statement, Decommissiqning 
of Eight Surplus Production 
Reactors at the Hanford Site, 
Richland, Washington, 
DOE/EIS-0 1 19D 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115" F). 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With 
Historical Data, PNNL- 1 3 8 59 
Extreme temperatures. Undefined quantities. 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Jatural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
High winds. 
Ash fall resulting from volcanic 
activity . 
Flooding from the Columbia 
River. 
Quantity 
[n the 300 Area, the annual average 
wind speed is 12.1 krn/hr (7.5 mph). 
The maximum peak gust wind speed at 
Hanford was 129 Whr (80 mph) 
(1 972). The annual average for 
number of days with peak gusts in 
Excess of 80 krn/hr (50 mph) is 
1.7 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 km/hr (25 mph) 
occur slightly more than 1% of the 
time, .on an annual basis. 
Undefined quantities. During the May 
18, 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens, 
about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash was 
deposited at the Hanford Site this 
resulted in a wet ash loading of only 
20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 lb/ft2). 
The probable maximum flood (PMF) 
is estimated to produce a Columbia 
River elevation at the 300 Area of 
116.5 m (382 ft) above mean sea level. 
Remarksa 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause 
debris to be thrown (a 
missile), causing a kinetic 
energy hazard, or causing a 
"puff' release if this material 
strikes contaminated soil. 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic 
activity have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of exposed 
surfaces at the excavation 
site; however, it would not 
result in a release of material. 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
or Yakima Rivers (more so 
for the Columbia) is not 
anticipated to inundate the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit. 
Referencesb 
IOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
IOE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (1’7 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Vatural phenomena 
:continued) 
Kinetic and potential 
Znergy 
Form 
<ainwater/snow and ice. 
I e avy equip ment/mac hiner yl 
Jehicle impacting the 
;ontaminated soil or drums of 
waste materials. 
Quantity 
rhunderstorm frequency is 
3pproximately 1 O/yr, with the highest 
likelihood in June, July, and August. 
The annual average precipitation for 
Hanford is 6.98 in. The wettest year 
3n record was 1995 with 12.31 in., the 
iiriest year was 1976, with 2.99 in. 
A similar project (1 18-K- 1 Burial 
Ground remediation) estimate includes 
the following heavy equipment 
allocation: 
Dozer: 1 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Grader: 1 
Water truck: 1 
Shuttle truck: 3 
Scrapers: 3 
Backhoe: 1 
Fueltruck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5. 
Remar ksa 
Spread of contamination 
could occur. The arid-to- 
semi-arid climate suggests 
that little, if any, surface 
water will accumulate within 
the excavation. Most 
precipitation is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration of 
precipitation. Consequently, 
little water remains to 
generate surface runoff. 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with contaminated 
soil causing a “puff” release 
of contaminated material. 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with drums 
containing retrieved wastes, 
rupturing the drums and 
causing particles to become 
airborne. 
Referencesb 
IOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
veasibility Study for  the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
IOE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 
3ased on STRs for lOO-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA projects 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Linetic and potential 
nergy (continued) 
Form 
~~ 
;ompressed gas bottles. 
;ailing loads/drums/equipment 
s e d  during remediation 
tctivities. 
4ircraft collision. 
Quantity 
Such materials will be kept to the 
ninimum needed to support the 
Jroject. 
:ompressed gasses, estimated 
pantities: 
lcetylene: 45 kg (100 lb in seven 
: ylinders) 
’ropane: 76 L (in four 5-gal tanks) 
3xygen: 45 kg (1 00 lb in four 5-gal 
anks) . 
!28 drums (estimated). 
rraffic as defined in 
3OE-STD-3014-96 (DOE 1996). 
Remar ks” 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of 
sontaminated soil or drums, 
resulting in a “puff” release 
of contaminated soils. Heavy 
machinery could collide with 
the tanks causing collapse 
and potential struck-by 
hazard, as well as “puff” 
release of contaminated soil. 
It is assumed that a drop 
would be of sufficient 
velocity to rupture the drum 
causing a “puff-type” 
airborne release. 
A falling drum could strike 
contaminated soil, or another 
filled drum, resulting in a 
“puff” release. 
The probability of this type 
of event is extremely low 
(per DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1 .OE-06). The Hanford Site 
is subject to very limited 
aircraft traffic due to relative 
location of airports and 
normal air traffic patterns. 
Referencesb 
ZRC Chemical Inventory 
latabase for 100-B/C, 1 00-N, 
ind 100-F RA projects 
3HI,2003 
IOE, 1996, DOE-STD-3014- 
26 
Table A-3. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 (618-3). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type Form Quantity Remarksa Referencesb 
"A key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC = Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001) 
NC = Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
'Complete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Cadiological 
Form 
Zontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding uranium-contaminated 
:quipment and materials, 
)lutonium and fission products, 
iranium oxide metal cuttings, 
horium oxide powder, and 
iquid or crystallized thorium 
iitrate . 
36 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings, fines and oils (Type 3). 
Zircaloy-2 (Type 4) 
1.4 drums of thorium-232 as: 
- Thorium oxide powder (3.3 
-Thorium nitrate (liquid or 
drums) 
crystals) (1.1 drums) 
5,648-lbs of depleted uranium 
scrap 
Quantity 
4m-241 : 5.29E-01 Ci 
20-60 : 1.89E-02 Ci 
3-137 : 8.70E-02Ci 
?u-238 : 3.49E-02 Ci 
3u-239 : 2.96Et-00 Ci 
Pu-241 : 2.96E+00 Ci 
Ra-226 : 8.13E-02 Ci 
3r-90 : 4.08E-01 Ci 
Th-228 : 1.8OE-01 Ci 
Th-232 : 2.87E-02 Ci 
U-234 : 6.42Et-01 Ci 
U-235 : 5.91Et-00 Ci 
U-238 : 6.42Et-01 Ci 
Zn-65 : 3.78E-02 Ci 
Total curies from all waste 
Forms. 
U-234: 3.69E-01 Ci 
U-235: 1.72E-02 Ci 
U-238: 2.12Et-00 Ci 
No. of Type 1 drums: 19 
No. of Type 2 drums: 1 
No. of Type 3 drums: 66 
No. of Type 4 drums: 773 
Thorium Oxide: 4.53E-01 Ci 
Thorium Nitrate:2.09E-02 Ci 
U-234: 1.1E-01 Ci 
U-235: 1.OE-02 Ci 
U-238: 5.2E-01 Ci 
Remarksa 
Soil data from 618-4 
ASNFHC MOC are used here 
9s analogous site data for the 
51 8-3 site soil. The 61 8-4 
data were taken fi-om 
Appendix A of DOE-RL 
(1995). Soil inventory based 
3n concentration from 6 18-4 
times the soil volume. 
Justification of use of this 
inventory is provided in 
Section 4.1.2 of the ASA. 
10% of the Th-232 drum 
inventory is expected to be in 
the soil. 
Drum inventory data from 
6 18-4 used as analogous site 
data for drums. 
The maximum uranium oxide 
concentration (black) was 
used for all uranium oxide 
drums. 
Referencesb 
DOE-RL 1995, Phase III 
Feasibility Study Report for 
the 300-FF-1 Operable Unit, 
DOERL-94-49, Rev. 0 
BHI, 200 1, 61 8-4 Burial 
Ground ASAlFHC, 
BHI, 2003 
WCH, 2005a 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, p.65 
BHI, 2003 
WCH, 2005a 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
3iticality 
bx ic  material 
zarcinogens 
Carcinogens (continued) 
Form 
Soil, drums, and contaminated 
Iebris, including contaminated 
;loves, miscellaneous 
:quipment, bronze crucibles, 
ead sink traps, and solid 
aboratory wastes, depleted 
iranium scrap. 
2ontaminated soil. 
Zontaminated soil and debris 
mcluding contaminated gloves, 
aiscellaneous equipment, 
3ronze crucibles, lead sink 
;raps, and solid laboratory 
wastes. 
Contaminated soil and debris 
including contaminated gloves, 
miscellaneous equipment, 
Quantity 
U-235: 5.93E+00 Ci 
4s: 2.6 E+02 kg 
Pb: 2.5 E+04 kg. 
As: 2.6 E+02 kg 
(3.5E+00 mg/kg) 
Be: 2.5 E+01 kg 
(3.3E-01 mg/kg) 
Cd: 1.1 E+02 kg 
(1.5E+00 mg/kg) 
Cr: 4.7 E+04 kg 
(6.2E+02 mg/kg) 
Ni: 2.8 E+04 kg 
(3.7E+02 mg/kg) 
Pb: 2.5 E+04 kg 
(3.3E+02 mg/kg) 
Remarksa 
Criticality screening 
concluded “No Criticality 
Impact.” 
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms. 
RAHC (if present as chloride, 
fluoride, hydroxide, oxide, 
phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
beryllium-aluminum alloy). 
RAHC (if present as chloride, 
oxide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
KHC (if present in hexavalent 
state). 
RAHC (if present as acetate, 
carbonate, carbonyl, 
hydroxide, nickelocene, 
oxide, or subsulfide). 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as chromate). 
Referencesb 
3H1, 2003f, Remediation: 
518-7 Burial Ground, 
Zriticality Screening No. 
1300X-CE-N0009, Rev. 0 
WIDS, Environmental 
Monitoring Description 
section, p. 1 
9perable Unit Technical 
i3aseline Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type Form 
36 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3il (Type 3) 
36 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3il (Type 3) 
~~ 
36 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oil (Type 3) 
Quantity 
PCBS: 7.0 E+Ol kg (9.2E-01 
nglkg) . 
As, 3.55E-03 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
3.55E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/L) 
Cd, 2.41Et-01 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
2.34E+O1 kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
3.67E-03 kg (6.8E+O1 mg/kg) 
6.5 8E-0 1 kg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
1.07E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/L) 
Cr, 1.6E+01 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
_- 
6.1OE+OO kg (3.3E+03 (mg/kg) 
3.38E-03 kg (8.OE-01 mg/L) 
Remarksa 
<AHC 
(HC (if present in its 
:lementa1 or soluble forms). 
W C  (if present as chloride, 
ixide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
KHC (if present 
state). 
n hexavalent 
Referencesb 
IHHS, 2001, Report on 
Tarcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Irum data from 618-4 Burial 
Sround ASA/FHC, 
LIOC-200 1-00 1 1, Table 3, 
3. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
malogous site data for these 
lrums 
3HI,2004c 
Referencesb I 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type Form Quantity Remar ksa 
86 drums of uranium as: Se, 5.36E+00 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
RAHC (if present as sulfide). 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oil (Type 3) 
_- 
5.36E+00 kg (2.9E+03 mg/kg) 
86 drums of uranium as: Pb, 5.62Et.03 kg, distributed as 
€allows: 
5.58E+03 kg (1.1E+06 mg/kg) 
4.OOE-02 kg (7.4Et.02 mg/kg) 
3.88E+01 kg (2.1Et.04 mg/kg) 
1.18Et.00 kg (2.8Et.02 mg/L) 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as lead 
chromate). 
DHHS, 2001, Report on . 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Drum data from 618-4 Burial 
Sround ASA/FHC, 
CIOC-200 1-00 1 1, Table 3, 
?. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
malogous site data for these 
drums 
BHI, 2004c 
Zarcinogens (continued) 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oil (Type 3) 
86 drums of uranium as: Arochlor-l254,2.OOE+OO kg, 
distributed as follows: 
RAHC 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oil (Type 3) 
-- 
2.00E+00 kg (5.4E+02 mg/L) 
86 drums of uranium as: Benzene, 3.17E-0 1 kg, 
distributed as follows: 
KHC 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oil (Type 3) 
-- 
3.17E-01 kg (7.5Et-01 mg/L) 
Arsenic, Asbestos, Benzene, 
Beryllium, Carbon 
Tetrachloride, Cupferron, 
Formalin, Trichloroethylene 
Undefined quantities KHC WCH, 2005b 
Nickel Chloride, 
Phenolphthalein, Plutonium, 
Uranyl Nitrate Hexahydrate 
RAHC WCH, 2005b Undefined quantities 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
3 iohazards 
isphyxiates 
Tlammable materials 
Form 
~~ 
hsecthodent bites and dust 
from excrement. 
3eavier-than-air gasses. 
Vegetation. 
Miscellaneous combustibles, 
general construction waste, 
including pieces of plastic, 
cardboard, wood, cloth, and 
other types generated during 
remediation. Containers with 
oil, paint chips, and waxy 
material. Powderhalts, 
batteries, asbestos, fabric belting 
material, and used rags may alsc 
be found during site remediation 
activities. 
Quantity 
Undefined quantities. 
Estimated quantities: 
Acetylene: 2.84E+04 L 
Propane: 400 L (1.06Et-02 gal) 
(7.4E+03 gal) 
Surface of burial ground 
essentially devoid of vegetation 
Jnknown quantity of 
;ombustible waste 
Remar ksa 
rhese hazards are routinely 
mcountered in industry. 
rhese hazards are routinely 
:ncountered in industry. 
4ctivities will be carried out 
m outdoor, well-ventilated 
Ireas. 
4 range fire would not cause a 
significant release of 
nazardous substances due to 
;he lack of combustibles, 
=specially vegetation, within 
the remediation site (the site 
will have been cleared of 
;ombustibles prior to 
initiation of remediation 
sctivities). Minimal amounts 
have been encountered at 
Dther burial ground 
remediation sites (6 18-4 and 
5 18-5). 
Referencesb 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
:lamable materials (continued) 
Form 
>rums of uranium tailings, 
ines, and oil (Type 3 drums) 
continued) 
>rums of uranium tailings, 
'Ines, and oil (Type 3 drums) 
'uels and oils used by project 
Quantity 
Benzene, 3.17E-0 1 kg, 
distributed over 66 Type 3 drums 
gives 4.8E+00 g/drum. 
2-butanone, 8.03E+OO kg, 
distributed over 66 Type 3 drums 
gives 1.22E+02 g/drum. 
Tetrachloroethene, 4.18E-0 1 kg, 
distributed over 66 Type 3 drums 
gives 7.27E+OO g/drum. 
Trichloroetliene, 8.45Et-00 kg, 
distributed over 66 Type 3 drums 
givesl.28Et-02 g/drum. 
Quantities of such materials will 
be kept to the minimum needed 
to support the project. Estimated 
quantities (per vehicle): 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 7,600 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake fluid: 19 I, 
Hydraulic/transmission fluid: 
760 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Propane: 380 L 
Remarks' 
Class IB Flamable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Noncombustible but 
decomposes in a fire to 
hydrogen chloride and 
phosgene gas. 
Combustible, burns with 
difficulty. 
Fuels and oils are found in 
vehicles, spare drums, and 
mineral oil staged for 
stabilization of the drums. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Pocket Guide tc 
Chemical Hazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000-130 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 1 00-N, 
md 100-K RA projects 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Flammable materials (continued) 
Corrosives 
Explosive materials 
Form 
Uranium oxide metal cuttings. 
Contaminated soil. 
Soil and debris. 
Quantity 
See Radiological Hazard Type. 
'luoride: 2.5Ei-02 kg 
VO3: 6.4Et-03 kg 
Zopper: 1.4E+04 kg 
Remar ksa 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Uranium metal is a 
combustible solid, especially 
as turnings or powder. Size of 
uranium pieces not 
documented. As a 
contaminant mixed with soil, 
it would not be expected to 
pose a significant 
flammability hazard. 
Corrosive nature assumed 
mitigated by mixing with soil. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. Copper 
can react severely with 
acetylene and hydrogen 
peroxide if present as metal 
dusdmist. If mixed with soil, 
explosive potential negated. 
Referencesb 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
Stenner et al., 1988 ., Hazard 
Ranking System Evaluation of 
CERCLA Inactive Waste Sites 
xt Hanford, PNL-6456, 
Vols. 1,2, and 3 
BHI, 2004c 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Zxplosive materials (continued) 
Form 
Zirc a10 y - 2 chips c o nt amina ted 
with beryllium and some 
Jranium, in 114-1, (30-gal) 
drums. Likely form is as 
turnings and chips, not fines, 
due to nature of machining 
process. 
Canisters and bottles of 
acetylene, propane, oxygen, 
gasoline in equipment fuel tanks 
and in other approved storage 
containers. 
Theno yltrifluoroacetone, 
hydrogen peroxide, potassium, 
oride, hydroxylamine hydroch 
picric acid 
Quantity 
‘Hundreds o f .  . . drums.” MAR 
:alculation assumes 773 such 
Irums. 
&antities of such materials will 
)e kept to the minimum needed 
:o support the project. Estimated 
pantities: 
3asoline: 190 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
zrease, paints, cleaners, solvents, 
Idhesives: 860 L 
4cetylene: 45 kg 
3xygen: 45 kg 
Propane: 380 L. 
Undefined quantities 
Remar ksa 
Assume that water fill has 
leaked out of drums, 
exacerbating pyrophoric 
qualities. 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to the 
site. Gasoline and diesel is 
present in various vehicles on 
site (e.g., heavy machinery 
used for excavation or 
transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount of 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air. 
These items were identified in 
the 6 18-7 IHE. 
Documentation mentions the 
use of these material in 
buildings that may have 
contributed to 6 18-7, but does 
not state the quantities or if 
they were actually disposed in 
618-7. 
Referencesb 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
BHI, 2004c 
DUN, 1977, Manufacturing 
Process Specifications, 
Metallic Uranium Fuel 
Elements Fabricated by the 
Co-Extrusion Process, 
DUN-560 1 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 100-N, 
and 100-K RA projects 
WCH,2005b 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
Quantity 
4g: 7.3E+03 kg 
(9.6E+0 1 mg/kg) 
\s: 2.6E+02 kg 
(3.5Et-00 mg/kg) 
Ba: 2.8E+03 kg 
(3.8E+O 1 mg/kg) 
Be: 2.5E-tOl kg 
(3.3E-0 1 mg/kg) 
Remar ksa 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, hydrogen 
peroxide, bromoazide, 
chlorine trifluoride, 
ethyleneimine, oxalic acid, 
tartaric acid. In the f o m  of a 
soil contaminant, it would not 
be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Barium chloride incompatible 
with acids and oxidizers; 
barium nitrate incompatible 
with acids, oxidizers, and 
aluminum-magnesium alloys. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
VTOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Wazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000-130 
BHI, 2004c, Determination of 
WAR for 300-FF-2 OU Sites, 
Zalc. No. 0300F-CA-N003, 
Rev, 2 
YIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Vazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000-130 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Wor 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards (continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
:continued) 
sheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Quantity 
Jd: 1.1E+02 kg 
(1 SEt-00 mg/kg) 
Zo: 2.7E+03 kg 
(3.6E+O 1 mg/kg) 
3: 4.7E+04 kg 
(6.2Et-02 mg/kg) 
Zu: 1.4Et-04 kg 
(1.9E+02 mg/kg) 
Remar ksa 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium, and tellurium. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, amrnoniurn nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
hydrogen peroxide) or alkalis. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
form). .In the form of a soil 
Contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Hazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000-130 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). 
Hazard Type 
Xeactive hazards (continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
:continued) 
Quantity 
Ig: 3.4E+02 kg 
(4.5E+00 mg/kg) 
Vi: 2.8E+04 kg 
(3.7E+02 mg/kg) 
Remar ksa 
Varies with chemical form. 
Incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, azides, calcium, 
chlorine dioxide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper, sodium 
carbide. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Nickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfur, 
selenium, wood and other 
combustibles, nickel nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. Varies with chemical 
form, incompatible with 
acetylene, ammonia, chlorine 
dioxide, azides, cium 
(amalgam formation), sodium 
carbide, lithium, rubidium, 
copper. Mercury alkyl 
compounds incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
chlorine). As a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
(19 Pages) 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Wazards, and Other 
gatabases, Publication No. 
2000-130 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
.eactive hazards 
;ontinued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
36 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
86 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
?b: 2.5Et-04 kg 
(3.3E+02 mg/kg) 
Cn: 2.1E1-04 kg 
(2.8Et-02 mg/kg). 
YOs: 6.4Et-03 kg . 
(8.4E+O 1 mg/kg) 
Ag, 1.13E+Ol kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
7.61E+01 kg (1.5E+03 mg/kg) 
9.23E-02 kg (1.7E+03 mg/kg) 
3.62E+OO kg (2.OE+03 mg/kg) 
1.20E-02 kg (2.8E-01 mg/L). 
As, 3.55E-03 kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
-- 
3.55E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/kg). 
Remarks" 
[ncompatible with strong 
)xidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
xids. In the form of a soil 
;ontaminant, it would not be 
2xpected to be a reactive 
nazard. 
Combustible, but solid form is 
iifficult to ignite; however, 
9owder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
sontinue burning under water. 
[n the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. As a soil 
contaminant, this chemical 
species would not be expected 
to be highly reactive. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, tartaric acid. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can read 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. 
Refer ewesb 
3HI72O04c 
\TIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
?ocket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other 
3atabases, Publication No. 
!OOO-130 
Table A-4. Hazard 
Hazard Type 
keactive hazards 
2ontinued) 
dentification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Form 
i6 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
fellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
36 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
36 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
36 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Bay 1.4OEt-02 kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
7.9 1E+00 kg (1.6Et-03 mg/kg) 
1.88E-02 kg (3.5Et-02 mg/kg) 
1.28Bt-02 kg (6.9Et-04 mg/kg) 
4.94E+00 kg (1.2E+03 mg/kg). 
2-Butanone, 8.03E-00 kg (total 
for all drums) distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
8.03E-00 kg (1.90E+03 mg/L). 
Cd,2.41E+01 kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
2.34E+O1 kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
3.67E-03 kg (6.8Et-01 mg/kg) 
6.58E-01 kg (3.6Et-02 mg/kg) 
1.07E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/L). 
Cry 6.1OE+OO kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
6.1OEt-00 kg (3.3E+03 mg/kg) 
3.38E-03 kg (8.OE-01 mglkg). 
Remar ksa 
3arium chloride incompatible 
vith acids and oxidizers; 
iarium nitrate incompatible 
vith acids, oxidizers, and 
iluminum-magnesium alloys. 
ncornpatible with strong 
ixidizers, amines, ammonia, 
norganic acids, caustics, 
socyanates, and pyridines. In 
he form of a soil 
;ontaminant, it would not be 
:xpected to be a reactive 
iazard. 
:ncompatible with strong 
ixidizers; elemental sulfur, 
;elenium, and tellurium. 
[ncompatibility varies with 
compound, includes strong 
oxidizers or alkalis. 
Referencesb 
$HI, 2004c 
JIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
'ocket Guide to Chemical 
fazards, and Other 
Iatabases, Publication No. 
:000-130 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
$6 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
86 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Zircaloy-2 chips, contaminated 
with beryllium and some 
uranium, in 114-L (30-gal) 
drums. Likely form is as 
turnings and chips, not fines, 
due to nature of machining 
process. 
Quantity 
3g, 2.91E-01 kg (total for all 
irums) distributed as follows: 
i.26E-04 kg (1.2E+0 1 mg/kg) 
j.96E-03 kg (1.4E+00 mg/L) 
!.85E-01 kg (1.5Et-02 mg/kg) 
Pb, 5.62Et-03 kg (total for all 
irums) distributed as follows: 
5.58E+03 kg (1.1E+06 mg/kg) 
4.00E-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
3.88E+O1 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
1.18E+00 kg (2.8Et-02 mg/L) 
773 drums of Zircaloy-2 
Remar ksa 
u'aries with chemical form, 
ncompatible with acetylene, 
irnmonia, chlorine dioxide, 
izides, calcium (amalgam 
Tormation), sodium carbide, 
ithiurn, rubidium, copper. 
Clercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
lxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
[ncompatible with strong 
3xidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
scids. 
Assume that water fill has 
leaked out of drums, 
exacerbating pyrophoric/ 
explosive properties. 
Referencesb 
3HI,2004c 
YIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Vazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000-130 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
BHI, 2003 
DUN, 1977, Manufacturing 
Process Specifications, 
Metallic Uranium Fuel 
Elements Fabricated by the 
Co-extrusion Process, 
DUN-560 1 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Xeactive hazards 
:continued) 
Electrical energy 
Natural phenomena 
Natural phenomena (continued) 
Form 
Jranium metal cuttings. 
Sallium Chloride * 
Supply lines outside of the 
2xcavation fence for office 
trailers and analytical needs. 
Lightning. 
Seismic event resulting in 
ground motion. 
Quantity 
Unknown. 
Unknown 
Electrical service is estimated at 
13.8 kV, 400 amp, service. 
Mean thunderstorm frequency is 
low, averaging lO/yr, with the 
highest likelihood of occurrence 
during the months of June, July, 
and August. 
The Hanford Site is located in 
Zone 2B, a zone of moderate 
seismicity. For the 300 Area, 
peak ground accelerations ranges 
from 0.1 to 0.3 g, have a 
corresponding annual mean 
frequency of from 4.OE-03 to 
2.OE-04. 
Remar ksa 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
contaminant in soil it would 
not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Identified in the 6 18-7 IHE. 
Documentation mentions its 
use in buildings that may have 
contributed to 618-7, but does 
not state the quantities or if it 
was actually disposed in 6 18- 
7. 
High voltage lines shorting to 
ground could result in sparks, 
which could initiate a brush 
fire in adjacent areas. See 
remarks for flammability and 
kine tic/po tential energy 
hazard types. 
Lightening could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks for 
flammability and 
kinetidpotential energy 
hazard types. 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant. 
During a seismic event, a 
heavy load could be dropped 
onto contaminated soil 
causing an airborne (puff) 
release. 
Referencesb 
WIDS, Site Comment section 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
WCH 2005b 
Based on 300-FF-1 and 
1 O O - N R -  1 designs 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With Historical 
Data, PNNL- 1 3 8 59 
DOE, 1989, Draft 
Environmental Impact 
Statement, Decommissioning 
of Eight Surplus Production 
Reactors at the Hanford Site, 
Rich land, Wash ington , 
U.S. Department of Energy, 
Washington D.C. 
DOE/EIS-0 1 19D, 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). 
Hazard Type 
qatural phenomena (continued) 
Form 
3xtreme temperatures. 
ligh winds. 
ish fall resulting from volcanic 
ic tivi ty . 
'looding from the Columbia 
Xiver. 
Quantity 
Undefined quantities. 
[n the 300 Area, the annual 
werage wind speed is 12.1 km/hr 
[7.5 mph). 
The maximum peak gust wind 
speed at Hanford was 129 Mhr 
(80 mph) (1972). The annual 
average for number of days with 
peak gusts in excess of 80 km/hr 
(50 qph) is 4.7 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 km/hr (25 
mph) occur slightly more than 
1% of the time, on an annual 
basis. 
Undefined quantities. During the 
May 18, 1980 eruption of Mount 
St. Helens, about 7.6 mm (0.3 
in.) of ash was deposited at the 
Hanford Site this resulted in a 
wet ash loading of only 20.4 
kg/m2 (4.2 lb/ft2). 
The probable maximum flood 
(PMF) is estimated to produce a 
Columbia River elevation at the 
300 Area of 116.5 m (382 ft) 
above mean sea level. 
Remar ksa 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C (-20 to 115" 
F) * 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause debris 
to be thrown (a missile), 
causing a kinetic energy 
hazard, or causing a "puff' 
release if this material strikes 
contaminated soil. 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic 
activity have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of exposed 
surfaces at the excavation site; 
however, it would not result ir 
a release of material. 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
or Yakima Rivers (more so 
for the Columbia) is not 
anticipated to inundate the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit. 
(19 Pages) 
Referenced' 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Iiite Climatological Data 
Iiummary 2001 With Historical 
Data, PNNL- 1 3 8 5 9 
DOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
DOE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). 
Hazard Type 
Cinetic and potential energy 
Form 
Kainwater/snow and ice. 
Heavy equipment/machinery/ 
vehicle impacting the 
zontaminated soil or drums of 
waste materials. 
Quantity 
Maximum amount of 
precipitation over a 12-hour 
period is 2.72 crn (1.07 in.), with 
3 return period of 25 years 
(design basis). 
A similar project (1 18-K-1 Burial 
Ground remediation) estimate 
includes the following heavy 
equipment allocation: 
Dozer: 1 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Grader: 1 
Water truck: 1 
Shuttle truck: 3 
Scrapers: 3 
Backhoe: 1 
Fueltruck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5.  
Remar ksa 
Spread of contamination 
could occur. The arid-to- 
semi-arid climate suggests 
that little, if any, surface water 
will accumulate within the 
excavation. Most 
precipitation is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration of 
precipitation. Consequently, 
little water remains to 
generate surface runoff. 
Heavy machinery may collide 
with contaminated soil 
causing a “puff’ release of 
contaminated material. Heavy 
machinery may collide with 
drums containing retrieved 
wastes, rupturing the drums 
and causing particles to 
become airborne. 
(19 Pages) 
Referencesb 
DOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
DOE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 
Based on STRs for lOO-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA projects 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. ’7 (618-7). 
Hazard Type 
Kinetic and potential energy 
:continued) 
Form 
Zompressed gas bottles. 
Falling loads/drums/equipment 
used during remediation 
activities. 
Quantity 
Such materials will be kept to the 
minimum needed to support the 
project. 
Compressed gasses, estimated 
quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb in 
seven cylinders) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal in ten 
10-gal tanks) 
Oxygen: 45 kg (100 lb in four 
cylinders). 
859 total drums (estimated). 
(19 Pages) 
Remar ksa 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of contaminated 
soil or drums, resulting in a 
‘‘pufY release of 
contaminated soils, Heavy 
machinery could collide with 
the tanks causing rupture and 
potential struck-by hazard 
(missile), as well as ‘‘puff’ 
release of contaminated soil. 
It is assumed that a drop 
would be of sufficient velocity 
to rupture the drum causing a 
“puff-type” airborne release. 
A falling drum could strike 
contaminated soil, or another 
filled drum, resulting in a 
“puff” release. 
Referencesb 
~~ 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 1 00-N, 
and 100-F RA projects 
BHI, 2003 
Table A-4. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 (618-7). (19 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Linetic and potential energy 
:continued) 
Form 
4ircraft collision. 
Quantity 
Traffic as defined in 
DOE-STD-3014-96 (DOE 1996). 
Remar ksa 
The probability of this type of 
event is extremely low (per 
DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1 .OE-06). The Hanford Site is 
subject to very limited aircraft 
traffic due to relative location 
of airports and normal air 
traffic patterns. 
aA key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC = Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 200 1). 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
NC = Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
'Complete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
Referencesb 
DOE, 1996, DOE-STD-30 14- 
36 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Xadiological 
Criticality 
Toxic material 
Form 
Uranium-contaminated soil and 
solid waste from reactor fuel 
rnanufac turing . 
11 8 drums of the following: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
tailings, fines, and oils (Type 3). 
Uranium-contaminated soil and 
solid waste from reactor fuel 
manufacturing. 
Uranium- c ont aminat ed soil and 
solid waste from reactor fuel 
manufacturing. 
Quantity 
Cs-137: 4.20E-03 Ci 
Pu-239: 2.75E-01 Ci 
Ra-226: 2.06E-02 Ci 
Sr-89/90: 7.60E-01 Ci 
Th-228: 9.08E-06 Ci 
U-234: 2.28E+01 Ci 
U-235: 1.47E+00 Ci 
U-238: 2.46E+Ol Ci 
Total curies from all waste forms. 
U-234: 5.01E-01 Ci 
U-235: 2.34E-02 Ci 
U-238: 2.95Ei-00 Ci 
No. of Type 1 & 2 drums: 27 
No. of Type 3 drums: 91. 
U-235: 1.47E+OO Ci 
Pu-239: 2.75E-01 Ci. 
As: 1.1 E+02 kg (3.5Et-00 mg/kg) 
Pb: 1.OE+04 kg (3.3E+02 mg/kg). 
Remarksa 
Used highest concentrations 
fi-om Metcalf letter. 
Drum inventory data from 
6 18-4 used as analogous site 
data for drums. 
The maximum uranium oxide 
concentration (black) was 
used for all uranium oxide 
drums. 
Criticality screening 
concluded “No Criticality 
Impact.” 
Referencesb 
Metcalf, 1980, Analysis of 
61 8-8 Burial Ground Soil, 
Letter 65452-80-204 
BHI, 2003 
BHI, 2001, 618-4 Burial 
Ground ASA/FHC, MOC- 
BHI, 2003 
200 1-00 1 1, p.65 
BHI, 2003g, Remediation. 
61 8-8 Burial Ground, 
Criticality Screening No. 
0300X-CE-NO007 Rev. 0 
BHI, 2004c 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI- 
00012, Rev. 0 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
As, 7.40E-03 kg total, distributed as 
Hazard Type 
3 arcinog ens 
KHC (if present in its 
Form 
Uranium-contaminated soil and 
solid waste from reactor fuel 
manufacturing. 
Uranium-contaminated soil and 
solid waste from reactor fuel 
rnanufac turing . 
(continued) 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity I Remar ks" 
As: l.lEt-02 kg (3.5Et-00 mg/kg). KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms. 
Be: 1.OE-t-01 kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). RAHC (if present as chloride, 
fluoride, hydroxide, oxide, 
phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
beryllium-aluminum alloy). 
Cd: 4.6 E+01 kg (1.5Et-00 mg/kg). RAHC (if present as chloride, 
oxide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
Cr: 1.9Et-04 kg (6.2Et-02 mg/kg). KHC (if present in hexavalent 
state). 
Ni: 1.1E+04 kg (3.7E+02 mg/kg). RAHC (if present as acetate, 
carbonate, carbonyl, 
hydroxide, nickelocene, 
oxide, or subsulfide). 
Pb: 1.OEt-04 kg (3.3Et-02 mg/kg). RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as chromate). 
PCBS: 2.8Et-01 kg (9.2E-01 
mg/kg) * 
RAHC 
-- 
7.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/L) 
-- 
Referencesb 
3HI72O04c 
3HI,2004c 
* 
I 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification. Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Zarcinogens (continued) 
Form 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Cd, 4.9E+O1 kg total, distributed as 
€allows: 
1.8E+O1 kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8Et-01 mg/kg) 
1.4E+OOkg (3.6Et-02 mg/kg) 
2.2E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/kg) 
-- 
Cr, 1.3OE+O1 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
1.3Et-01 kg (3.3E-t-03 (mg/kg) 
7.1E-03 kg (8.OE-01 mg/L) 
-- 
Se, 1.1E+01 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
l.lE+Ol kg (2.9Et-03 mg/kg) 
-- 
-- 
Pb, 1.1 1E+04 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
1.1E+04 kg 
8.OE-02 kg 
8.3E+01 kg 
2.4E+OO kg 
-- 
Remar ksa 
iAHC (if present as chloride, 
ixide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
(I-IC (if present in hexavalent 
jtate). 
W C  (if present as sulfide). 
M C  (if present as lead 
icetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as lead 
;hornate). 
Referencesb 
3HI,2004cO 
3rum data from 618-4 
%rial Ground ASAIFHC, 
LIOC-200 1-00 1 1, Table 3, 
3. 67 (BHI 2001), are used 
is analogous site data for 
;hese drums 
IHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Clarcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
2arcinogens (continued) 
Biohazards 
Asphyxiates 
Form 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Insecthodent bites and dust 
from excrement. 
Heavier-than-air gasses. 
Quantity 
Arochlor-1254,4.2E+OO kg total, 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
1.2E+00 kg (5.4E+02 mg/L) 
-- 
Benzene, 6.6E-01 kg total, 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
-- 
6.6E-01 kg (7.5Ei-01 mg/L) 
-- 
Undefined quantities. 
Estimated maximum quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb) 
Propane: 380 L (1,006 gal). 
Remar ksa 
iAHC 
(HC 
I'hese hazards are routinely 
mcountered in industry. 
I'hese hazards are routinely 
mcountered in industry. 
4ctivities will be carried out 
.n outdoor, well-ventilated 
ireas. 
Referencesb 
3HI,2004c 
lrurn data from 618-4 
gurial Ground ASA/FHC, 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, Table 3, 
3. 67 (BHI ZOOl), are used 
i s  analogous site data for 
:hese drums 
DHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Zarcinogens, Ninth Edition 
:hemica1 Inventory 
latabase for lOO-B/C, 100- 
V, and 100-F RA projects 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
;lamunable materials 
Form 
degetation. 
Uiscellaneous combustibles, 
zeneral construction waste, 
ncluding pieces of plastic, 
;ardboard, wood, cloth, and 
)ther types generated during 
-emediation. Containers with 
3i1, paint chips, and waxy 
naterial. Powderhalts, 
mtomotive-type batteries, 
lsbestos, fabric belting material, 
2nd used rags may also be found 
luring site remediation 
xtivities. 
Quantity 
Surface of burial ground essentially 
Sevoid of vegetation. 
Unknown quantity of combustible 
waste expected to be relatively small 
Ziven the presence of “burning pits” 
within the 300 Area. 
Remarks’ 
2 range fire would not cause 
i significant release of 
iazardous substances due to 
.he lack of combustibles, 
:specially vegetation, within 
,he remediation site (the site 
will have been cleared of 
;ombustibles prior to 
nitiation of remediation 
ictivities). Minimal amounts 
lave been encountered at 
3ther burial ground 
-emediation sites (6 18-4 and 
5 1 8-5). 
Yo combustible wastes were 
mcountered at other nearby 
mrial grounds (6 1 8-4 and 
5 18-5). 
Referencesb 
Serber, M. S., 1992, Past 
Practices Technical 
Characterization Study: 
3 00 A rea-Hun ford Site, 
WHC-MR-03 8 8 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
;lammable materials 
continued) 
Corrosives 
Form 
kels and oils used by project. 
]rums of uranium tailings, 
k e s ,  and oil (Type 3 drums). 
Contaminated soil. 
Quantity 
Quantities of such materials will be 
kept to the minimum needed to 
support the project. Estimated 
quantities (per vehicle): 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 7,600 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake fluid: 19 L 
Hydraulic/transmission fluid: 760 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
~~ 
Benzene, 6.3E-0 1 kg, distributed 
over 138 Type 3 drums gives 
4.6Et-00 g/drum. 
2-butanone, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed 
over 138 Type 3 drums gives 5.1E- 
02 g/drum. 
Tetrachloroethene, 8.3E-0 1 kg, 
distributed over 138 Type 3 drums 
gives 6.OE+00 g/drum. 
Trichloroethene, 1.7E+O 1 kg, 
distributed over 138 Type 3 drums 
gives 1.2E+02 g/drum. 
Fluoride: 1 .OE+02 kg. 
Remar ksa 
Fuels and oils are found in 
vehicles, spare drums, and 
mineral oil staged for 
stabilization of the drums. 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 1 00-N, 
and 100-K RA projects. 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Noncombustible but 
decomposes in a fire to 
hydrogen chloride and 
phosgene gas. 
Combustible, burns with 
difficulty. 
Corrosive nature assumed 
mitigated by mixing with soil. 
~~ 
Referencesb 
3HI,2004c 
VIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSl 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
“Tazards, and Other 
gatabases, Publication No. 
2000-1 30 
BHI, 2004c 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (1'7 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
3xplosive materials 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
Zanisters and bottles of 
2cetylene, propane, oxygen, 
Zasoline in equipment fuel tanks 
2nd in other approved storage 
;ontainers. 
Quantity 
NO3: 2.6E+03 kg (8.4E+O1 mg/kg) 
Copper: 5.8E+03 kg (1.9E+02 
mg/kg) 
Quantities of such materials will be 
kept to the minimum needed to 
support the project. 
Estimated quantities: 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Grease, paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 2.8E+04 L 
Oxygen: 1.4E+O4 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Remar ksa 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. Copper 
can react severely with 
acetylene and hydrogen 
peroxide if present as metal 
dust/mist. If mixed with soil, 
explosive potential assumed 
negated. 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to the 
site. Gasoline and diesel is 
present in various vehicles on 
site (e.g., heavy machinery 
used for excavation, or 
transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount of 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
Quantity 
ig: 2.9E+03 kg (9.6E+O1 mg/kg). 
i s :  1.1Et-02 kg (3.5Et-00 mg/kg). 
Ba: 1.2Et-03 kg (3.8E+01 mg/kg). 
Remarks" 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, 
hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, tartaric acid. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Barium chloride incompatible 
with acids and oxidizers; 
barium nitrate incompatible 
with acids, oxidizers, and 
aluminum-magnesium alloys. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
3HI,2004c 
\TIOSH, 2000, Online 
VIOSH Pocket Guide to 
7hemical Hazards, and 
3ther Databases, 
'ublication No. 2000-130 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (1'7 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
.eactive hazards 
:ontinued) 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
oil and debris. 
2ontinued) 
Soil and debris 
:continued) 
Quantity 
3e: 1.OE-t-01 kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Ed: 4.6Et-01 kg (1.5E+OO mg/kg). 
Co: l.lE-t-03 kg (3.6E-t-01 mg/kg). 
Cr: 1.9E+04 kg (6.2Et-02 mg/kg). 
Cu: 5.8E+03 kg (1.9E+02 mg/kg). 
Remar ks" 
ncompatible with acids, 
:austics, chlorinated 
iydrocarbons, oxidizers. In 
he form of a soil 
:ontaminant, it would not be 
:xpected to be a reactive 
iazard. 
[ncompatible with strong 
3xidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium and tellurium. In 
:he form of a soil 
;ontaminant, it would not be 
Zxpected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
[ncompatible with strong 
oxidizers, ammonium nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
hydrogen peroxide) or alkalis 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
form). In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
$HI, 2004c 
JIOSH, 2000, Online 
JIOSH Pocket Guide to 
7hemical Hazards, and 
3ther Databases, 
'ublication No. 2000-130 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Online 
VIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Chemical Hazards, and 
Other Databases, 
Publication No. 2000-130 
Table A-5. 
Hazard Type 
Iazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Form Quantity 
Kg: 1.4E+02 kg (4.5EtOO mg/kg). 
?Ti: 1.1E+04 kg (3.7Et-02 mg/kg). 
Remar ks" 
Varies with chemical form. 
Incompatible with acetylene, 
amrnonia, azides, calcium, 
chlorine dioxide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper, sodium 
carbide. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Nickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfiir, 
selenium, wood and other 
combustibles, nickel nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Reactive hazards 
(continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
continued) 
1 18 drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
118 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Pb: 1.OE+04 kg (3.3Et-02 mg/kg). 
Zn: 8.5Et.03 (2.8E+02 mg/kg) kg. 
NOS: 2.6Et-03 kg (8.4E+01 mg/kg). 
Ag, 2.4E+01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.6E+01 kg (1.5E+03 mg/kg) 
1.8E-01 kg (1.7E+03 mg/kg) 
7.6E+OO kg (2.OEt-03 mg/kg) 
2.5E-03 kg (2.8E-01 mg/kg) 
-- 
As, 7.4E-03 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
7.4E-03 kg (2.8E-01 mg/L) 
-- 
Remar ksa 
hcompatible with strong 
)xidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
xids. In the form of a soil 
;ontaminant, it would not be 
:xpected to be a reactive 
nazard. 
Zombustible, but solid form 
1s difficult to ignite; however, 
?owder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
sontinue burning under water. 
[n the form of a soil 
sontaminant, it would not be 
Sxpected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. 
;;ontaminant, this chemical 
species would not be expected 
to be highly reactive. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, and tartaric acid. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers and bromine azide. 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
YIOSH, 2000, Online 
VIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Chemical Hazards, and 
Other Databases, 
Publication No. 2000- 130 
BHI, 2004c 
BHI, 2002, Determination oj 
MAR for 300-FF-2 OU Sites, 
Calc. No. 0300F-CA-N0003, 
Rev. 0 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Reactive hazards 
[continued) 
Form 
18 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Ir'ellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
1 18 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
1 18 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
118 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
!-Butanone, 7.4E-03 kg (total for 
111 drums) distributed as follows: 
7.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/L) 
Zd, 4.9Et-01 kg (total for all drums) 
listributed as follows: 
1.8Et-01 kg (4.6Et-03 mg/kg) 
1.4E+OO kg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.2E-03 kg (2.5E-Olmg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8Et-01 mg/kg) 
_- 
Cr, 1.3E+O1 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
1.3E+01 kg (3.3Et-03 mg/kg) 
7.1E-03 kg (8.OE-01 mg/kg) 
-- 
Hg, 6.1E-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.3E-03 kg (1.2Et-01 mg/kg) 
6.OE-0 1 kg (1.5E+02 mg/kg) 
1.2E-02 kg (1.4Et-00 mg/kg) 
-- 
-- 
~~~ 
Remarksa 
Incompatible with strong 
lxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium, and tellurium. 
[ncompatibility varies with 
;ompound, includes strong 
Dxidizers or alkalis. 
Reactivity varies with 
chemical form, incompatible 
with acetylene, amrnonia, 
chlorine dioxide, azides, 
calcium (amalgam 
formation), sodium carbide, 
lithium, rubidium, copper. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2002, Determination oj 
MAR for 300-FF-2 OU Sites, 
Calc. No. 0300F-CA-N0003, 
Rev. 0 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (1'7 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
3lectrical energy 
Vatural phenomena 
Vatural phenomena 
:continued) 
Form 
18 drums of uranium as: 
Hack oxide powder (Type l), 
I'ellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Iils (Type 3). 
hpply lines outside of the 
:xcavation fence for office 
railers and analytical needs. 
Lightning. 
Seismic event resulting in 
ground motion. _. 
Quantity 
Pb, 1.1E+04 kg (total for all drums) 
jistributed as follows: 
1.1E+04 kg (l.lEt-06 mg/kg) 
8.OE-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
3.3E+O1 kg (2.1E1-04 mg/kg) 
2.4Ei-00 kg (1.4Ei-00 mg/kg) 
-- 
Electrical service is estimated at 
13.8 kV, 400 amp service. 
Mean thunderstorm frequency is 
low, averaging 1O/yr, with the 
highest likelihood of occurrence 
during the months of June, July, and 
August. 
The Hanford Site is located in 
Zone 2B, a zone of moderate 
seismicity. For the 300 Area, peak 
ground accelerations ranges from 0.1 
to 0.3 g, have a corresponding 
annual mean fi-equency of from 
4.OE-03 to 2.OE-04. 
Remarksa 
[ncompatible with strong 
3xidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
xids. 
High-voltage lines shorting to 
ground could result in sparks 
that could initiate a brush fire 
in adjacent areas. See 
remarks for flammability and 
kinetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
Lightening could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks for 
flammability and 
kinetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
An earthquake would not be 
expected to posses enough 
energy to cause a release of 
contaminated soil directly to 
the air. During a seismic 
event, a heavy load could be 
dropped onto contaminated 
soil causing an airborne (puff: 
release. 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant. 
Referencesb 
3ased on 300-FF-1 and 
1 O O - N R -  1 designs 
3oitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
rite Climatological Data 
S'ummary 2001 With 
Yistorical Data, 
?NNL- 1 3 859 
Yanford Generic Interim 
Yafety Basis, WHC-SD-GN- 
:SB-3000 1, Rev. 0 (WHC 
1994) 
IOE, 1989, Draft 
Ynvironmental Impact 
Ytatement, Decommissioning 
?f Eight Surplus Production 
Peactors at the Hanford Site, 
P ich land, Washington, 
IOE/EIS-0 1 19D 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
qatural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
3xtreme temperatures. 
4igh winds. 
4sh fall resulting from volcanic 
ictivity. 
Flooding from the Columbia 
River. 
Quantity 
Undefined quantities. 
In the 300 Area, the annual average 
wind speed is 12.1 Whr (7.5 mph) 
Peak gusts have occurred as high as 
129 km/hr (80 mph) (1972). The 
annual average for number of days 
with peak gusts in excess of 
80 Whr (50 mph) is 4.7 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 Whr 
(25 mph) occur slightly more than 
1% of the time, on an annual basis. 
Undefined quantities. During the 
May 18,1980 eruption of Mount 
St. Helens, about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of 
ash was deposited at the Hanford 
Site this resulted in a wet ash 
loading of only 20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 
lb/ft2). 
The probable maximum flood 
(PMF) is estimated to produce a 
Columbia River elevation at the 300 
Area of 116.5 m (382 ft) above 
mean sea level. 
Remar ksa 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115” F). 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause 
debris to be thrown (a 
missile), causing a kinetic 
energy hazard, or causing a 
“puff” release if this material 
strikes contaminated soil. 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic 
activity have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of exposed 
surfaces at the excavation 
site; however, it would not 
result in a release of material. 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
or Yakima Rivers (more so 
for the Columbia) is not 
anticipated to inundate the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit. 
Referencesb 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With 
Wistorical Data, 
PNNL- 13 859 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With 
Wistorical Data, 
PNNL- 13 859 
DOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
DOE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 
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Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Linetic and potential energy 
continued) 
Form 
;ompressed gas bottles, 
'ailing loads/equipment used 
luring remediation activities. 
4ircraft collision. 
4 drum being dropped a vertical 
iistance. 
Quantity 
Such materials will be kept to the 
ninimum needed to support the 
x-oj ect. 
:ompressed gasses, estimated 
pantities: 
4cetylene: 45 lcg (1 00 lb in seven 
; ylinders) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal in ten 
10-gal tanks) 
3xygen: 1.4E+04 L (in four 5-gal 
:arks). 
118 drums total (estimated) during 
;he course of the project. 
Undefined quantity. 
118 drums. 
Remarksa 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of contaminated 
soil or drums, resulting in a 
”puff’ release of 
contaminated soils. Heavy 
machinery could collide with 
the tanks causing catastrophic 
failure/ explosion of tank and 
potential struck-by hazard, as 
well as “puff’ release of 
contaminated soil. 
A falling drum could strike 
contaminated soil, or another 
filled drum, resulting in a 
“puff’ release. 
The probability of this type of 
event is extremely low (per 
DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1 .OE-06). The Hanford Site is 
subject to very limited aircraft 
traffic due to relative location 
of airports and normal air 
traffic patterns. 
It is assumed that a drop 
would be of sufficient 
velocity to rupture the drum 
causing a “puff-type” 
airborne release. 
Referencesb 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 1 00-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA 
yojects 
DOE, 1996, DOE-STD- 
3014-96 
Table A-5. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 (618-8). (17 Pages) 
Hazard Type Form Quantity Remarks" Referenced' 
aA key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC = Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 200 1). 
NC = Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
bComplete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
Hazard Type Form Quantity Remar ksa Referencesb 
CO-60: 1.52E-03 Ci 
Cs-137: 6.99E-03 Ci 
Ra-226: 6.54E-03 Ci 
Sr-90 : 3.28E-02 Ci 
Th-228: 1.44E-02 Ci 
U-234: 5.16Et-00 Ci 
U-235: 4.75E-01 Ci 
U-238: 5.16E+00 Ci 
Zn-65: 3.04E-03 Ci 
Soil data from 6 18-4 
ASA/FHC MOC are used 
here as analogous site data 
for the 6 18- 13 site soil. The 
6 18-4 data were taken from 
Appendix A of DOE-RL 
(1995). Soil inventory based 
on concentration from 6 18-4 
times the soil volume. 
Justification of use of this 
inventory is provided in 
Section 4.1.2 of the ASA. 
DOE-RL, 1995 
BHI, 200 1 , 61 8-4 Burial 
Ground ASA/FHC, 
BHI, 2003b, Hazard 
Categorization of the 61 8-2 
and 61 8- I 3  Waste Sites, 
Calc. No. 0300X-CA-N0015, 
Rev. 1 
BHI, 2003 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1 , p.65 
<adiological Jranium-contaminated soil 
tnd solid waste from reactor 
uel manufacturing. 
Total curies from all waste foms. 
Zriticality LTranium-contaminated soil 
md solid waste from reactor 
%el manufacturing. 
U-235: 4.75E-01 Ci Criticality screening 
concluded ‘Wo Criticality 
Impact.” 
BHI, 2003e, Remediation: 
61 8-3 Burial Ground, 
Criticality Screening No. 
0300X-CE-N0008, Rev. 0 
Uranium-contaminated soil 
md solid waste from reactor 
fuel manufacturing. 
As: 2.1 E+01 kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg) 
Pb: 2.0 E+03 kg (3.3Et-02 mg/kg). 
BHI, 2004c 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
roxic material 
2arcinogens Uranium-contaminated soil 
2nd solid waste from reactor 
he1 manufacturing. 
As: 2.1 E+O1 kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg). KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms. 
BHI, 2004c 
RAHC (if present as 
chloride, fluoride, hydroxide, 
oxide, phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
beryllium-aluminum alloy). 
Be: 2.0 E+OO kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Cd: 9.1 E+OO kg (lSE+OO mg/kg). RAHC (if present as 
chloride, oxide, sulfate, or 
sulfide). 
KHC (if present in 
hexavalent state). 
Cr: 308 E+03 kg (6.2E+02 mg/kg). 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Z arc ino gens 
continued) 
3 iohazards 
isphyxiates 
'lammable materials 
Form 
Insecthodent bites and dust 
iom excrement. 
4eavier-than-air gasses. 
Vegetation. 
Quantity 
Vi: 2.3 E+03 kg (3.7E+02 mg/kg). 
Pb: 2.0 E+03 kg (3.3E+02 mg/kg). 
PCBs: 5.6 E+OO kg (9.2E-01 mg/kg). 
Jndefined quantities. 
Estimated maximum quantities: 
4cetylene: 45 kg (100 lb) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal). 
Surface of burial ground essentially 
ievoid of vegetation. 
Remar ksa 
RAHC (if present as acetate, 
carbonate, carbonyl, 
hydroxide, nickelocene, 
oxide, or subsulfide). 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as 
chromate). 
RAHC 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
Activities will be carried out 
in outdoor, well-ventilated 
areas. 
A range fire would not cause 
a significant release of 
hazardous substances due to 
the lack of combustibles, 
especially vegetation, within 
the remediation site (the site 
will have been cleared of 
combustibles prior to 
initiation of remediation 
activities). Minimal amounts 
have been encountered at 
other burial ground 
remediation sites (6 18-4 and 
618-5). . 
Referencesb 
-- 
Zhemical Inventory Database 
for 100-B/C, 100-N, and 
100-F RA projects 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
’lamable materials 
:continued) 
Corrosives 
Form 
Vliscellaneous combustibles, 
zeneral construction waste, 
ncluding pieces of plastic, 
:ardboard, wood, cloth, and 
3ther types generated during 
-emediation. Containers with 
3i1, paint chips, and waxy 
naterial. Powder/salts, 
zutomotive-type batteries, 
sbestos, fabric belting 
naterial, and used rags may 
zlso be found during site 
yemediation activities. 
Fuels and oils used by project. 
Contaminated soil. 
Quantity 
Unknown quantity of combustible waste 
expected to be relatively small given the 
presence of “burning pits” within the 
300 Area. 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support the 
project. Estimated quantities (per 
vehicle): 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 7,600 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake Fluid: 19 L 
Hydraulic/transmission fluid: 760 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Fluoride: 6.0Et-01 kg (3.3E+OO mg/kg). 
Remarksa 
No combustible wastes were 
xcountered at other nearby 
burial grounds (6 18-4 and 
5 18-5). 
Fuels and oils are found in 
vehicles, spare drums, and 
mineral oil staged for 
stabilization of the drums. 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 1 00-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-K RA 
projects. 
Corrosive nature assumed 
mitigated by mixing with 
soil. 
Referencesb 
Serber, M. S., 1992, Past 
Practices Technical 
Characterization Study: 
300 Area-Hanford Site, 
WHC-MR-03 8 8 
BHI, 2004c 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
:xplosive materials 
3xplosive materials 
continued) 
teactive hazards 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
Zanisters and bottles of 
icetylene, propane, oxygen, 
5asoline in equipment fuel 
anks and in other approved 
itorage containers. 
3011 and debris. 
Quantity 
NO31 5.1Ei.02 kg (8.4Ei.01 mg/kg) 
Copper: 1.2Ei.03 kg (1.9Ei.02 mg/kg). 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support the 
project. 
Estimated quantities: 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Grease, paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Oxygen: 45 kg 
Propane: 380 L. 
Ag: 5.8 E+02 kg (9.6Ei.01 mg/kg). 
Remar ksa 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. Copper 
:an react severely with 
acetylene and hydrogen 
peroxide if present as metal 
dust/mist. If mixed with soil, 
explosive potential assumed 
negated. 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to 
the site. Gasoline and diesel 
is present in various vehicles 
on site (e.g., heavy 
machinery used for 
excavation, or transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some' amount of 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, 
hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, and tartaric acid. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
3HI,2004c 
VIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Docket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other 
Patabases, Publication No. 
ZOOO- 130 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Keactive hazards 
:continued) 
Form 
$oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
4s:  2.1 E+Ol kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Ba: 2.3Et-02 kg (3.8E+Ol mg/kg). 
Be: 2.OE+OO kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Cd: 9.1E+01 kg (1.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Remar ksa 
lncompatible with strong 
Dxidizers and bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can 
react with inorganic arsenic 
to form the highly toxic gas 
arsine. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Barium chloride 
incompatible with acids and 
oxidizers; barium nitrate 
incompatible with acids, 
oxidizers, and aluminum- 
magnesium alloys. In the 
form of a soil contaminant, it 
would not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium, and tellurium. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Hazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000- 130 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
20: 2.2E+02 kg (3.6Et-01 mg/kg). 
3: 3.8Et-03 kg (6.2E+02 mg/kg). 
=lu: 1.2E+03 kg (1.9E+02 mg/kg). 
Hg: 2.7E+O1 kg (4.5E+OO mg/kg). 
Remar ksa 
[ncompatible with strong 
Dxidizers and ammonium 
nitrate. In the form of a soil 
sontaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
hydrogen peroxide) or 
alkalis. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
form). In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with chemical form. 
Incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, azides, calcium, 
chlorine dioxide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper, sodium 
carbide. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Referencesb 
3HI72O04c 
qIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Docket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other 
Vatabases, Publication No. 
!OOO-130 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
~ 
Hazard Type 
.eactive hazards 
zontinued) 
Form 
'oil and debris. 
sontinued) 
Quantity 
Vi: 2.3E-tO3 kg (3.7Et-02 mg/kg). 
Pb: 2.OEs03 kg (3.3Et-02 mg/kg). 
Zn: 1.7E+03 kg (2.8E-tO2 mg/kg). 
Remarksa 
qickel metal incompatible 
vith strong acids, sulfur, 
;elenium, wood and other 
;ombustibles, nickel nitrate. 
:n the form of a soil 
:ontaminant, it would not be 
:xpected to be a reactive 
iazard. Varies with chemical 
Form, incompatible with 
icetylene, ammonia, chlorine 
iioxide, azides, calcium 
[amalgam formation), 
sodium carbide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper. Mercury 
alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). As 
a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide 
acids. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Combustible, but solid form 
is difficult to ignite; however 
powder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
continue burning under 
water. In the form of a soil 
Contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
3HI,2004c 
JIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
'ocket Guide to Chemical 
fazards, and Other 
)atabases, Publication No. 
1000-130 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Ceactive hazards 
continued) 
Slectrical energy 
Yatural phenomena 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
(continued) 
Supply lines outside of the 
excavation fence for office 
trailers and analytical needs. 
Lightning. 
Quantity 
NO3: 5.1E3-02 kg (8.4E+01 mg/kg). 
Electrical service is estimated at 
13.8 kV, 400 amp service. 
Mean thunderstorm fiequency is low, 
averaging 1O/yr, with the highest 
likelihood of occurrence during the 
months of June, July, and August. 
Remar ksa 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. As a soil 
contaminant, this chemical 
species would not be 
expected to be highly 
reactive. 
High-voltage lines shorting 
to ground could result in 
sparks that could initiate a 
brush fire in adjacent areas. 
See remarks for flammability 
and kinetidpotential energy 
hazard types. 
Lightning could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks for 
flammability and 
kine tic/po tential energy 
hazard types. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Vazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000- 130 
Based on 300-FF-1 and 
1 O O - N R -  1 designs 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
rite Climatological Data 
Yummary 2001 With 
Historical Data, PNNL- 13 8 59 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
qatural phenomena 
:continued) 
Form 
ieismic event resulting in 
;round motion. 
Zxtreme temperatures. 
3igh winds. 
Quantity 
The Hanford Site is located in Zone 2B, 
a zone of moderate seismicity. For the 
300 Area, peak ground accelerations 
ranges from 0.1 to 0.3 g, have a 
corresponding annual mean frequency 
of from 4.OE-03 to 2.OE-04. 
Undefined quantities. 
In the 300 Area, the annual average 
wind speed is 12.1 Whr (7.5 mph) 
The maximum peak gust wind speed at 
Hanford was 129 km/hr (80 mph) 
(1972). The annual average for number 
of days with peak gusts in excess of 
80 W h r  (50 mph) is 4.7 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 Whr (25 mph) 
occur slightly more than 1% of the time, 
on an annual basis. 
Remar ksa 
During a seismic event, a 
heavy load could be dropped 
mto contaminated soil 
:awing an airborne (puff) 
release. 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant. 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115" F). 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause 
debris to be thrown (a 
missile), causing a kinetic 
energy hazard, or causing a 
"puff' release if this material 
strikes contaminated soil. 
Referencesb 
Vanford Generic Interim 
Safety Basis, WHC-SD-GN- 
[SB-3000 1, Rev. 0, 
Westinghouse Hanford 
Zompany, Richland, 
Washington 
DOE, 1989, Draft 
Environmental Impact 
Iitatement, Decommissioning 
cf Eight Surplus Production 
Reactors at the Hanford Site, 
Rich land, Washington, 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Iiite Climatological Data 
Iiummavy 2001 With 
Historical Data, PNNL- 1 3 859 
DOEYEIS-0 1 19D 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Jatural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
ish fall resulting from 
rolcanic activity. 
;looding from the Columbia 
Civer. 
<ainwater/snow and ice. 
Quantity 
Jndefined quantities. During the May 
.8, 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens, 
ibout 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash was 
leposited at the Hanford Site this 
.esulted in a wet ash loading of only 
l0.4 kg/m2 (4.2 lb/ft2). 
The probable maximum flood (PMF) is 
:stimated to produce a Columbia River 
:levation at the 300 Area of 116.5 m 
:382 ft) above mean sea level. 
rhunderstorm frequency is 
tpproximately 1 O/yr,  with the highest 
ikelihood in June, July, and August. 
Vlaximum amount of precipitation over 
i 12-hour period is 2.72 cm (1.07 in.), 
Nith a return period of 25 years (design 
iasis). 
Remar ksa 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic 
activity have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of exposed 
surfaces at the excavation 
site; however, it would not 
result in a release of material. 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
or Yakima Rivers (more so 
for the Columbia) is not 
anticipated to inundate the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit. 
Spread of contamination 
could occur. The arid-to- 
semi-arid climate suggests 
that little, if any, surface 
water will accumulate within 
the excavation. Most 
precipitation is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration of 
precipitation. Consequently, 
little water remains to 
generate surface runoff. 
Melting snow or ice would 
likewise not be expected to 
produce substantial runoff 
due to the soils high 
permeability. 
Referencesb 
IOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
veasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
IOE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 
IOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
IOE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 
Table A-6. Hazard Identification Worksheet for Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 (618-13). (12 Pages) 
Hazard Type 
Cinetic and potential 
mergy 
Form 
3eavy equipment/machinery/ 
Jehicle impacting the 
:ontamhated soil or drums of 
jvaste materials. 
~ 
Zompressed gas bottles. 
Aircraft collision. 
Quantity 
4 similar project (1 18-K-1 Burial 
Ciround remediation) estimate includes 
;he following heavy equipment 
illocation: 
Dozer: 1 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Srader: 1 
Water truck: 1 
Shuttle truck: 3 
Scrapers: 3 
Backhoe: 1 
Fuel truck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5. 
Such materials will be kept to the 
minimum needed to support the project. 
Compressed gasses, estimated 
quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb in seven 
; ylinders) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal in ten 10-gal 
tanks) 
Oxygen: 45kg (100 lb in four 
cylinders). 
Undefined quantity. 
Remarksa 
~~ ~ 
Heavy machinery may 
sollide with contaminated 
soil causing a “puff’ release 
Df contaminated material. 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with drums 
r;ontaining retrieved wastes, 
rupturing the drums and 
causing particles to become 
airborne. 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of 
contaminated soil or drums, 
resulting in a “puff” release 
of contaminated soils. Heavy 
machinery could collide with 
the tanks causing 
catastrophic failure/ 
explosion of tank and 
potential struck-by hazard, as 
well as “puff’ release of 
contaminated soil. 
The probability of this type 
of event is extremely low 
(per DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1 .OE-06). The Hanford Site 
is subject to very limited 
aircraft traffic due to relative 
location of airports and 
normal air traffic patterns. 
Referencesb 
Based on STRs for 100-B/C7 
100-N, and 100-F RA projects 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 1 00-N, 
and 100-F RA projects 
DOE, 1996, DOE-STD-30 14- 
96 
Hazard Type Form Quantity Remarksa 
aA key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC = Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
NC = Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
bComplete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
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300-FF-2 OPERABLE UN MEDIATION PR 
B.1 GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
All events that could result in a potential release of hazardous substances were evaluated using 
the following approach: 
e Events were grouped into three categories: operational/internal events, natural phenomena 
events, and external/man-made events. 
Events that were not applicable (e.g., flooding due to probable maximum flood, failure of 
engineered ventilation or filtration systems) were noted as not applicable (N/A). 
0 Frequency, Consequence, and Risk rankings were not assigned for events (such as loss of 
power to equipment) that could not result in a release of hazardous substances. These events 
are noted as not evaluated @/E) in the corresponding columns. 
Consequence and Risk rankings were not assigned to events with an assigned unmitigated 
frequency of D, beyond extremely unlikely. N/E is noted in the corresponding columns. 
B.2 FREQUENCY RANKS 
Frequency ranks were assigned using the following guidelines and the event frequency rank 
chart shown below. 
The frequency of the initiating event is the unmitigatedfrequency. 
0 Initiating events that involved human error were assigned an Unmitigated frequency rank 
of A. 
Initiating events that involved failure of an active component were assigned an unmitigated 
frequency rank of A. 
e Initiating events that involved failure of a passive component, were assigned an unmitigated 
frequency rank of B. 
0 Fire initiators involving use of an ignition source (e.g., vehicle exhaust systems, compressed 
gas torches) were assigned a frequency rank of A. 
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Anticipated 
Unlikely 
0 Frequency assigned to natural phenomenon events assigned consistent with frequency of 
applicable evaluation basis event. 
A May occur several times in the life of the facility > 1 E-02 
B Not anticipated to occur during the life of the facility 1E-04 to 1E-02 
0 Events that would not result in a potential release of hazardous substances (e.g., loss of 
power caused by vehicle accident) were not evaluated for frequency. 
~~ 
Extremely unlikely 
Beyond extremely unlikely 
Event Frequency Ranks. 
C 
D All other events <1E-06 
Probably will not occur in the life of the facility 1E-06 to 1E-04 
Term I Rank 1 Description Frequency Range I (yr-1) 
3.0 CONSEQUENCE RANKS 
Consequence ranks for the public, co-located worker, and facility worker were assigned based on 
anticipated unmitigated dose using the following charts. For events that were assigned a 
frequency of beyond extremely unlikely (event frequency D), the consequences were not 
evaluated. 
Public Consequence Ranks. 
Term Rank I Dose Range I Concentration Range 
________~ 
High I 1 I >25remTEDE I >ERP G-2/TEEL-2 
Moderate I 2 I 1to25TEDE I ERPG-l/TEEL-l to ERPG-2/TEEL-2 
Low I 3 1 0.1 to 1 rem TEDE I <ERPG-l/TEEL-l to ERPG-2/TEEL-2 
~~ 
Negligible 1 4 1  <o. 1 rem TEDE I <ERPG- 1 /TEEL- 1 
ERPG = emergency response planning guideline 
TEDE = total effective dose equivalent 
TEEL = temporary emergency exposure limit 
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High 
ocated Worker Consequence Ranks. 
1 >lo0 rem TEDE >ERPG-3/TEEL-3 
I Term I Rank 1 DoseRange I Concentration Range I 
Low 
Negligible 
3 
4 <1 rem TEDE <ERPG- 1 ITEEL- 1 
1 to 25 rem TEDE <ERPG- 11TEEL- 1 to ERPG-2lTEEL-2 
I Moderate I 2 I 25to 100remTEDE I ERPG-2lTEEL-2 to ERP G-3lTEEL-3 I 
Term 
High 
Moderate 
Low 
Negligible 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 <Low 
Exposure to .Radioactivity or Other Hazardous Materials Characterization 
Severe exposure resulting in prompt fatality 
Significant exposure (>lo0 rem TEDE or severe injury) 
Moderate exposure (1 0 to 100 rem TEDE, reversible health effects) 
ERPG = emergency response planning guideline 
TEDE = total effective dose equivalent 
TEEL = temporary emergency exposure limit 
Consequence Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Facility er Consequence Ranks. 
Frequency Rank 
D A B C 
I I I1 I11 
I I1 I11 IV 
I11 I11 IV IV 
IV IV IV IV 
€3.3 RISKRANKS 
Unmitigated frequency and consequence ranks were used to determine unmitigated risk ranks in 
accordance with the following chart. 
Risk Ranks. 
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Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk 
Frequency Consequence Risk 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
s s c s  Admin 
:ire 
Event 
Type 
1A 
Item Summary 
Number 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
1B 
and pressure 
regulators on welding 
cquipment (P). 
[mproper 
:ontrol of 
ignition 
sources 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Vehicle 
malfunction 
Graded/graveled 
roadways minimize 
Vead Of fire 
Graded/graveled 
roadways minimize 
spread of fire (M). 
Separation of roads 
from remediation 
lnay prevent 
vehicle fire from 
causing Of 
hazardous substances 
(0 
411 waste 
;ites 
Hanford Fire Department 
response 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Routine vehicle 
maintenance (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Hanford Fire Department 
response 
Radiation Protection 
prograln (see Note 2). 
411 waste 
sites 
OPERATIONAIJINTERNAL EVENTS (INITIATORS INTERNAL TO REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES) 
,oils, debris, and 
rums/containers 
ontaminated with 
iazardous substances 
radiological, 
issionable, reactive, 
arcinogenic, toxics, 
orrosive, flammable/ 
ombustible). 
bel  storage tanks, 
ylinders, cabinets 
ontaining flammable/ 
ombustible liquids. 
;ee 1A 
Welding, cutting, grinding operations or improper 
:ontrol of other ignition sources (e.g., smoking) 
gnites flammable/combustible materials used or 
zenerated during remediation, resulting in an internal 
Eire. The fire could result in a release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
rlie fire could also cause an explosion (see item 2C). 
The fire could also cause an internal missile (see 
item 3A). 
Vehicle malfunction causes vehicle fire. Vehicle fire 
ignites combustible/flammable material used or 
generated during remediation. The fire could result 
in a release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
The fire could also cause an explosion. (see itetn 2C). 
The fire could also cause an internal missile (see 
item 3A). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
BacMlash arrestors ITrained personnel (P). 
Event 
Type 
:ire Storage tanldcylinderl 
:abinet construction/ 
Item 
qumber 
IC Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
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Diking or double- 
walled tanks to 
:ontain liqL1ids (PI. 
Initiator 
/chicle 
ccident 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Radiation Protection 
Location 
1\11 waste 
lites 
Siting storage tanks/ 
: ylinders/cabinets 
0 Away from heavy 
traffic areas reduces 
accident potential 
(PI 
Away from 
rernediation areas 
reduces potential 
involvement of 
wastes (P) (M) 
vegetation 
minimizes spread of 
fire (M). 
0 In areas cleared of 
Summary 
PrOgraln (see Note 2). 
Affected Hazard 
'ee 1A 
Event Description 
iuman error causes vehicle impact to flammable 
iquid storage tanks, cabinets, or pressurized gas 
ylinders, causing breach of tank/cabinets/cylinders 
nd pooling of flamnmable/comnbustible liquids or 
:asses. Introduction of an ignition source causes a 
ire resulting in a release of hazardous substances via 
:ntraimnent. 
'he fire could also cause an explosion (see item 2C). 
?lie fire could also cause an internal missile (see 
tein 3A). 
Unmitigated Risk 
Frequency 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
'onsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs I Admin 
resistance to damage/ Fire Department 
ieterioration (P). 
materials provides 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
Item 
{umber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk 
2onsequence Risk sscs Admin .ocation Event Description kequency Affected Hazard 
'ee 1A 
Initiator 
:hemica1 
:action/ 
utoignition 
f 
iaterial 
yropllol-ic 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Jse of intrinsically 
;afe/nonsparking 
naterials when 
)pening sealed 
isums/containers (P). 
lvespacking 
ieteriorated dnims 
md filling ovespacks 
dblanketing or 
;tabilizing substances 
Irevents exposure to 
iir (P). 
?illing drums 
dblanketing or 
,tabilizing substances 
e.g., water, sand, grout, 
nineral oil) to prevents 
:xposure to air (P). 
j afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
{adiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
ire I D  dl waste 
ites 
iapid oxidation of pyrophoric material (e.g., 
circonium or uranium) occurs during opening or 
iandling of druins/containers or handling of debris 
.esulting in autoignition and a fire resulting in a 
-elease of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
3lanketing substances (e.g., inineral oil) or films of 
;Libstances that were used to prevent exposure to air 
ire anticipated to remain, which ininiinizes the 
xobability of autoignition. Should fire occur with 
Facility workers in the area, the release would not be 
:onfined and would be expected to disperse with air 
:unents. Workers would move away, upwind, or 
:vacuate the immediate area. Exposure to facility 
workers as a result of a fire is judged to be negligible. 
4lthough uranium and zirconium are pyrophoric 
materials, records indicate they are present as metal 
rurnings from machining processes, not as finely 
divided powdedfines required for explosive 
reactions. The potential for explosion and generation 
3f an internal missile is judged negligible. 
2A kadiolytic 01 
hemical 
ecomposi- 
ion of waste 
h y d rog en) 
111 waste 
ites 
;ee 1A Radiolytic decoinposition of water or hydrocarbon 
inateiials (e.g., ininesal oil) or cheinical 
decomposition in sealed dmms/containers produces 
hydrogen. Inadvertent ignition during opening or 
handling of dsums/containers results in burning or 
explosioddeflagration and release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
The potential for radiolytic or chemical 
decoinposition leading to an explosion is judged 
extremely unlikely. The long decay time for the 
anticipated wastes, such as uranium, would result in a 
low generation rate of hydrogen. Degradation of 
initial drum seal integrity to less than 100% via 
environmental (e.g., soil) exposure also decreases the 
potential for a significant accumulation of hydrogen 
Drum headspace further limits the inventory of 
hydrogen that could accumulate, thereby limiting the 
potential energy that could be released as a result of 
ignition. Due to these limitations, should ignition 
occur, a localized rapid burn (not rupture of the drum 
or ejection of its contents) is anticipated. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Jse of intrinsically 
;afe/nonsparking 
naterials when 
Ipening sealed 
hms/containers (P). 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
{adiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
bplosioi 
Flash 
;ire (see 
dote 3) 
Event 
Type 
:xplosion 
'lash 
ire (see 
Jote 3) 
I tem 
Jurnber 
2B 
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Initiator 
lultiple 
auses of 
ooled 
ammab le/ 
ombustible 
apors/ 
asses 
.ocation 
dl waste 
ites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
e e  1A 
Event Description 
4 pool of flammable/combustible vapors/gasses is 
.aused by: 
1 Vehicle accident (item 1 C) 
1 Human error during refueling operations, handling 
or use of flammable/combustible gasses 
1 Deterioratioddamage of storage tanks/cylinders. 
nadvertent introduction of an ignition source causes 
in explosion/deflagration resulting in a release of 
lazardous substances via entrainment. 
The explosion may also result in an internal missile 
see item 3B). 
Uthough the frequency of an inadvertent release of 
lammable/cornbustible gasses is anticipated due to 
iuman error, the frequency of an explosion that 
vould result from these initiators is judged to be 
:xtremely unlikely. The remediation project uses 
,elatively small volumes of flammable/combustible 
gasses; accordingly, the potential for a release of a 
ignificant quantity of gas as a result of a human 
mor is small. In addition, the gasses are not stored 
n confined areas or buildings. The gasses would be 
:xpected to rapidly disperse thereby preventing 
tccumulations at concentrations that would result in 
in explosion. Should ignition occur, a small 
ocalized flash fire is more likely than an explosion. 
Unmitigated Risk 
'requency 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Jonsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
- 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
Storage tankJcylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
resistance to damage/ 
deterioration (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets 
* Away from heavy 
traffic areas reduces 
vehicle accident 
potential (P) 
* Away from heavy 
traffic areas 
minimizes ignition 
sources (P) 
* Awayfrom 
remediation areas 
minimizes potential 
for involvement 
with waste 
* In areas cleared of 
vegetation 
minimizes spread of 
fire (M) 
In unconfined 
outdoor areas 
minimizes 
collection of 
vapors/gasses (P). 
Backflow preventers 
(PI. 
Underwriters 
Laboratories- (UL)- 
listed pumping 
equipment (P). 
Diking or double- 
walled tanks to 
contain liquids (P). 
Adrnin 
,icensed vehicle 
)perators (P). 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
janford Fire Department 
'esponse (M). 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
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Event 
Type 
Item 
iumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk I Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Initiator ,ocation Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency :onsequence Risk I sscs Admin 
.xplosior 
:lash 
ire (see 
lote 3) 
2c ee 1A 4 fire imparts energy sufficient to heat and pressurize 
uel tanks, gas cylinders, flammable liquid storage 
:abinets, or sealed drums/containers causing loss of 
nt egri ty . 
The mpture/explosion results in a release and burning 
)f contents, including hazardous substances if 
iresent, via entrainment. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
janford Fire Department 
esponse (M). 
iafety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note I). 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
IV Storage tankhylinderl 
IV materials provides 
cabinet construction/ 
some protection (P). 
Iv Proper venting of 
tankdcabinets 
provides some 
protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinders/cabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens probability of 
involvement w/waste 
(M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets or 
drums in areas cleared 
of vegetation/ 
combustibles inay 
prevent their 
involvement with fire 
(PI. 
;ire 
:ire 
~ 1 1  waste 
ites 
ill wastc 
ites 
The explosion may also result in an internal missile 
see item 3B). 
The potential for a fire imparting energy sufficient to 
:ause rapid pressurization and rupture/explosion of 
anks, cylinders, drums, or containers is judged 
mlikely. The contained materials provide a heat sink 
,hat will retard the heatup and pressurization rates, 
+educing the probability of catastrophic failure of the 
;ontainer, and violent ejection of contents. Vents 
nay also be present (e.g., tanks, cylinders) or inay be 
xeated by the heatup (e.g., popping of drum lids) that 
would further reduce the potential for catastrophic 
Failure and ejection. 
nternal 
Aissile 
3A lee 1A Fire damages a pressurized cylinder causing an 
internal missile. The internal missile impacts 
Zontaminated soil or debris resulting in a puff-like 
release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Jse of dust suppressants/ 
ixatives on contaminated 
oilddebris (M). 
iafety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
ipill response procedures 
MI. 
bdiation Protection 
'rograin (see Note 2). 
IV Druidcontainer 
construction/materials 
IV provides some 
protection (M). 
Iv Storage tadcylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
some protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinderdcabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens probability of 
involvement w/waste 
(MI. 
The internal missile may also impact/rupture one or 
inore waste drums/containers, or fuel storage 
tanks/cabinets, resulting in an airborne release of 
hazardous substances and spilling of contents (see 
item 9). 
The internal missile could also cause a secondary 
tire, explosion, spill, or release of material. 
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Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
TY Pe 
Summary Item 
$umber 
3B 
Event Description 'requency 'onsequence Risk sscs Admin Initiator .ocation Affected Hazard 
4n explosion causes an internal missile that may 
rnpact contaminated soil or debris resulting in a puff- 
ike release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Norker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Inidcontainer 
:onstruction/materials 
xovides some 
irotection (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
:ylinders/cabinets 
iway froin reinediation 
weas lessens probability 
If involvement 
dwaste (M). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debiis (M). 
Spill response procedure: 
30 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
iternal 
4issile 
:xplosion ill waste 
ites 
iee 1A 
4n internal missile may also result in a rupturing of 
me or more drums/containers, resulting in an 
iirborne release of materials and/or spilling of 
hwdcontainer contents (see item 9). 
The internal missile could also cause a secondary 
fire, explosion, spill, or release of material. 
3 c  111 waste 
ites 
;ee 1A A vehicle accident impacts equipment or obstructions 
:ausing an internal missile. 
The missile inay impact contaminated soil or debris 
resulting in a puff-like release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
An internal missile may also result in a rupturing of 
one or more drums/containers, resulting in an 
airborne release of materials and/or spilling of 
druidcontainer contents (see item 9). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Iruidcontainer 
:onstruction/materials 
irovides some 
irotection (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Maintaining roadways 
free of obstructions (P). 
Separation of nonnal 
roadways from active 
reinediation and staging 
areas (P) 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
nternal 
4issile 
nternal 
vlissile 
rehicle 
ccident 
Iuinan err01 
~~ 
Mishandling of pressurized cylinders causes ptincture 
or damage resulting in an internal missile that may 
impact contaminated soil or debris resulting in a puf5 
like release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
An internal missile inay also impact and rupture one 
or more drutns/containers resulting in an airborne 
release of materials and/or spilling of druidcontainer 
contents (see item 9). 
An internal missile may also cause a secondary fire, 
explosion, spill, or release of hazardous substances. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
1 v  
IV 
IV 
Sas cylinder 
:onstruction/materials 
irovides some 
irotection (P). 
Druidcontainer 
:onstruction/materials 
irovides some 
srotection (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
:ylinders/cabinets 
iway fimn remediation 
~ e a s  lessens probability 
if involvement 
dwaste (M). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debiis (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
3D I11 waste 
lites 
;ee 1A 
IV 
IV 
Druidcontainer 
constiuctiodmaterials 
provides some 
protection (M). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Item 
Jumber 
Summary Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
oss of 
ower 
Affected Hazard :onsequence Risk sscs Admin Initiator ,ocatior Event Description 
Vehicle accident or other human error causes loss of 
power to electrically powered equipment. 
Loss of power does not result in release of hazardous 
substances as electrically powered systems are not 
relied upon to prevent or mitigate releases of 
hazardous substances during remediation activities. 
Failure of portable electrical generators causes loss of 
power to electrically powered equipment. 
Loss of power does not result in release of hazardous 
substances as electrically powered systems are not 
relied upon to prevent or mitigate releases of 
hazardous substances during remediation activities 
Waste size reduction (e.g., mechanical shears or 
cutting torches) may be conducted during 
remediation. For radiological protection and 
ALARA, temporary enclosures or vacuum systems 
could be used to control the spread of contamination. 
From an analysis perspective, these enclosures or 
vacuums are not engineered ventilation systems are 
relied upon to prevent or mitigate releases of 
hazardous substances. 
Waste size reduction (e.g., mechanical shears or 
cutting torches) may be conducted during 
remediation. For radiological protection and as low 
as reasonably achievable (ALARA), temporary 
enclosures or vacuum systems may be used to contro 
the spread of contamination. From an analysis 
perspective, these enclosures or vacuums are not 
engineered filtration systems are relied upon to 
prevent or mitigate releases of hazardous substances. 
Human error in rigging, lifting, or operating 
equipment causes load of soil, debris, or drum/ 
containers to be dropped. 
Drop of soil or debris results in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Drop of druidcontainer results in rupture of drum, 
release of hazardous substances via entrainment, and 
spillage of contents (see item 9). 
Not 
evaluated 
Jot evaluated Not 
:valu- 
ated 
Jot evaluated. \Jot evaluated. 4A rehicle 
ccident 
;ee 1A ill wastc 
ites 
111 wastt 
ites 
NIA 
Not 
evaluated 
4ot evaluated Not 
:valu- 
ated 
Jot evaluated. \Jot evaluated. ;ee 1A oss of 
ower 
(OSS of 
'entila- 
on 
'ilter 
'ailure 
3quipment 
ailure 
NIA 
rT/A 
3uman err01 
4B 
5 
6 
7A 
NIA NIA NIA NIA ' NIA NIA 
NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: P 
Facility 
Worker: P 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
rrained equipment 
iperators and riggers (P). 
Jse of dust suppressants/ 
ixatives on contaminated 
;oils/debris (M). 
spill response (M). 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Iropped 
,oad 
411 wastl 
;ites 
See 1A 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Drudcontainer 
constructiodmaterials 
provides some 
protection (M). 
IV 
IV 
Staging of excavated 
drundcontainers 
away from heavy 
traffic areas (P). 
IV 
IV 
Dedicated staging area 
for excavated drums/ 
containers away from 
heavy traffic areas (P). 
Table l3-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Rernediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
dumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk I Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk I sscs Admin 
ee lA Equipment failure causes load of soil, debris, or 
dmms/containers to be dropped. 
Drop of soil or debris results in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Drop of druinkontainer results in rupture of drum, 
release of hazardous substances via entrainment and 
spillage of contents (see item 9). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of equipment 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
(P). 
I11 waste 
ites 
411 waste 
ites 
411 wastr 
;ites 
>sopped 
Bad 
inpact 01 
4eavy 
,oads 
inpact ol 
3eavy 
-,oads 
7B 
SA 
8B 
{quipment 
ailure 
luinan enoi 
IV 
Huinan error causes ovei-tumed vehicle or drop of 
heavy load/equipment. Impact on soil OS debris 
results in a puff-like release of hazardous substances 
via entrainment. 
Impact on drums/containers result in rupture of 
dmdcontainers, release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment, and spillage of contents (see item 9). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Trained equipment 
operatois and iiggers (P). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
)ee 1A 
IV 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of equipment 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
(PI. 
Zquipment 
ailure 
;ee 1A Equipment failure causes overturned vehicle or drop 
of heavy equipment. Impact on soil or debris results 
in a puff-like release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment, 
Impact on dsumdcontainers result in rupture of 
dsuinkontainers, release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment, and spillage of contents (see item 9). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Item 
?umber 
Summary Event 
Type Event Description i'requencj Zonsequence Risk sscs Admin ,ocation Affected Hazard Initiator 
4ultiple 
awes 
3nviron- 
nental 
:xposure 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Double-walled tanks 
provide some 
protection (P). 
Dikes, catch basins, 
other retention devices 
prevent spread (M). 
Staging of excavated 
di-ums/containers 
away from heavy 
traffic areas lessens 
potential for some 
spills (P). 
Drumkontainer 
constmctiodmaterials 
provide some 
protection (M). 
Trained equipment 
operators and riggers (P). 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
RefLieling instructions 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of equipment 
and vehicles (P). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
(PI. 
ee 1A I Human error (e.g., vehicle accidents, valve 
mispositioning) 
B Internal missiles 
* Human error (e.g., dropped loadimpact of heavy 
load) or, 
heavy load) 
B Equipment failure (e.g., dropped loadimpact of 
may result in spill of hazardous substances, airborne 
release via entrainment, and spills of other 
liquids/solids. 
Spills of pyrophoric material blanketing liquids 
(e.g., mineral oil or water) from dmms/containers 
could result in a fire (see item 1D). 
ill waste 
ites 
411 waste 
des 
pills 
:orrosior Environmental exposure causes corrosion of 
drums/containers resulting in failure of drums/ 
containers during excavation, handling, or storage. 
Failure of dnims/containers results in release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment and spill of 
contents (see item 9). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: P 
Facility 
Worker: P 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
N/A 
- 
None. Placing corroded dmmsl 
containers into overpacks 
may prevent subsequent 
failure of deteriorated 
diums (P). 
Spill response (M). 
Periodic inspection of 
druirdcontainers and 
overpacks for 
deterioration (P). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
e e  1A 
11 \I/A N/A N/A Although diumdcontainers provide some protection 
from a spill or release of contents, engineered 
structures (e.g., buildings, ventilation systems) 
subject to structural fatigue are not relied on to 
prevent or mitigate a release of hazardous substances 
during remediation. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A StructLlra 
Fatigue 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Event 
TY pe 
Item 
iumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
Not 
:valu. 
ated 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard 3requency Consequence sscs Admin Event Description 
Excavation, handling, or storage of soils, debris, or 
dmms/containers may expose waste materials that arc 
reactive with air or incompatible with other materials 
This exposure could cause a chemical reaction that 
would result in a release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment or spill. 
The reaction could also result in a fire (see Item 1 D 
for autoignition of pyrophoric materials). 
Concentrations of chemicals found in drums/ 
containers are generally greater than concentrations 
found in soils and debris. 
:hemica1 
teaction 
12 ixcavation, 
iandling, 
torage 
411 waste 
ites 
;ee 1A Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
)midcontainers 
:onstmction/materials 
nay prevent exposure 
o air or other 
ncornpatible inaterials 
P). 
Adding blanketing or 
stabilizing substances 
(e.g., water, sand, grout 
mineral oil) to 
pyrophoric materials (P). 
Use of druidcontainer 
overpacks to prevent loss 
of blanketing liquids. 
Segregation of waste 
streams may prevent 
exposure to incompatible 
materials (P). 
Hanford Fire Departineni 
response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Not evaluated. Juclear 
Xticalig 
13 ;issionable 
naterial 
411 waste 
;ites 
See 1A A criticality screening performed for the waste site 
inventories concluded the concentrations of 
fissionable materials were such that the remediation 
activities could be executed with no criticality 
impact. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Not evaluated Jot evaluated. 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Item 
llumber 
14 
15A 
,ocation Affected Hazard Event Description hx?quenc;). Zonsequence Risk sscs Admin Initiator 
;ee 1A Zxcess water used to suppress fires or dust causes 
iccumulations that migrate beyond the reinediation 
irea, resulting in spread of contamination. 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
iunoff control 
neasures, as necessary 
e.g., ditches, dikes) 
P). 
'ireldust 
uppression 
ill waste 
ites 
ianford Fire Department 
isactices to minimize use 
)f water inside waste site 
PI. 
'eriodic radiological 
;urveys would identify 
;pread of contamination 
vithin the remediation 
irea (P). 
h i t e d  source of dust 
;uppression water (tankei 
suck) (P). 
ieinediation of 
:ontamination spread 
)eyond boundaries (M). 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
icensed vehicle 
Iperatoss (P). 
ianford Fire Depastinent 
.esponse (M). 
iadiation Protection 
'rogsam (see Note 2). 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Norker: B 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Worker: P 
ntesnal 
'looding 
'ipe or 
lessel 
Cupture 
Iehicle 
.ccident 
411 waste 
sites 
jee 1A Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Storage tanks 
:onstruction/mateiials 
xovide some 
xotection (P). 
likes to contain 
;pilled liquids (M). 
louble-walled tanks 
nay prevent spill (P). 
Siting storage tanks 
iway from heavy 
raffic would reduce 
xobability of vehicle 
iccident (P). 
Y'ehicle impact to fuel storage tanks, gas cylinders, 01 
issociated piping results in rupture, spill of contents, 
ind possible fire. 
See item 1C for evaluation of fire. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Item 
{umber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
Admin Initiator ,ocation Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence SSCS 
'ipe or 
ressel 
[uphire 
15B 2orrosion 411 waste 
sites 
gee 1A Environmental exposure causes corrosion of fuel 
storage tanks, gas cylinders,.or associated piping that 
results in rupture, spill of contents, and possible fire. 
See item 1C for evaluation of fire. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
'rotective coatings on 
anks/c ylinderdpiping 
revent corrosion (P). 
Periodic inspections of 
vesseldtanks for 
degradation (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Spill response (M). 
Hanford Fire Department 
response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). - 
IV 
IV 
IV 
15C 3ver- 
~ressurizatio~ 
)r blocked 
vent 
411 waste 
iites 
See 1A Blocked vent or relief valves cause over- 
pressurization (or internal vacuum during pumping) 
that results in rupture or fuel storage tanks or 
associated piping, spill of contents, and possible fire 
See item 1C for evaluation of fire. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Periodic inspections of 
ventdreliefs for 
obstruction (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Spill response (M). 
Hanford Fire Department 
response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Provision of proper 
vents and reliefs to 
prevent over- 
pressurization or 
negative pressure 
during pumping (P). 
UL-listed pumping 
equipment (P). 
'ipe or 
Jesse1 
tupture 
Event 
Type 
Item Summary Unmitigated Risk 
Number 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk 
.ightning 
nduced 
Yaste 
;ite Fire 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
SSCS Admin 
Table I3-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Rernediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
17 ,ightning 
trike in 
vaste site 
111 waste 
ites 
;ee 1A i direct lightning strike in the waste site could ignite 
lammable/combustible materials used or generated 
using remediation activities, resulting in a waste site 
ire. The fire could result in a release of hazardous 
ubstances via entrainment. 
i direct lightning strike could also impart enough 
nergy to result in an explosion (see item 19). 
i direct lightning strike could also impart enough 
nergy to result in an internal missile (see item 20). 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
1v 
IV 
IV 
Proper grounding of 
flammable liquid 
storage tanks (P). 
UL-listed pumping 
equipment (P). 
Proper venting of 
storage tanks/ 
flammable liquid 
storage cabinets (P) 
(MI. 
Graded/graveled 
roadways provide fire 
break (P) (M). 
Storage tank/cylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provide 
some protection (P) 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets in 
cleared areas away 
from remediation 
areas (P) (M). 
(MI. 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
Ianford Fire Department 
esponse (M). 
:leasing remediation 
rea of vegetation/ 
oinbustibles (P) (M). 
tadiation Protection 
'sograin (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Item 
lumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Event 
Type 
dghtning 
iduced 
.ange 
ire 
- 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
sscs Admin Initiator .ocation Affected Hazard Event Description Zrequency :onsequence 
Clearing remediation 
%rea of vegetation/ 
:ombustibles (M). 
Hanford Fire Department 
response (M). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Radiatioi Protection 
Program see Note 2). 
18 dl waste 
ites 
,ee 1A i proximate lightning stsike could initiate a range 
ire that enters the waste site. The range fire could 
gnite flammable/combustible mateiials used or 
tenerated during remediation activities. The fire 
ould result in a release of hazardous substances via 
intrainment of hazardous substances. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Graded/graveled 
roadways provide fir6 
break (P). 
Storage tanldcylinded 
cabinet constiuctiord 
materials provide 
some protection (P). 
Proper venting of 
tankdcabinets 
provides some 
protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinderdcabinets 
away from 
remediation areas (M) 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylindedcabinets in 
areas cleared of 
vegetation/ 
combustibles (P). 
,i ghtning 
trike in 
ricinity 
,ightning 
;trike in 
vaste site 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Norker: C 
Facility 
gorker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Proper grounding of 
flammable liquid 
storage tanks (P). 
Proper venting of 
storage tanks (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinderdcabinets 
away from 
reinediation areas 
lessens potential 
involvement of wastes 
(MI. 
Periodic fire safety 
inspections for proper 
grounding, venting (P). 
Hanford Fire Department 
response (M). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note I), 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
ightninl 
nduced 
3xplosior 
19 ill waste 
ites 
4 direct lighting strike on fuel tanks/gas cylinders/ 
itorage cabinets causes an explosion that results in a 
,elease of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
The explosion could also initiate a waste site fire 
see item 17). 
The explosion could also result in an internal missile 
see item 20). . 
;ee 1A 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Item 
dumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
Initiator ,ocation Affected Hazard Event Description Trequency :onsequence Admin 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Hanford Fire Department 
response (M). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Routine radiological 
surveys for spread of 
contamination (M). 
Remediation of 
contamination areas (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
sscs 
; torage tank/cylinder/ 
abinet construction/ 
naterials provide 
otne protection (P). 
iiting storage tanks/ 
ylinders/cabinets 
.way froin remediation 
reas lessens potential 
nvolvement of wastes 
MI. 
ill waste 
ites 
;ee 1A A direct lightning strike causes an internal missile 
that may impact Contaminated soil or debris resulting 
in a puff-like release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment. 
An internal missile may also result in a rupturing of 
one or more drums/containers, fuel tanks/cylinders/ 
cabinets resulting in an airborne release of materials 
and spill of contents (see item 9). 
The internal missile could also cause a secondary 
fire, explosion, spill, or release of material. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Vorker: C 
Facility 
Vorker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
20 ightning 
nduced 
4issile 
;looding 
dghtning 
trike in 
Jaste site 
datura1 
recipitation 
Heavy precipitation (e.g., rain or snow) causes 
localized puddles and flooding of the remediation 
areas, resulting in spread of hazardous substances 
from remediation area. 
Due to arid climate and soil permeability, the 
potential for this occurrence is judged low. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
N/A 
- 
Not 
:valu. 
ated 
- 
(one. 21A 1\11 waste 
;ites 
;ee 1A Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
N/A 
\lot evaluated 
:looding 
'MF 
21B leavy rains/ 
now melt 
esulting in 
)robable 
naxiinum 
lood 
411 waste 
;ites 
See 1A Regional flooding to the probable maxiinurn flood 
elevation will not affect the remediation sites due to 
their higher elevation. 
N/A N/A N/A 
- 
Not evaluated. : looding 
Zata- 
;trophic 
2 1 c  3reach of 
lams 
411 wastc 
;ites 
See 1A Breach of dams on Columbia River will result in 
flooding of remediation area and spread of hazardous 
substances from remediation area. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Jot evaluated. 
tein 1A 
'ontaminated 
Iiumslcontainers 
High winds could suspend removable surface 
containination froin drums. High winds could spread 
containination to offsite receptors. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Tipover of dnmdcontainers as a result of high wind 
is not anticipated due to their low center of gravity, 
mass, and geometry. 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
iirborne 
<elease 
nduced 
)y High 
Nind 
Item 
hmbei  
22A 
Event Description Frequencj Zonsequence Risk sscs Admin Initiator 
ligh wind 
Location 
411 waste 
;ites 
Affected Hazard 
tein 1 A ligh winds suspend containinated soil or removable 
urface containination on debris, resulting in airborne 
elease via entrainment. High winds could spread 
.ontamination to offsite receptors. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
\lone. Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Suspension of 
remediation activities 
during high winds (P). 
Routine air monitoring 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
( 0  
Zontarninated soil, 
iebris 
iirborne 
<elease/ 
;pill 
nduced 
)y High 
Mind 
;vent 
22B ligh wind 411 waste 
;ites 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Intdcontainers and 
wei-packs provide 
xotection from 
ipilling contents (M). 
Prohibition on stacking 
of dntins inay prevent 
tipover (P) or dainage to 
drums (M). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Housekeeping of 
remediation area 
minimizes unnecessary 
materials that could 
become missiles (P). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Prograin (see Note 2). 
nternal 
Ylissile 
nduced 
)y High 
Nind 
?vent 
ligh wind :tern 1 A 
Zontarninated 
Inuns/containers 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Inttdcontainer and 
wespack construction 
naterials provide 
;oine physical 
xotection (M). 
storage tank/cylinder/ 
:abinet construction/ 
naterials provide 
oine protection (P). 
;iting storage tanks/ 
: ylinders/cabinets 
iway froin remediation 
reas lessens potential 
nvolveinent of wastes 
MI. 
22c  411 waste 
;ites 
High winds could generate inissile that may result in 
punctusing/ntptusing one or inore drums/containers 
or fuel tanks/cylinders/cabinets resulting in an 
airborne release of hazardous substances and spilling 
of contents. Wind-generated missiles that result in 
dainage to diuins/containers or fuel tanks/cylinders/ 
cabinets and subsequent spill are not anticipated. 
Based on DOE-STD-1020-2002, Table 3-2, 
regarding wind design criteria, it is believed that the 
frequency of a peak gust wind speed sufficient to 
generate a missile that could breach a druid 
containers is less than lE-O2/yr on the Hanford Site. 
See item 3B for evaluation of internal missile. 
sscs 
Jone. 
Admin 
Excavation layback 
requirements prevent 
slope shifts (P) (M). 
Hanford Emergency 
Response (M). 
Remediation of 
contamination spread 
(MI. 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
doow center of gravity 
)f remediation 
:quipment provides 
oine protection (M). 
jtaging of excavated 
lnuns/containers 
,way froln heavy 
lotential damage (M). 
raffic areas lninilnizes 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debiis (M). 
Hanford Emergency 
Response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Prograln (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
4irborne 
ielease 
nduced 
'Y 
Seismic 
:vent 
Item 
{umber 
23A 
23B 
23C 
- 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Initiator Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency :onsequence -,omtion 
Jarthquake 1\11 waste 
ites 
tein 1A Seismic event causes ground movement and shaking 
of exposed remediation soils and debris, resulting in 
generation of minimal amounts of airborne hazardou: 
substances as dust and spread of contamination. 
Due to excavation layback requirements (nidrise 
limited to 1.5: 1) and moisture content, a seismic 
event is not anticipated to have sufficient energy to 
cause shifting of soil slopes. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
:ontaminated soils, 
lebris 
[mpact o 
Heavy 
Load 
[nduced 
3Y 
Seismic 
Event 
Zarthquake i l l  waste 
ites 
tein 1A 
iemediation 
:quipment 
Seismic event causes ground movement and shaking 
of excavation equipment, and iinpact to soils, debris, 
drums/containers. 
Overturn of remediation equipment, resulting in 
heavy load impact to soils, debris, and drums/ 
containers is not anticipated due to the low center of 
gravity of remediatioii equipment. 
See items 8A and 8B for evaluation of heavy load 
impacts. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Seismic event causes ground movement and shaking 
of fuel storage tanks/cylinders/cabinets, resulting in 
rupture and spill of contents. 
Breach of fuel storage tanks/cylinders is not 
anticipated due to construction and low center of 
gravity. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
;torage tank/cylinder/ I Spill response (M). Rupture 
of Pipes/ 
Vessels 
Induced 
Seismic 
Event 
by 
Zarthquake 411 waste 
;ites 
tern 1A 
zuel storage tanks/ 
: ylinders/cabinets 
Jse of double-walled 
anks if appropriate 
M). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Event 
Type 
Summary Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Item 
iumber 
Event Description Frequency :onsequence Risk sscs Admin Initiator ,ocation Affected Hazard 
~ 
Seismic event causes minor ground movement and 
shaking of diums/containers, that may result in tip 
over, rupture of dmins/containers, airborne release, 
and spillage of druidcontainer contents (see item 9). 
Tip over or sliding of drums/containers during 
eaithquakes is not anticipated. Calculation 
No. 0200W-CA-CO 164, Rev 0, evaluated the seismic 
stability of drums in the staging area at the 
Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility and 
concluded sliding/tipover would not occur during the 
design basis event. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Iruinkontainer and 
werpacks 
:onstruction and 
naterials provide 
n-otection from 
upture (P) and 
pilling contents if 
ipped over (M). 
'rohibition on stacking 
If drums lessens 
Iotential for tipover (P). 
'rohibition on stacking 
If druins lessen damage 
o drums (M). 
;pill response (M). 
ladiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
iuphire 
If 
3Iuinsl 
:on- 
ainers 
nduced 
'Y 
Seismic 
3vent 
2 3 0  larthquake 111 waste 
ites 
em 1A 
nims/containers 
Snow blankets soil, debris, and drums with sufficient 
load to cause release of hazardous substances. 
Buildup of snow on excavated drundcontainers is 
not anticipated to result in dead loads sufficient to 
collapse or breach drums/containers. 
Buildup of snow on fuel tanks/cylinders/cabinets is 
not anticipated to result in dead loads sufficient to 
collapse or breach them. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
?ot evaluated Not 
:valu. 
ated 
?ot evaluated. dot evaluated. Zollapse 
3 f  
Drums/ 
2011- 
:ainer, 
Fuel 
Tanks/ 
Cylinder 
Induced 
by Snow 
Load 
24 how fall 411 waste 
ites 
em 1A 
Iruindcontainers 
uel tank& ylinders/ 
ibinets 
em 1A Volcanic ash blankets soil, debris, and drums with 
sufficient load to cause release of hazardous 
substances. 
Buildup of ash on excavated druidcontainers, fuel 
taizks/cylinders/cabinets is not anticipated to result in 
dead loads sufficient to collapse or breach 
druins/containers. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
\lot evaluated Not 
walu 
ated 
- 
\Jot evaluated. dot evaluated. Collapse 
of 
Drums/ 
Con- 
tainers, 
Fuel 
Tanks/ 
Cylinder 
Induced 
by Ash 
Fall 
25 Jolcanic 
ictivity 
411 waste 
; i t a  
hms/containers 
uel tankdcylinderd 
sbinets 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Event Item Summary 
Type Number I I I I I 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency I Consequence I Risk 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
s s c s  Admin 
I 
.ange 
ire 
Range 
Fire 
Storage drums/tanks/ 
Raininable liquid 
storage cabinets 
sonstruction materials 
provide some 
resistance (P). 
Graded roads/fire lines 
inhibit spread of fire 
into remediation areas 
:PI (M). 
Proper venting of 
tankdcabinets 
provides some 
protection (P) (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinders/cabinets 
26A Remediation/storage 
areas cleared of 
vegetation (P) (M). 
Minimization and proper 
storage of combustible 
materials (M). 
F1alnlnable 
cabinets (M). 
Hanford Emergency 
Response Plan (M). 
Hanford Fire Departinen 
response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
26B 
lehicle or 
tansportation 
.ccident 
'roximate 
iircraft crad 
dl waste 
ites 
I11 waste 
ites 
ee 1A 
;ee 1A 
i vehicle or transportation accident could initiate a 
ange fire that enters the waste site. The range fire 
ould ignite flarnmable/comnbustible materials used or 
,enerated during remediation activities. Equipment 
uel/oil, drums holding mineral oil, etc., would be 
vailable to propagate a fire. The fire could result in 
release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Zn aircraft crash could initiate a range fire that enters 
he waste site (see item 26A). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: E 
Facility 
Worker: E 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
See item 26A. See item 26A. 
Event 
Type Affected Hazard 
'ee 1A Vaste 
;ite Fire 
Summary 
Event Description 
An aircraft crash in the waste site could directly 
ignite flaininable/combustible materials in the 
remediation area. The fire could result in a release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
The aircraft crash could also cause an explosion 
(see item 27A). 
DOE-STD-3014-96, Table B-14, assigns a 1E-04 
frequency of a general aviation airplane crash (and 
lesser frequencies for military or commercial aircraft) 
occurring per square mile, per year, at the Hanford 
Site. The definition of general aviation aircraft 
includes nonmilitary or noncommercial flight 
activities such as herbicide application and power 
line surveys as are conducted on the Hanford Site. 
One square mile equates to 2.59 E+06 in2. Since 
none of the waste sites exceed 2.5 E+04 in2 in surface 
area, the probability of an airplane crash occurring 
inside the waste site boundaries is two orders of 
magnitude less, or 1 E-06. It is also anticipated that 
remediation activities will not expose the entire 
surface of the waste site at any one time, which 
would further reduce the potential for a release of 
hazardous substances. 
Item 
hmber 
26C 
Table B-1 Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
liiitiator 
iirci-aft 
.rash in the 
vaste site 
Location 
411 waste 
ites 
Unmitigated Risk 
'requency 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Norker: D 
Facility 
Norker: D 
'onsequence 
\lot evaluated 
- 
Risk 
Not 
:valu- 
ated 
-
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
got evaluated. 
Admin 
qot evaluated. 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
Jumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
Not 
:valu- 
ated 
- Initiator ,oation Affected Hazard Event Description sscs Admin :onsequence 
dot evaluated 27A ill waste 
ites 
;ee 1A An aircraft crash in the remediation area could result 
in an explosion, and the release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Norker: D 
dot evaluated. \lot evaluated. iircraft 
rash in the 
iaste site 
iircraft 
:rash in 
ricinity of 
vaste site 
Bplosion 
zxplosior 
The explosion could also cause a missile (see 
item 20). 
DOE-STD-3014-96, Table B-14, assigns a 1E-04 
frequency of a general aviation airplane crash (and 
lesser frequencies for inilitaiy or commercial aircraft 
occurring per square mile, per year, at the Hanford 
Site. The definition of general aviation aircraft 
includes nonmilitary or noncommercial flight 
activities such as herbicide application and power 
line surveys as are conducted on the Hanford Site. 
One square mile equates to 2.59 E+06 in2. Since 
none of the waste sites exceed 2.5 E+04 in2 in surfacl 
area, the probability of an airplane clash occumng 
inside the waste site boundaries is two orders of 
magnitude less, or 1E-06. It is also anticipated that 
remediation activities will not expose the entire 
surface of the waste site at any one time, which 
would further reduce the potential for a release of 
hazardous substances. 
see 1A Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Not 
walu. 
ated 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
4ot evaluated. Vot evaluated. 27B 1\11 waste 
ites 
\rot evaluated 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
An aircraft crash in the proximate vicinity of the 
remediation area could result in an explosion and 
pressure pulse. 
As the remediation area is not confined, the resulting 
pressure pulse is judged insufficient to damage 
drums/containers, fuel tanks/cylinders/cabinets 
resulting in a release of hazardous substances. 
A vehicle or transportation accident causes a loss of 
power supply to the remediation site, resulting in 
possible intemption in remediation work. 
Loss of power does not result in release of hazardou 
substances as electrically powered systems are not 
relied upon to prevent or mitigate releases. 
Vone. Loss of 
Power 
28 Jehicle or 
ransportatia 
1 accident 
911 waste 
;ites 
See 1A Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
(one. 
Event 
Type 
(elease 
If Haz- 
rdous 
tances 
iub- 
Item 
$umber 
29 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 300-FF-2 Remediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Initiator 
iccident at 
iearby 
acility 
Location 
411 waste 
ites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
4/A 
Event Description 
Accident at nearby facility causes an airborne release 
of toxic materials. Depending on concentration and 
wind directiordstability, the release may result in 
deposition of hazardous substances in the 
remediation area. Interaction of the released 
substances with existing hazardous substances in the 
waste sites is not anticipated. 
Initiation of emergency procedures at the nearby 
facility would result in the appropriate notification or 
evacuation of remediation workers. 
The remediation activities do not include the 
operation of processes, equipment, or systems that 
require continuous manned operation. There are no 
monitored processes or operations that cannot be 
suspended and workers evacuated. 
Unmitigated Risk 
Frequency 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
zonsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
\Tone. 
Admin 
3anford Emergency 
tesponse Program. 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
VOTE 1 : Safety/Fire Protection Program procedures (S/FPP) include, as appropriate, the following: 
1 Hot work peiinits (P) that require protection or movement of combustible materials (P), and fire watch with extinguisher and means to notify Hanford Fire Department (M). 
1 Fire Marshal Peiinits for installation, storage, use, or handling of flaininable/combustible liquids (based on type and volume of flamnable/cotnbustible liquids (P), including restrictions on smoking (P) and 
1 Fire Marshal pennits for siting/construction of membrane structures and tents, and other portable structures (e.g., trailers). 
1 Use of UL-listed flaminable/comnbustible liquid pumping equipment (P). 
1 Periodic inspections for control of ignition sources (P), control of combustibles (P), removal of excess combustibles (P) (M), and material condition of flaimnable/combustible liquid storage tanks. 
1 Provisions for storage of flainmable/cotnbustible gasses (P) including sepaiate storage of fuels and oxygen, chains, and caps (P). 
refueling operations (P), and measures for containment of liquids (dikedcatch basins, double-wall tanks, or combination thereof). 
Appropriate provisions are identified for opening bulged or sealed druindcontainei-s, that include (as appropriate) limiting number of drums handled at one time, use of intrinsically safe/nonsparking 
materials and remote apparatus to open, separation from other dmms/containers prior to opening (P) (M). 
stabilization substances (P) (M). 
1 Appropriate provisions for storing excavated drums/containers, that include (as appropriate) use of noncombustible overpacks and staging materials (P), and use of nonflaimnable/combustible blanketing 01 
VOTE 2: Radiation Protection Program procedures include, as appropriate, the following: 
b Monitoring and survey methods to detect the spread of radioactive contamination to minimize or prevent its release during a proximate event (P) and to mitigate the potential for additional release of 
B Instructions to suspend work in outdoor radiological areas when visible airborne dust is present (P) (M). 
B Provision for storage of radioactive material in designated locations and in containers appropriate for radiological hazards (P) (M). 
P Conduct of operations and personal protective equipment (PPE) for work in radiological areas to minimize or prevent exposure and intake (P) (M). 
UOTE 3: As defined in NFPA 199 1, an explosion is a rapid release of high-pressure gas into the environment. The events of concern in this evaluation involve a propagating reaction that begins at a 
specific point (e.g., ignition point) and then propagates through the unreacted material. Propagation may generate a flash fire or an explosion that propagates either subsonically (deflagration) or 
supersonically (detonation) (AIChE 1989). The energy release rate of this type of event is dependent on the propagation rate, which, in turn, is dependent on the combustible concentration. Propagation 
xcurs rather slowly near the limiting combustible concentrations (e.g., lower explosive limit) and increases to a inaxiinum near stoichiometry. Any such event at the burial ground is expected to be a flash 
fire or a deflagration with small pressure generation. 
SSC = systems, structures, and components 
material after an event (M). 
Training to ensure appropriate response to radiological hazards.(M). 
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Table C-1. 300-FF-2 Inventory Basis Documents. (9 Pages) 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
Location Withii 
the document 
Document Title and 
ID  NO.^ 
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
Waste 
Site 
Site ID No.: 61 8-1. NA \Jo chemical inventory is 
wail able. 
'age 664. Liazard Ranking System 
?valuation of CERCLA 
'nactive Waste Sites at 
Yanford, PNL-6456 
Pu-239: 0.06 Ci, 
Pu-240: 0.0 17 Ci. These values 
are decayed through April 1 , 
1986. 
11 8-1 
11 8-1 Site ID No.: UPR-300-13. t,432 lb of NO3 and 477 lb of 
:opper. 
Site ID No.: 
JPR-300-13. Assume 
:opper is in metal form. 
'age 255. Yazard Ranking System 
!?valuation of CERCLA 
fnactive Waste Sites at 
Yanford, PNL-6456 
3 lb (0.0005 Ci) of uranium. 
NA 1,542 L (1,200 &)of 93% 
;ulfuric acid. 
Site ID No.: 
JPR-300- 14. 
'age 256. i18-1 Yazard Ranking System 
Yva Luation of CERCLA 
rnactive Waste Sites at 
Vanford, PNL-6456 
NA 
UPR-300- 13. ipproximately 4,92 1 L of spent 
xocess acid was spilled. The 
Icid released included 4,432 lb 
If NO3 and 447 lb of copper. 
4pproximately 1,9 10 lb of 
:austic was added to neutralize 
he acid. 
JPR-300-13. ;ection 5.9, 
JPR-300- 1 3 I 
i18-1 3 00-FF-2 Operable 
Unit Technica L Base Line 
Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
The acid released included 3 lb, 
or approximately 5.0 x Ci, 
of uranium. 
jl8-1 300-FF-2 Operab Le 
Unit Technical BaseLinc 
Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
NA NA $343 L (1,200 gal) of 93% 
mlfuric acid solution. 
JPR-300- 14. ;ection 5.10, 
JPR-300-14. 
;ection 6.5, 61 8-1 
Solid Waste Buria 
;round No. 1). 
518-1 300-FF-2 Operable 
Unit Technical BaseLinc 
Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
A large quantity of uranium, 
estimated to be about 16 tons, 
was buried at this site. 
It is estimated that wastes at this 
site contain 6.0 x 
Pu-239 and 1.70 x 
Pu-240 in curies decayed 
through April 1 , 1986. 
Ci of 
Ci of 
6 1 8- 1 Burial Ground. NA NA 
Letter from 
D. L. Renberger (UNC 
Nuclear Industries) to 
R. A. Holten 
(U.S. DOE), Aug. 8, 
1986. Received 
August 15,1986 
61 8-4 Burial Ground 
ASA/FHC, 
MOC-2001-0011 
Table C-1. 300-FF-2 Inventory Basis Documents. (9 Pages) 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
Location Within 
the document 
Document Title and 
ID  NO.^ 
Radiological Inventory 
Infor ma tion 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Waste 
Site 
i18-1 ZERCLA: Phase I Installation 
4ssessment of Inactive Waste 
Disposal Sites at Hanford 
'Hanford Inactive Site Survey 
batabase) Pu-239: 0.06; Others: 
io curie amounts identified. 
Hanford Defense Waste DEIS: 
Volume 2, Appendix A, 
rable A.11: Pu: 96 Ci; Others: 
io  curie amounts identified. 
'his letter refers to a 
liscrepancy between these 
nventory numbers. 
NA 9ttachment 1. 
'age 65. Soil data for 61 8-4 to use as 
inalogous data for soil: Cs- 137, 
I .  15 pCi/g; CO-60, 0.25 pCi/g; 
Ra-226, 1.075 pCi/g; Th-228, 
2.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
548.45 pCi/g; U-235,78.1 
pCi/g; U-238, 848.45 pCi/g; Zn- 
55, 0.5 pCi/g. 
NA Soil data for 61 8-4 to use as 
analogous data for soil: As, 
3.475 mg/kg; Be, 0.325 mgkg; 
Cd, 1.5 mg/kg; Cr, 
623.075 mgkg; Co, 36 mg/kg; 
Cu, 191.625 mgkg; Pb, 
332.5 mg/kg; Hg, 4.45 mg/kg; 
Ni, 371.5 mg/kg; Ag, 96 mg/kg; 
Zn, 280 mg/kg; F-, 3.25 mg/kg; 
NH3,0.625 mg/kg; N03, 84 
mg/kg; S04, 332.5 mg/kg; 
PCBs, 0.9225 mg/kg; Ba, 
37.525 mg/kg. 
NA 51 8-1 
518-1 
518-2 
NA Drum data for 6 18-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
NA 'ages 66 and 67 Drum data for 61 8-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
61 8-4 Burial Ground 
ASA/FHC, 
MOC-200 1 -00 1 1 
Hazard Ranking System 
Evaluation of CERCLA 
Inactive Waste Sites at 
Hun fo rd, PNL-645 6 
Radionuclide inventory: 
2,000 Ci of beta. These values 
are decayed through April 1, 
1986. 
Without specific knowledge of 
the radionuclides present, 
decaying gross beta activity to 
1986 would not have been 
possible. Additional 
documentation is believed to 
provide sufficient basis for 
concluding that this inventory 
estimate is incorrect and can be 
dismissed 
NA qo chemical inventory is 
ivailable. 
v'ol. 11, Page 667. 
Waste 
Site 
il8-2 
Comments On 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
i18-2 
Location Within 
the document 
Document Title and 
ID  NO.^ 
NA 3 00-FF-2 Operable 
Unit Technical Baseline 
Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
Section 6.6, 6 18-2 
(Solid Waste Burial 
61 8-4 Burial Ground 
ASA/FHC, 
M0c-2001-0011 
Table C-1. 300-FF-2 Inventory Basis Documents. (9 Pages) 
Radiological Inventory 
Informa tion 
Stenner et al. (1988) estimated 
.hat this site contained 2.0 x 
1 O3 Ci of gross beta activity and 
51 Ci of Pu-239 decayed to 
September 1, 1980. Materials 
with radiation levels of up to 
35 radshr are known to have 
peen buried at this site 
[Paas 1955). 
Soil data for 61 8-4 to use as 
snalogous data for soil: Cs-137, 
1.15 pCi/g; CO-60, 0.25 pCi/g; 
Ra-226, 1.075 pCi/g; Th-228, 
2.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
848.45 pCi/g; U-235,78.1 
pCi/g; U-238, 848.45 pCi/g; Zn- 
65,0.5 pCi/g. 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
This data has been discounted as 
unreliable and is not used. (See 
Appendix D). 
Soil data from 61 8-4 ASA/FHC 
MOC are used here as 
analogous site data for the 61 8-2 
site soil. The 61 8-4 data were 
taken from Appendix A of 
DOE-RL (1 995). Soil inventory 
based on concentration from 
61 8-4 times the soil volume. 
Justification of use of this 
inventory is provided in Section 
4.1.2 of the ASA. 
Contaminated soil and debris 
including uranium-contaminated 
equipment and materials, 
plutonium and fission products, 
and uranium oxide metal 
cuttings. 
Chemical Inventory 
Infor ma tion 
Two dump truck loads of 
iutomotive-type batteries 
Soil data for 61 8-4 to use as 
inalogous data for soil: As, 
3.475 mg/kg; Be, 0.325 mg/kg; 
Ed, 1.5 mg/kg; Cr, 
523.075 mg/kg; Co, 36 mg/kg; 
clu, 191.625 mg/kg; Pb, 
332.5 mg/kg; Hg, 4.45 mg/kg; 
Ni, 371.5 mg/kg; Ag, 96 mg/kg; 
Zn, 280 mg/kg; F, 3.25 mg/kg; 
NH3,0.625 mg/kg; N03, 84 
mg/kg; S04, 332.5 mg/kg; 
PCBs, 0.9225 mg/kg; Ba, 
37.525 mglkg. 
Ground No. 2). 
NA Page 65. 
Phase III 
Feasibility Study 
Report for  the 300- 
FF-1 Operable 
Unit, DOE/RL-94- 
49, Rev. 0 
Burial Ground 
A SA/FHC, 
DOE-=, 1995, 
BHI, 2001, 618-4 
MOC-200 1 -001 1, 
p. 65 
Waste 
Site 
18-2 
61 8-2 
j 1 8-2 
locument Title and 
ID No." 
3H1,2003a7 618-2 
hpplemental 
Zadionuclide 
nventory Estimate, 
2alc. No. 0300X- 
2A-NO0 16 
6 18-2 Burial Ground 
Spent Fuel Inventory 
Calculation Based on 
Waste Disposal Data, 
Rev. 0 (BHI 2004a) 
0300X-CA-NO0 1 9, 
6 1 8-2 Exposure Rate 
per Mass of Fuel 
Calculation, 0300X- 
CA-N0018, Rev. 0 
(BHI 2004b) 
61 8-4 Burial Ground 
4 SA /FHC, 
MOC-200 1 -00 1 1 
Table C-1. 300-FF-2 Inventory Basis Documents. (9 Pages) 
Radiological Inventory 
Infor ma tion 
1-31 4.95E-3 
:-14: 1.02E-4 
\Ti-59: 2.04E-5 
20-60: 4.11E-6 
\Ti-63: 1.43E-3 
;r-90: 6.82E-1 
Tc-99: 3.57E-4 
2s-137: 8.1 1E-1 
ZU-152: 6.12E-6 
SU-154: 2.28E-4 
ZU-155: 5.93E-5 
'a-234m: 5.96E-5 
J-234: 3.57E-4 
J-235: 1.53E-5 
J-238: 3.57E-4 
'u-238: 1.89E-3 
'u-239: 5.10E-2 
'u-240: 1.07E-2 
'u-241: 4.73E-2 
a - 2 4  1 : 1.42E-2 
Radionuclide inventory: 1 , 156 
g irradiated U; 0.04 g Pu; 2.6 
Ci of long-lived beta-emitting 
isotopes. These values are 
decayed to 1986. 
Drum data for 6 18-4 to use as 
inalogous data for drums (see 
3ttachment for concentrations). 
Zomments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
Iot cell debris is assumed ro 
lave had up to 25% of its 
adiological inventory 
ssociated with. combustible 
naterials. A fire reduced 
his to 6.25% of the 
nventory assuming 75% of 
he combustibles were 
:onsumed. 
Dose rate information from 
radiological survey records 
and special work permit 
records for waste shipments to 
300 Area burial grounds in 
195 1-54 used to determine 
inventory related to disposal 
of irradiated uranium fuel 
wastes from 300 Area 
analytical laboratories. 
NA 
Chemical Inventory 
Infor ma tion 
NA 
NA 
)rum data for 61 8-4 to use as 
inalogous data for drums (see 
ittachment for concentrations). 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
No chemical inventory 
is available 
NA 
Location Within 
the document 
Page 5 of 5 
SheetNo. 11 of 
11 in 618-2 
Burial Ground 
Spent Fuel 
Inventory 
Calculation 
Based on Waste 
Disposal Data, 
NOO19, Rev. 0. 
0300X-CA- 
'ages 66 and 67. 
Table C-1. 300-FF-2 Inventory Basis Documents. (9 Pages) 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Loca tion Within 
the document 
Waste 
Site 
Iocument Title and 
ID No." 
Radiological Inventory 
Infor ma tion 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
'age 668. 5 1 8-3 lazard Ranking System 
:valuation of CERCLA 
nactive Waste Sites at 
lanford, PNL-6456 
NA llthough used for radioactive 
vaste disposal, no inventory is 
wail ab1 e. 
NA \To chemical inventory is 
wailable. 
NA Section 6.7, 61 8-3 
'Solid Waste Burial 
Sround No. 3). 
518-3 '00-FF-2 Operable 
/nit Technical Baseline 
kport, BHI-000 12, 
tev. 0 
NA \Jo inventory of chemicals or 
tadionuclides present at this site 
s available (Cramer 1987, 
;tenner et al. 1988). 
NA 
- ~~ 
Soil data for 61 8-4 to use as 
analogous data for soil: As, 
3.475 mg/kg; Be, 0.325 mg/kg; 
Cd, 1.5 mg/kg; Cr, 
623.075 mg/kg; Co, 36 mg/kg; 
Cu, 191.625 mg/kg; Pb, 
332.5 mg/kg; Hg, 4.45 mg/kg; 
Ni, 371.5 mg/kg; Ag, 96 mg/kg; 
Zn, 280 rng/kg; F-, 3.25 mg/kg; 
NH3,0.625 mg/kg; N03, 84 
tng/kg; S04, 332.5 rng/kg; 
PCBs, 0.9225 mg/kg; Ba, 
37.525 mg/kg. 
'age 65. 5 1 8-3 ;18-4 Burial Ground 
1 SA/FHC, 
doc-200 1-001 1 
Soil data for 6 18-4 to use as 
analogous data for soil: Cs- 137, 
1.15 pCi/g; Co-60,0.25 pCi/g; 
Ra-226, 1.075 pCi/g; 111-228, 
2.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
848.45 pCi/g; U-235,78.1 
pCi/g; U-238, 848.45 pCi/g; 
Zn-65, 0.5 pCi/g. 
NA NA 
;I 8-4 Burial Ground 
i SA/FHC, 
doc-200 1-00 1 1 
Drum data for 61 8-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
NA Drum data for 6 18-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
'ages 66 and 67. 5 1 8-3 NA 
Vo chemical inventory is 
ivai 1 ab 1 e. 
'age 676. 61 8-7 I-lazard Ranking System 
?valuation of CERCLA 
hactive Waste Sites at 
'ianfo rd, PNL-645 6 
NA 4lthough used for radioactive 
Naste disposal, no inventory is 
wailable. 
NA 
Waste 
Site 
11 8-7 
Iocument Title and 
ID  NO.^ 
'00-FF-2 Operable 
/nit Technical Baselint 
:epovt, BHI-000 12, 
Lev. 0, (Phillips et al. 
979) 
Table C-1. 300-FF-2 Inventory Basis Documents. (9 Pages) 
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
Drummed containers holding 
solvent with moderate amounts 
of uranium were buried in the 
trenches (Phillips et al. 1979). 
Other low-level material, 
slightly contaminated with 
uranium and thorium, was also 
buried in the trenches, and 
hundreds of drums with zircaloy 
chips, slightly contaminated 
with beryllium, were deposited 
in this burial ground (Cramer 
1987, Stenner et al. 1988) from 
1962 until June 1973 (PNL 
1986). The zircaloy chips 
buried at this site were generally 
less than 0.25 in. wide and 
5 mm thick and were buried in 
114-L (30-gal) steel drums 
(Hawley et al. 1986). 
The drums containing zircaloy 
chips were originally filled with 
water. Because the drums may 
have corroded and leaked, they 
may now be void of liquid. 
Cramer (1 987) reports that the 
pit at the center of this waste sit( 
was used for the disposal of 
thoria. However, Site personnel 
report that the southernmost 
trench (not the pit) was used for 
the disposal of thoria. 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
NA 
Chemical Inventory 
Informa tion 
NA 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
Location Within 
the document 
iection 6.9,618-7 
Burial Ground 
40. 7). 
Table C-1. 300-FF-2 Inventory Basis Documents. (9 Pages) 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Location Within 
the document 
Radiological Inventory 
Infor ma tion 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
C hemical Inventory 
Information 
Waste 
Site 
~ 
Document Title and 
ID  NO.^ 
- 
ippendix 1. NA NA Lequired composition of 
iuclear-grade zirconium and 
irconium alloy sheet, strip, and 
)late. Also required 
:omposition of nuclear-grade 
irconium and zirconium alloy 
ube. 
See attached sheet. 18-7 7reep of Zirconium 
4 lloys in Nuclear 
yeactors 
NA Soil data for 6 18-4 to use as 
malogous data for soil: As, 
5.475 mg/kg; Be, 0.325 mg/kg; 
2d, 1.5 mg/kg; Cr, 
$23.075 mg/kg; Co, 36 mg/kg; 
2u, 19 1.625 mg/kg; Pb, 
132.5 mg/kg; Hg, 4.45 mg/kg; 
Vi, 371.5 mg/kg; Ag, 96 mg/kg; 
5n, 280 mg/kg; F-, 3.25 mg/kg; 
VH3, 0.625 mg/kg; N03, 84 
ng/kg; S04, 332.5 mg/kg; 
'CBs, 0.9225 mg/kg; Ba, 
37.525 mg/kg. 
'age 65. 11 8-7 51 8-4 Burial Ground 
4 SA/FHC, 
UIOC-200 1 -00 1 1 
Soil data for 61 8-4 to use as 
analogous data for soil: (3-137, 
1.15 pCi/g; Co-60, 0.25 pCi/g; 
Ra-226, 1.075 pCi/g; Th-228, 
2.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
848.45 pCi/g; U-235,78.1 
pCi/g; U-238, 848.45 pCi/g; Zn- 
65,0.5 pCi/g. 
WA 
- 
'ages 66 and 67. NA 51 8-4 Burial Ground 
4SA/FHC, 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1 
Drum data for 6 18-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
NA ]rum data for 6 18-4 to use as 
inalogous data for drums (see 
ittachment for concentrations). 
il8-7 
Lists chemicals that wert 
ised in buildings that 
:ontributed waste to 
518-7. However, the 
3ata on which the IHE is 
3ased does not 
specifically state if the 
naterial was discarded 
n 61 8-7 or the quantity. 
5 18-7 6 18-7 Integrated 
Hazard Evaluation 
Worksheet, IHE-2005- 
0017 
Provides a full disclosure 
approach to the radionuclides 
inventory. 
Lists radionuclides that were 
used in buildings that 
contributed waste to 6 18-7. 
However, the data on which the 
IHE is based does not 
specifically state if the material 
was discarded in 61 8-7 or the 
quantity . 
'rovides a full disclosure 
ipproach to chemical hazards. 
Wire Document 
NA No chemical inventory is 
w ai 1 ab 1 e. 
NA 'age 678. 518-8 Hazard Ranking System 
Evaluation of CERCLA 
Inactive Waste Sites at 
Hanford, PNL-6456 
Although used for radioactive 
waste disposal, no inventory is 
available. 
Waste 
Site 
il8-8 
Document Title and 
ID  NO.^ 
100-FF-2 Operable 
/nit Technical Baseline 
kport, BHI-000 12, 
lev. 0 
Table C-1. 300-FF-2 Inventory Basis Documents. (9 Pages) 
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
Surface contamination levels up 
.o 12,000 dpm betdgamma and 
1,200 dpm alpha were identified 
n an area 18 m (60 ft) northwest 
3f 6 18-8, approximately 46 m2 
:500 ft2) in size. An area of 
subsuiface contamination with 
levels up to 1 mWhr was found 
adjacent to the northeast 
boundary extending 
approximately 12 m (40 ft). 
The presence of this 
contamination indicated the 
potential for buried radioactive 
material outside an established 
burial ground. The subsequent 
investigation included several 
“test holes” to estimate the 
lateral extent of the 
contamination (BHI 1994). Of 
the seven test holes surveyed, 
one identified radioactive 
contamination from 200 to 
1,500 c/m betdgamma located 
1.2 to 1.8 m (4 to 6 ft) below 
grade. 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
NA 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Infor ma tion 
NA 
Location Within 
the document 
Section 6.10,6 18-8 
Solid Waste Burial 
hound No. 8). 
Table C-1. 300-FF-2 Inventory Basis Documents. (9 Pages) 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Location Within 
the document 
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Document Title and 
ID  NO.^ 
i18-4 Burial Ground 
1 SA/FHC, 
d0c-200 1-00 1 1 
Waste 
Site 
11 8-8 'age 65. NA Soil data for 61 8-4 to use as 
malogous data: As, 
3.475 mg/kg; Be, 0.325 mg/kg; 
Cd, 1.5 mg/kg; Cr, 
623.075 mg/kg; Co, 36 mg/kg; 
Cu, 19 1.625 mg/kg; Pb, 
332.5 mg/kg; Hg, 4.45 mg/kg; 
Ni, 371.5 mg/kg; Ag, 96 mg/kg; 
Zn, 280 mg/kg; F-, 3.25 mg/kg; 
NH3,0.625 mgkg; N03, 84 
mg/kg; S04, 332.5 mg/kg; 
PCBs, 0.9225 mg/kg; Ba, 
37.525 mg/kg. 
NA Soil data for 61 8-4 to use as 
tnalogous data: Cs-137, 
I. 15 pCi/g; Co-60,0.25 pCi/g; 
<a-226, 1.075 pCi/g; Th-228, 
l.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
348.45 pCi/g; U-235, 78.1 
>Ci/g; U-238, 848.45 pCi/g; 
En-65, 0.5 pCi/g. 
NA Drum data for 6 18-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
NA 'ages 66 and 67. i18-8 518-4 Burial Ground 
ISA/FHC, 
doc-200 1-00 1 1 
Drum data for 6 18-4 to use as 
malogous data for dizims (see 
zttachment for concentrations). 
Uthough used for radioactive 
vaste disposal, no inventory is 
ivai 1 ab1 e. 
NA 40 chemical inventory is 
wail ab1 e. 
'age 688. j18-13 "lazard Ranking System 
?valuation of CERCLA 
'nactive Waste Sites at 
Yanford, PNL-6456 
NA 
NA Soil data for 61 8-4 to use as 
analogous data: As, 
3.475 mg/kg; Be, 0.325 mg/kg; 
Cd, 1.5 mg/kg; Cr, 
623.075 mg/kg; Co, 36 mg/kg; 
Cu, 19 1.625 mg/kg; Pb, 
332.5 mg/kg; Hg, 4.45 mg/kg; 
Ni, 371.5 mg/kg; Ag, 96 mg/kg; 
Zn, 280 mg/kg; F-, 3.25 mg/kg; 
NH3, 0.625 mg/kg; N03, 
84 mg/kg; S04, 332.5 mg/kg; 
PCBs, 0.9225 mg/kg; Ba, 
37.525 mg/kg. 
NA 'age 65. 518-13 51 8-4 Burial Ground 
4 SA/FHC, 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1 
Soil data for 61 8-4 to use as 
analogous data: Cs-137, 
1.15 pCi/g; CO-60, 0.25 pCi/g; 
Ra-226, 1.075 pCi/g; Th-228, 
2.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
848.45 pCi/g; U-235, 
78.1 pCi/g; U-238, 
848.45 pCi/g; Zn-65, 0.5 pCi/g. 
"Complete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
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Combustible Noncombustible Combustible Combustible 
Non- 
Waste Site Comparison Soil Waste Waste Drums Liquid Liquid Total 
618-3 NE 1.1 1 E-02 1.09E-02 2.03E-0 1 2.54E-01 1.26E-03 4.80E-0 1 
Rev. No.: 4 
1 I 
12 
13 
14 
Date: (?!/& 
Sheet No.: 2 of 49 
61 8-7 Northern Trenches NE 2.21 E-02 2.24E-02 4.18E-01 I .63E-01 I .26E-03 4.02E-02 6.67E-01 
618-7 Thoria Pit NE 4.24E-04 4.25E-04 7.92E-03 4.44E-01 1.26E-04 4.02E-01 8.55E-01 
I .94E-01 618-8 NE 1.72E-02 2.53E-03 4.09E-02 1.32E-01 1.26E-03 
618-13 NE 2.60E-03 NA NA NA 1.26E-03 3.87E-03 
15 
i 
TOTAL OF ALL SITES : 2.2OE+OO 1 
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High Wind Event 
Included in this calculation. High 
Washington Closu I 
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i 4.0 Assumptions 
2 
3 The hazards evaluated in this calculation are identified in Chapter 4 of the Final Hazard Categorization and Auditable Safety 
4 Analysis (BHI 2003c). These hazards and their assumed impacts to waste materials are identified below: 
Fire Event 
(onsite or range) 
Not included in this calculation. Not included in this calculation. 
Dropping of Materials 
5 
winds are assumed to impact to have 
contaminated soil causing a 
release of contaminated material. 10 ”/ This event is assumed to have no impact on soil. 
1 1  
12 Contaminated Icontamination present on llncluded in this calculation. IThese materials are light and 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Combustible 
Solids 
combustible solids would not be 
readily entrained by the wind 
because the material was 
deposited f&y years ago. It is 
expected that the amount of 
contamination released by this 
mechanism would be less than 
the amount released through a 
Combustible solids consist of 
rags, swipes and other soft 
waste contaminated with 
irradiated fine metals. 
have a high surface area to 
mass ratio. Consequently, they 
would generate little force during 
impact with surfaces. DOE 
2000, Section 5.2.3.1, states thal 
no significant suspension of 
surface contamination is 
postulated for such materials. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
fire. 
Contaminated, Contamination present on 
Noncombustible combustible solids would not be 
Solids readily entrained by the wind 
because the material was 
deposited fifty years ago. It is 
expected that the amount of 
contamination released by this 
mechanism would be less than 
the amount released through a 
Included in this calculation. A 
fire could suspend some of the 
surface contamination due to 
heating of the metallic 
components. DOE (2OOO) 
assesses the release of a 
sparse population of particles 
attached to the surface of a 
noncombustible solid. 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Included in this calculation. 
Noncombustible solids (e.g., 
equipment parts, piping) may be 
lifted out of a trench and 
dropped, or digging equipment 
may impact them. 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
fire. I 
Drummed Waste Not included in this calculation. Included in this calculation. Fire Included in this calculation. 
(Uranium oxide, High wind is assumed to be is assumed to breach drums Dropping of a drum is assumed 
uranium metal, unable to breach an intact drum; causing release of drum to impact drums causing a 
and oil) therefore, there is no impact from contents. release of drum contents. 
this type of event on drummed 
waste. 
December 2006 
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Liquids 
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D-4 
Resuspension - Outdoors, pool Thermal stress of aqueous Free-fall spills of aqueous 
at low wind speeds (page 3-5 of solutions - boiling of aqueous solution, 3-m fall distance (page 
DOE-HDBK-3010); 4E-07hour solutions in flowing air (page 3- 3-4 of DOE HDBK-3010); 1 E-04. 
or 3.2E-06 for evaluated 8-hr 1 of DOE-HDBK-3010); 2E-03 Value is also applicable to 
exposure (an 8-hr exposure is combustible organic liquids. 
selected consistent with DOE- Thermal stress of combustible 
STD-3009-94, Appendix A, organic liquids - quiescent 
Section A.3.3). Value is also burning, small surface area 
applicable to combustible organic pools, or small solvent layers 
liquids. over large aqueous layer 
burning to self-extinguishment 
(page 3-6 of DOE-HDBK-3010); 
51 I 11 E-02 I 
WCH- 137 
Rev. 0 
Contaminant 
cs-137 
Ra-226 
Th-228 
u-234 
U-235 
U-238 
sr-90’ 
CO-60 
Zn-65 
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
(pCi/g) 
1.1 5E+OO 
1.08E+00 
2.38E+00 
8.48E+02 
7.81 E+Ol 
8.48E+02 
5.40E+00 
2.50E-01 
5.00E-01 
Date: 7/31/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CAN0011 
300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley,h,+ 
300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
Rev. No.: 2 
Date: 
Sheet No.: 
I 4.0 Assumptions (continued) 
2 
3 
4 A letter from S. G. Metcalf dated October 31, 1980 (Metcalf, 1980) (Attachment 2) indicates a large concentration of Pu-239 in the 
5 618-8 Burial Ground. Pu-239 has a specific activity of 6.21 E-02 Ci/g [HNF, 19981. However, this information has been discounted 
6 based on additional historical information and a recent discussion with S.G. Metcalf (Attachment 1). To be conservative, however, 
7 this calculation has included a 1 gram of Pu-239 which is equivalent to that expected in 618-1 Burial Ground. 
8 
9 
Table 1: 
Radionuclides in Soils at 618-4 
Concentration’ 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 ’ Concentration provided by Table 2 (page 65) of BHI (2001). 
25 Contaminant 3-90 was provided by Phase I Remedial Investigation Report for the 300-FF-1 Operable Unit (DOURL 1992). 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 Note: 
40 ’ Concentration provided by Table 2 (page 65) of BHI (2001). 
41 Contaminant Sr-90 was provided by Phase I Remedial Investigation Report for the 300-FF-1 Operable Unit (DOURL 1992). 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
c. 
Inventory From 61 8-4 Drums 
Concentration' Mass of Substance 
(pCi/g) for solids, (kg) for solids, Powder Drum 
Sample Type Isotopes powder; (pCiR) for oil Volume (L) for oil' Type2 , 
U-234 
Originator: E. Gonsalves 2 ~ Date: 7/31/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO011 Rev. No.: 2 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. B l a k I e y A  fi Date: ? / ~ G ( P  
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) Sheet No.: 5 of 49 
8 
9 
10 
- ~- ~ J 
I Uranium Oxide Powder3 U-234 5.26E+04 267 1 &2 
Uranium Metal Tailings, U-234 4.75E+04 28 3 
Oil u-234 1.70E+05 64 3 
15 
16, 
17 
18 
U-235 I 
U-238 
Uranium Oxide Powde? U-238 3.1 OE+05 267 1 &2 
Uranium Metal Tailings, U-238 2.80E+05 28 3 
Oil U-238 1.00E+06 64 3 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
December 2006 
Estimated Number 
of Buried Drums Percentage of each Drum 
Drum Contents at 61 8-4 kind of drum (%) Type 
Drums of black uranium 
Drums of oil coated metal 
powder 354 23.0 1 
tailings, fines and sludges 1184 77.0 2 
Drum Total = 1538 I 
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18 
19 
20 
Wash~ngton Closure Hanford, LLC. 
61 8-8 Parkina Lot3 13,250 15,238 
(106rnx125mx0.457rn) 
61 8-134*6 2,448 2,815 
Originator: E. Gonsalves g& Date: 7/31/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NOOll 
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35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
1 4.0 Assumptions (continued) 
2 
3 Soil Volume and Number of Drums - Assumptions and Given Information: 
4 This analysis uses contaminated waste site volumes (not including layback) from the 300-FF-2 waste site volume 
5 calculation (BHI 2002a), which are shown below. A 15% swell factor was assumed to calculate loose cubic meters (LCM). A 
6 density of 2.16 g/cm3 was assumed for the contaminated soil. 
1 ~ ,  Volume of con tam in at^ , 
Waste Waste 
11 Site Site 
12 Volume Volume 
7 
Urum Drum Drum Drums 
Total 
Drums Type' Typeb Type' of 
Waste Site: 1 & 2  3 4 Th-232 
618-3 Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 228 52 176 0 0 
618-7 Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 Northern Trenches 859 20 66 773 0.4 
I 118 27 91 618-Sd Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 0 0 
618-7 Solid Waste Burial GroundNo. 7 Thoria Trench 06 2 7 77 4.0 
1 3 ~  
14 61 8-3' 12,865 14,795 
15 618-7 Northern Tren~hes~ '~  25,799 29,669 
16 618-7 Thoria 
171618-8 North Area2 I 3,492 I 4,016 1 
21 ' The above volumes were calculated using the footprint of the buried trenches, which were determined 
22 using ground penetrating radar (GPR) (BHI 1995a, 1995b, 1995~). These values represent the total waste site 
23 volume of soil and debris. (Contaminated Soil + Debris = Total Volume - Overburden) 
24 *These volumes are further broken down into soil, combustible and noncombustible waste forms on Sheets 12 and 13. 
25 3The parking lot area is assumed to consist of contaminated soil only. Na drums, combustibles, or noncombustibles 
26 are assumed to be present. 
27 This site is assumed to contain only contaminated soil. 
28 5The total volume for 618-7 burial ground can be found in WCH (2006b) by adding the volume of the individual segments. 
29 The total volume has been extrapolated to 65,000 BCM from 37,165 and the volume of the trenches have been 
30 extrapolated accordingly. This was done because the volumes in WCH (2006b) were calculated using a depth of 154, 
31 however in an aerial picture of one of the trenches (WCH, 2006a) the trench seems deeper. 
32 'The 618-13 volume is from volume calculation 0300F-CA-CW09, Rev.0. 
33 
42 a Drum Types 1 and 2 indicates uranium oxide powder (black and yellow). 
43 Drum Type 3 uranium metal tailings in oil. 
61 Drum Type 4 indicates Zircaloy-2. 
45 Drums were not considered in the calculation of MAR (0300F-CA-N0003). Number of drums at 618-8 included here is 
46 based on the north area of the waste site only and was calculated using the following relationship: 
47 179 drums at 618-4 x (3,492 BCM at 618-8 / 5,289 BCM at 618-1) = 118 drums at 618-8. 
48 
49 618-7 
50 The 618-7 Burial Ground consists of two segments: the Northern Trenches and the Thoria Pit. It is assumed that the 
51 Northern Trenches each received an inventory amount equal to 10% of the Thoria Pit segment's radionuclide inventory based 
52 on potential cross contamination. It is assumed that the Thoria Pit received an inventory amount equal to 10% of the 
XI combined inventory of the northern trenches due to cross contamination. 
55 Historical data (DUN-3862) shows that 5,648-lbs of depleted uranium were dumped in the 618-7 burial ground. It is expected 
56 that this material was dumped in the 618-7 north trench based on the time frame of the document (October 1970) 
57 
58 Discrete Item Type D from WCH (2005c), one Pu stainless cup, is assumed to be found in both the North and Middle 
59 trenches. 1OY0 of the inventory of one discrete item type D is assumed to be in the Thoria Pit due to cross contamination. 
61 It is assumed that the Th-232 inventory calculated in WCH (2005a) is in the Thoria Pit. 90% of which is assumed to be 
62 contamination on debris, with the remaining 10% adhered to the soil. 
63 
64 Liquids 
65 Liquids, as estimated in MOC-2005-0002, are included for 618-3, 618-7 Northern Trenches, 618-8, and 618-13. 10% of the 
66 liquid inventory estimated for the 618-7 Northern Trenches is assumed to be in the Thoria Pit. For conservativism, it is 
67 assumed that all liquids are combustible. 
54 
60 
I 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 2.xldCalc (6) (Assumptions cont.) 
December 2006 D-7 
WCH- 137 
Rev. 0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
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SheeFiE; 1 E& 
5.0 Methodology: 
The following is a list of the steps involved in determining the FHC for each of the waste sites: 
SteD 1 : Determine contaminated soil and drum concentrations. 
Radionuclide concentrations in contaminated soil and drums for each of the waste sites were included in the preliminary 
therefore, analysis of chemical constituents are not included in this FHC calculation. 
hazard categorization and are documented in WCH (2005a). Only radionuclides are used in determining the FHC; I 
Data obtained from actual sampling results of the 61 8-4 soil and drums has been used as the basis of the inventory for 
each of the waste sites except 61 8-8, which has a site-specific soil inventory. The soil and drum concentrations from the 
61 8-4 Burial Ground are included in Tables 1 and 2 in Section 4.0. 
Step 2: Calculate contaminated soil and drum inventories. 
Soil radionuclide inventories (Ci) were calculated by multiplying each radionuclide concentration (pCi/g) by an assumed 
density (g/cm3) and by the waste site soil volume (m3) x 1 .OE+6 cm3/m3 and dividing by 1 .OE+12 pCilCi. The soil and drum 
inventories are included in Section 9.0. For site 618-2 the waste site soil volume was assumed to be equal to the total 
volume. 
Drummed inventories for uranium oxide powder, metal and oil inventories were calculated by multiplying the concentration 
24 (pCi/g or pCi/L) by the total mass or volume per drum (kg or L) by the total number of drums. 
26 SteD 3: Calculate the adiusted TQ values flQ,,& 
28 The hazard category 3 threshold quantities (TQ) in DOE-STD-1027-94 (DOE, 1997) are based on the release values (RV) 
29 calculated in (EPA, 1989.) Release values are determined for each of four exposure pathways: food ingestion, water 
30 ingestion, inhalation, and direct exposure. The TQ for a given isotope is 20 times the most restrictive RV. The TQ can be 
31 expressed as: 
32 
33 
34 
25 
27 
TQ = 20 x MIN { RVFOOD, RVWATER, VINH, RVDR 1 (1 1 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-RevlCalc (7) (Methodology) 
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1 5.0 Methodology (continued): 
3 Step 3: Continued 
5 The EPA methodology uses the following assumptions: 
7 1) The RV for the water ingestion pathway assumes that 100% of the material is released to drinking water (see EPA, 
8 1989 Appendix B.l) 
9 2) The RV for the inhalation pathway and the RV for the food ingestion pathway both are inversely proportional to a 
2 
4 
6 
io respirable airborne release fraction (see EPA, 1989 Appendix A.2 and Appendix C.1). 
11 3) The RV for direct exposure for isotopes other than noble gases assumes a point source 
13 The DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Nuclear Safety Technical Position, NSTP 2002-2 (DOE, 2002), 
14 allows that the hazard Category 3 threshold quantities (TQ) for radionuclides for which the food pathway and the inhalation 
15 pathway are limiting may be revised if, based on the physical and chemical form and available dispersive energy sources 
16 for the facility and its hazardous materials, the credible release fractions (airborne release fractions) can be shown to be 
17 significantly different from the values used in the EPA Technical Background Document. All potential accident scenarios 
18 must be considered under unmitigated conditions. All pathways must be considered and the most limiting pathway must 
19 be used. 
21 Based on the guidance in NSTP 2002-2, the adjusted category 3 TQ for an isotope in a particular material form can be 
22 expressed as: 
23 
24 
25 
26 Where fl 
27 
28 from any potential accident 
29 
30 
31 
32 any potential accident scenario 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 Appendix E 
12 
20 
TQADJ = 20 x MIN { fi x RVFOOD, f2 x RVWATER, fix RVINH, f3 x RVDIR 1 (2) 
is the ratio of the respirable airborne release fraction used in the EPA analysis 
(from EPA, 1989 Exhibit A-1) to the largest respirable airborne release fraction 
is the release value for the food pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the fraction of material released to drinking water in the EPA 
analysis (Le., 1) to the largest fraction of material released to drinking water in 
is the release value for the water pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the release value for the inhalation pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the dose rate from a point source at 30 meters to the dose rate 
from a distributed source of equal activity at 30 meters 
is the release value for the direct exposure pathway from EPA, 1989 
RVFOOD 
f2 
RVWATER 
RVINH 
f3 
RVDIR 
39 
40 
41 The potential accident scenarios and corresponding release fractions are identified from a hazard analysis. These 
42 analyses form the basis for identifying appropriate respirable airborne release fractions. The release fractions will be from 
43 DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE, 2000), Roberson, 2002, or other analyses previously approved by DOE. Equation 2 will be 
44 used to generate adjusted TQs for each material form present at the burial grounds. 
45 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc (8) (Methodology Cont.) 
December 2006 D-9 
WCH-137 
Rev. 0 
Originator: N.D. Clapper /d Dc Date: 1/16/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NOOl l Rev. No.: 1 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley & Date: ; / j $ , j ~ Q  1 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Cattgorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) Sheet No.: 9 of53-52 
DCY 
I 5.0 Methodology (continued): 
2 
3 Step 3: Continued 
5 The total inventory of radionuclides in each material form is compared to the adjusted TQs for that form using the sum of 
6 the ratios. The final hazard categorization is based on summing the adjusted TQ fractions of all the different material 
7 forms. 
9 For conservatism, this final categorization will assume that f2 is equal to 1 although there is no potential for releases to 
10 drinking water in the vicinity of the waste sites. It will also assume that f3 is equal to 1, although the point source model is 
11 quite conservative for the large distributed sources at each burial ground. 
12 
13 
14 The adjustment factor f ,  can be expressed as: f ,  = REpA/RHA. 
16 Where, 
18 
19 
20 
21 this hazard analysis. 
4 
8 
15 
17 
REPA is the respirable release fraction for a particular hazardous material (e.g., cobalt, aluminum, strontium) 
from EPA (1989), Exhibit A-1. 
RHA is the respirable release fraction for a particular hazardous chemical for the potential hazard identified in 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
In general, the respirable release fraction (R) is the product of the airborne release fraction (ARF) and the release fraction 
(RF), or R = ARF x RF. 
Step 4: Determine the final hazard categorization for each waste site. 
The inventories for each waste type are divided by adjusted TQ values. These individual ratios for each waste site are 
then summed and compared to 1. If the sum of the ratios is above 1 using the adjusted TQ, then adjusted TQ has been 
exceeded and the FHC for a waste site is determined to be above Category 3. If the sum of the ratios is below 1, the FHC 
is determined to be below Category 3. 
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I 7.0 Calculation of Waste Forms 
3 Waste form inventories have been calculated based on the following assumptions: 33% of the waste site volume is debris and 67% is 
4 contaminated soil. Of the debris present 10% is assumed to be combustible. The combustible solids are assumed to be contaminated 
5 uniformly. The remaining debris is assumed to be noncombustible. The noncombustible solids been further broken down to 50% 
6 contaminated concrete and 50% contaminated steel piping. The following table summarizes this breakdown of waste forms. This 
7 analysis has been performed for the 61 8-1, 61 8-3, 61 8-7, and 61 8-8 burial grounds. 61 8-1 3 is assumed to contain only contaminated 
8 soil and liquid. 
9 
2 
19 Steel 50% 
20 
21 
22 
23 Calculation of contamination to debris ratios: 
25 Concrete: Using a 1 cubic foot (0.0283 cubic meter) block of concrete with an assumed 6 mm thick contaminated layer on one surface 
26 1) Calculation surface area of concrete block: 
27 0.093 m2/side x 1 side = 9.30E-02 m2 
24 
(e.g., pieces of a Contaminated wall or foundation). 
28 thickness of contamination (6 6,00E-03 
29 mm)= -
30 Total contamination per cubic 
31 meter of waste = 5.58E-04 m3 
32 2) The contamination to debris volume ratio for concrete is 5.58E-04 m3/2.83E-02 m3 = 
34 Steel: Using a 1 cubic meter block of steel piping with an assumed 1 mm thick contaminated layer on the inside of each pipe. 
36 1) Calculation surface area of a single 1 m long section of 0.0762 m (3 in) inner diameter steel pipe: 
37 Surface Area = 71 x diameter 0.239 m2 
38 x length = 
0.02 
33 
35 
m m  39 thickness of contamination (1 
40 mm) = 
41 Total contamination per pipe 
42 = 2.39E-04 m3 / pipe 
43 2) Calculate total number of pipes within 1 cubic meter block. 
44 1 m / 0.072 m/pipe = 13 pipes 
45 Total number of pipes=pipes 
46 per column x no columns (1 3) 
47 3) Calculate total contamination from all pipes: 
48 Total contamination per pipe 0.040 m3 
49 
50 4) The Contamination to debris volume ratio for steel is 0.04 m3/l m3 = 
169 total pipes (1 3 x 13 grid) 
x number of pipes = 
0.04 
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Wash~n$ton Closure 
Volume 
Uranium Soil Total Debris Debris Debris Concrete Steel 
of Combustible Noncombustible 
Waste Site Drumsa (LCM)b (LCM)' (LCM)~ (LCM)' (LCM)' (LCM)' 
618-3 47.4 9,881 4,867 487 4,380 43 89 
618-7 Northern Trenches 178.8 19,758 9,732 973 8,759 86 177 
61 8-7 Thoria Pit 17.9 3,563 1,755 175 1,579 16 32 
618-8 North Area 24.6 2,674 1,317 132 1,186 12 24 
618-13 NA 2,815 NA NA NA NA 1 NA 
618-8 Parking Lot NA 15,238 NA NA f NA NA NA 
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Entrained in 
24 Hour 
Period (g) 
350 
1,051 
269 
1,392 
1 04 
Washington C 
R =  
ARF x RFe 
1.6E-08 
2.5E-08 
3.5E-08 
3.6E-08 
1.7E-08 
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
Soil 
33 Waste Volume 
34 618-3 9,881 
Site (LCM)= 
Date: 7/31/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO01 I Rev. No.: 2 
300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley&-@ 
3OO-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment} 
- 
soil SUrfaCe Rateof 
kk~ss Area Entrainment 
(sib (m2) (glh) 
2.13E+10 3.644 14.6 
I 8.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated with this Hazard Analysis 
2 
3 8.1 Determination of Soil and Debris Release Values 
4 
5 8.1.1 Dumping 
6 
7 Contaminated Soil: The respirable ARF for soil dumping used in Roberson (2002) Attachment 4 is 1 .OE-06. The RF value for 
8 contaminated soil is 1; therefore, the R value used for dumpinn of contaminated soil is l.OE-06. 
9 
IO Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids may be lifted out of a trench and dropped. These 
11 combustible materials are light. Consequently, they would generated liffle force during impact with surfaces. DOE (2000), 
12 Section 5.2.3.1, states that no significant suspension of surface contamination is postulated for such materials. It is expected 
13 that the amount of contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the amount released through a fire. Dumping 
14 of contaminated combustible solids is not considered further in this calculation. 
16 Contaminated. Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated, noncombustible solids (e.g., equipment parts) may be lifted out of a 
$7 trench and dropped, or digging equipment may impact them. DOE (ZOOO), Section 5.3.3, addresses free-fall spill and impaction 
18 stress to such solids. The bounding ARF for shock-vibration of contaminated noncombustible materials that do not undergo 
19 brittle fracture is 1 .OE-03. The release fraction is assumed to be 1 .O; therefore, the R value used for this scenario is I .OE-03. 
20 
21 
22 Contaminated, Combustible Liauids: Free-fall spills of aqueous solution, 3-m fall distance (page 3-4 of DOE HDBK-3010); the R 
23 value used for this scenario is 1 .OE-04. 
24 
25 8.1.2 Entrainment 
27 The soil entrainment rate used in Attachment 4 of Roberson (2002) is 4.OE-03 g/m2-h. 
15 
26 
28 
29 
30 Contaminated Soil: The following table summarizes elements required to calculate an appropriate R value for entrainment of soil 
31 in a 24 hour period. The most restrictive R value from all of the sites has been used for all sites. 
35 
36 
19,758 4.27E+10 10,950 43.8 
3,563 7.70E+09 2,800 11.2 
61 8-7 Northern 
Trenches 
61 8-7 Thoria 
Pit 
37 
38 
I *. I 
618-8 17,912 3.87E+10 14,505 58.0 
618-13 2,815 6.08E+09 1,088 4.4 
41 Surface areas are taken from calc (BHI 2002a). 618-8 also includes the parking lot which has dimensions 
42 of 106 m x 125 m. 
43 Rate of entrainment (glh) is calculated using the following equation: 
44 x = Surface Area m2 x 0.004 g/m2-h = Rate of Entrainment glh 
45 e The respirable release value for a 24 hour period is calculated by dividing the mass 
46 entrained in a 24 hour period by the total waste site mass. 
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I 8.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated with this Hazard Analysis 
2 
3 Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contamination present on combustible solids would not be readily entrained by the 
4 wind because the material was deposited 30 to 50 years ago and the contaminants are expected to be absorbed onto the 
5 materials. It is expected that the amount of contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the amount 
6 released through a fire. 
7 
8 Contaminated. Noncombustible Solids: Contamination present on noncombustible solids would not be readily entrained 
9 by the wind because the material was deposited 30 to 50 years ago. It is expected that the amount of contamination 
i o  released by this mechanism would be less than the amount released through dumping. 
11 
12 Contaminated. Combustible Liauids: Resuspension - Aqueous liquids outdoors, pool at low wind speeds (page 
13 3-5 of DOE-HDBK-3010); 4E-O7/hour or 3.2E-06 for evaluated 8-hr exposure (an 8-hr exposure is selected 
14 consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3). Value is also applicable to combustible organic 
15 liquids. Therefore, the R value used for this scenario is 3.2E-06. 
17 8.1.3 Fire 
19 Contaminated soil and sludae: The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across a site could 
20 entrain some of the soil in the updraft, but it would be expected that the amount released by this mechanism would be 
21 less than the amount of soil released through wind entrainment. 
23 Contaminated, Combustible Solids: The release value for this scenario is 5.OE-04 (DOE 2000). This value was judged to 
24 be bounding for the conditions under consideration (Le., ignition of soft waste from an external source such as a range 
25 fire or an internal source such as a vehicle fire) and is considered to be bounding for this analysis. Therefore, the R 
26 value used for this scenario is 5.OE-04. 
28 Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: A fire could suspend some of the surface contamination due to heating of the 
29 metallic components. DOE (2000), Section 5.1 (page 5-5) assess the release of a sparse population of particles 
30 attached to the surface of a noncombustible solid. The R value for this scenario is 6.OE-05. 
32 Contaminated, Combustible Liauids: Thermal stress of organic combustible liquids - quiescent burning, small surface 
33 area pools, or small solvent layers over large aqueous layer burning to self-extinguishment (page 3-6 of DOE-HDBK- 
34 3010); I E-02. Therefore, the R valued used for this scenario is 1.OE-02 for combustible liquid. 
35 
36 Contaminated. Noncombustible Liauids: Thermal stress of aqueous solutions - boiling of aqueous solutions in flowing air 
37 (page 3-1 of DOE-HDBK-3070); 2E-03. Therefore, the R va ued used for this scenario is 2.OE-3 for noncombustible 
38 liquid. 
39 
40 8.2 Determination of Drummed Waste Release Values 
42 The following is a discussion of two accident scenarios, falling drum and fire, and their associated R values, which is the 
43 ARF multiplied by an RF, as appropriate. A high wind scenario was not evaluated for drummed contamination since it 
44 was assumed that high wind would not breach a drum. The most conservative R values for each waste type (i.e., gives 
45 the smallest adjusted TQ value) were used in the FHC calculations and are summarized on Sheet 14. 
47 8.2.1 Dropping 
49 Uranium Oxide Powder: The R value for the uranium oxide powder contained in a drum was based on values given in 
50 Section 4.4.3.3.2, “Large Falling Object Impact or Induced Air Turbulence” of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000). This 
51 section identified an R value of 1 .OE-4 for the suspension of bulk powder due to the shock-impact resulting from dropping 
52 a drum. These values are believed to be very conservative for this accident scenario because they are derived, primarily, 
53 from an experiment that involved dropping a large (i.e., several pounds) rock from a height of 3.7 m onto an open, steel 
54 (quart-sized) can filled with sand. Therefore, the R value for release of uranium powder due to droppinn a drum is 
16 
18 
22 
27 
31 
41 
46 
48 
55 1.OE-04. 
56 
57 
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1 8.0 Hazard Analysis - (continued) 
2 
3 Uranium Metal in Oil: For the drums containing oil and uranium metal, only the contaminated oil is considered as 
4 MAR. The metal is not considered to be at risk because it is too large for uptake into the human lung. DOE (2000), 
5 Section 3.2.3.3, discusses experiments performed to measure the ARF and RF generated by the free-fall spill (from 
6 a height of 3 m) of viscous solutions. The ARF and RF values are identified as 7E-06 and 0.8, respectively. Given 
the viscosity of the oil and the potential spill height from the breached drums, these values are believed to be very 
8 conservative to model the spill of contaminated oil in this scenario. Therefore, an R value for release of uranium 
contaminated oil due to drOpRinU of a drum is 7.OE-06 x 0.8 to uive 5.6E-06. 
10 
11 8.2.2 Fire 
12 
13 This scenario is based on an assumption that a drum has been breached releasing oil into a pool that catches fire 
14 (from an onsite or range fire). 
16 Section 3.3. of DOE (2000), which studied 30% TBP/kerosene solutions, distinguishes between small-scale pool 
17 burning and vigorously buming large pools, with the ARF for small-scale pools being less than those for a large pool. 
18 Further, Section 3.3 distinguishes between vigorously burning large pools that burn to complete dryness and those 
19 that do not, with a larger ARF for those that burn to complete dryness. Given the volume of oil potentially involved in 
20 a fire and the anticipated smaller aerosol formation rate from the burning oil as compared to the burning kerosene- 
21 TBP mixtures, a vigorously burning large pool (that does not burn to complete dryness) is judged to be a reasonable 
22 approximation of the release scenario. The ARF and RF for this release mechanism are 3E-2 and 1 .O, respectively 
23 and are listed in Section 3.3.7 of DOE (2000). Therefore, an R value for release of uranium contaminated oil 
24 due to a fire is 3.OE-02. 
26 Entrainment of Powder. Section 4.4.1.1 of DOE (2000) provides ARFs for plutonium oxide. Uranium oxide powder 
27 is, like plutonium oxide powder, a nonreactive material in regards to heat and oxygen. It is assumed, based on this 
28 nonreactivity, that the only significant mechanism to release uranium oxide (due to heating) is entrainment due to 
29 the flow of heated air over the oxide powder. To develop a conservative ARF and RF for this scenario, it is assumed 
3o that the airflow has a high velocity. Section 4.4.1 -1 of DOE (2000), identifies a ARE of 6E-3 and RF of 0.01 for 
3, chemically nonreactive compounds subjected to thermal stress. These values are believed to be very conservative 
32 for overpacked drums containing a large volume of uranium oxide because the bulk of the oxide material would be 
33 shielded from the convective flow caused by the fire (Le., surface oxide material would limit impact to sub-surface 
34 material). Therefore, an R value for release of uranium Dowder due to a fire is 6.OE-03 x 0.01 to qive 6.OE-05. 
35 
36 Combustion of Metal. Oxidation of the uranium metal fines and turnings at the bottom of a drum would not occur until 
37 the layer of oil covering the metal burns down to a point where the metal would be exposed to oxygen. There would 
38 be an influx of oxygen into the drum from the top (normally, the only passage that would allow oxygen to enter would 
39 be through the vent ports, however it is assumed that the lid of the drum has been removed). The heat generated 
40 from the burning oil may be sufficient to elevate the surface temperature of the uranium metal to the point that self- 
41 sustained oxidation could occur. 
43 Vaporization of the mineral oil could result in a high-pressure vapor phase if the vent ports of a drum were to 
44 become plugged (it is unlikely that this would occur as a fire would melt the rubber membrane of the vent ports 
45 before significant gas pressures could build). Even i f  the vent ports were to become plugged and allow vaporized oil 
46 to build-up in the air space, venting of the drum would not eject the uranium tailings and fines at the bottom of the 
47 drum because of the buffering effect of the intervening oil layer. 
48 
49 Differential heating of the drum would not result in a significant enough temperature gradient to generate a vapor 
50 phase within the oil at the bottom of the drum (large bubbles) that could disturb uranium oxidation products and eject 
51 the material into the air, Even if burning oil was to surround the outside of a drum, the bottom of the drum would not 
52 heat rapidly enough to result in a roiling boil. The drum and its contents would provide a heat sink to distribute heat 
53 and prevent rapid heating of one part of the drum while the remainder of the drum remained relatively cool. 
15 
25 
42 
54 
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38 
39 
40 
Material Form SoillDebris Entrainment Fire I Drum I Value 
Soil 1 .OE-06 3.6E-08 NA I NA 1 1.OE-06 
Combustibles NA NA 5.OE-04 I NA I 5.OE-04 
41 Noncombustibies 1 .OE-03 NA 6.OE-05 NA 1.OE-03 
6.OE-05 1 .OE-04 1 .OE-04 
43 Oil (Drum) NA NA 3.OE-02 5.6E-06 3.OE-02 
44 Metal (Drum) NA NA 1.OE-04 NA 1.OE-04 
45 Combustible Liquids 1 .OE-04 3.2E-06 1 .OE-02 1 .OE-02 
46 Noncombustible Liquids 1 .OE-04 3.2E-06 2.OE-03 I 2.OE-03 
47 NA = not applicable. 
48 ' Applicable to both uranium oxide and thorium oxide powders. 
December 2006 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc (1 7) Hazard Analysis Cont 
D-18 
r4 
0 
0 
o\ 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
ashington Closure Hanford, LLC. 1 
Carbon 
Cobal~'~' 
Cesium 
Europium 
Europium 
Eitropiwn 
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C-14 
CO-60 
Cs- I 37 
Eli-IS2 
ELI-1% 
Eit-155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
1%-234111 
PU-238 
Pu-239 
PLI-240 
Pu-24 I 
Ra-226 
Sr-89 
9 - 9 0  
Tc-99 
Th-228 
Th-232 
U-234 
U-235 
U-238 
Zn-65 
1 9.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values 
2 
3 CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD QUANTWIES ADJUSTED FOR APPROPR 
Food'2' 
Element Isotope RF:~,,"' RVn, Ingestion RV 
6 Aniericium (Am-24 1 1 .E-03 
5.E-01 
I .LO3 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
I .E42 
I .E42 
5.E-01 
1 .E-02 
I .E-02 
1 .LO3 
1 .E43 
1.E-03 
1 .E43 
1 .E-03 
1 .E03 
I .E02 
1 .E-02 
1 .LO2 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E43 
1 . E 4 3  
I .E-02 
1 .E-o6 
1 .E-06 
I .LO6 
I .E-06 
1 . E-06 
I .E-06 
I .E-06 
1 . E-06 
1 .E-06 
1 .E-06 
1 .GO6 
1 .E-06 
I .E06 
I .E-06 
1 .E-06 
1 .E46 
I .E46 
1 .E-06 
1.E-06 
1. E-06 
1 .E-% 
1 .E46 
I .E46 
I .E-06 
1 .E-06 
3 .OE-0 1 
6.OE+Ol 
3.OE+00 
2.4E+01 
I.SE+OI 
1.2E+02 
5.9b-02 
2.7E+02 
2.9E+04 
2.1 E+OO 
1.8Ern 
I .8E+00 
9.OE+01 
1.7E+01 
8.9E+0l 
1.8E+00 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+OO 
1.2E+01 
6.OE-01 
8.2E-01 
2.1E-01 
ATE RESPIRABLE RELEASE FRACTION ( 
(Ci) 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
5.9E+03 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
1 .SE+02 
2.9E+02 
3.0E+O I 
2.68-02 
2.1 E+01 
1.6E+02 
I .OE+02 
1 .OE+01 
1 .OE+OI 
4.7E+01 
8.3E+02 
2. I E+03 
I .OE+03 
3,6E+04 
3. IE-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
I .6E+OO 
3. I E+OO 
5.2E+01 
2. I E+OO 
3.6E+02 
5.2E-02 
5.2E-03 
2.E-01 
2. IE-01 
2.1E-01 
1.6E+02 
2 )  
Ad.j!@ 
TQ 
( a )  
5.2E+02 
3.0E+03 
2.8E+02 
1.3E+03 
7.OE+02 
8.48+02 
1.4E+04 
I .2E+05 
1.2E+08 
5.4E+07 
1.5E+03 
6.28+02 
5.2E+02 
5.2E+02 
3.2E+04 
1.2E+04 
3.48+06 
I .6E+05 
S.8E+03 
1 .OE+03 
1 .OE+02 
4.28+03 
4.2E+03 
4.28+03 
6.OE+02 
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Fo&~') Water'3' Inhalation Direct(') Adj.(6' 
Element Isotope RE,,"' RVm Ingestion RV Ingestion RV RV'" Exposure RV TQ 
(Ci) (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) 
5 DRUMMED WASTE 
2.7E+02 
7.3E+05 
2.7E+02 
2.7E+02 
';j 
N 
0 
4.2E+Ol 
1.OEi-00 
4,2E+Ol 
1.4E-01 
u02 
Th-232 
U-metal 
Oil 
1 .E-04 
1 
1 .E44 
3.E-02 
1 .E-03 
1.E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
3.OE-1-00 
2.1E-01 v. Ig. 
3 .0E+OO v. Ig. 
3.OE+OO I v.Ig. 
v. Ig. 2.1E-01 
5.28-03 
2.IE-01 
2.1E-01 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Uranium Oxide 
P*WdlP 
(U-234, U-235, U-238) 
Thorium Oxide Powder 
(Th-232) 
Uranium Metal 
(U-234, U-235, U-238)'' 
Oil 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl Kalc (1 9) Adj TQ (Drums) 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLG. I 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Originator: N.D. Clapper PJPc Date: 1/16/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NOOl l Rev. No.: 
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Carbon 
C~ba l l ‘~ ’  
Cesium 
Europium 
Europium 
Europium 
Tritium 
Nickel 
Nickel 
Protactinium‘x1 
Plulonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Radium 
Strontium 
Technetium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Zinc 
1 9.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values (continued) 
2 
CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD QUANTlTl W ADJUSTED FOR APPROPRIATE KESPIRAB 
Element 
Am-241 
C-14 
co-60 
cs- I 37 
E~I -  152 
Ell- 154 
ELI- 155 
13-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234m 
1’u-238 
Pu-239 
PU-240 
Pu-24 I 
Ra-226 
3-90 
Tc-99 
Th-228 
Th-232 
u-234 
U-235 
U-238 
211-65 
1.E-03 
5.E-01 
1 .E-03 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
I L O 2  
5.E-01 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E-03 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-02 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
1 .E-06 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
3.OE-01 
6.OE+OI 
3.0E+00 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+OI 
I .2E+02 
5.9E+02 
2.7 E+02 
2.9E+04 
2.1 E+OO 
I .8E+M) 
1.8E+OO 
9.0E+01 
6.OE-01 
8.2E-01 
8.9E+OI 
I .8E+00 
2.lE-01 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+OO 
3.OE+00 
1.2E+O 1 
v. Ig. 
1 .SE+02 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. 1g. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
2.9E+02 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
5.9E+03 
3 .OE+O 1 
2.6E-02 
2.1E+01 
1.6E+02 
1 .OE+02 
I .OE+O I 
I.OE+OI 
4.7E+OI 
8.3E+02 
2.1 E+03 
1 .OE+03 
3.6E+04 
3. I E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6B-02 
1.6E+00 
3.1E+OO 
2.1 E+OO 
3.6E+02 
5.2E-02 
5.2E-03 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
2.lE-01 
1 .6E+02 
I .5E+O1 
6.5E+01 
3.5E+OI 
4.2E+01 
7.0E+02 
7.6E+01 
1.7E+06 
5.OE+06 
I .4E+08 
5.9E+03 
7.3E+05 
7 .5 E+05 
2.7E+02 
6.4E+01 
9 
Adj!” 
TQ 
(Ci) 
I .OE+OO 
3.OE+03 
2.8E+02 
1.2E+03 
7.OE+02 
8.4B+02 
1.4E+04 
1.2E+05 
2.4E+05 
I .  1 E+05 
1.5E+03 
1.2E+OO 
I .OE+OO 
1 .OE+OO 
6.4E+01 
2,4E+01 
3.3E+02 
5.8E+03 
2.1 E+OO 
1 .OE+02 
8.4E+00 
8.4E+00 
8,4E+00 
6.OE+02 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc (20) Adj TO (Combustible) 
h, 
0 
0 
c3\ 
5 NONCOMBUSTIBLE DEBRIS 
6 Americium Am-24 1 
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
25 
26 
27 
28 
N.D. Clapper /r/Dc Date: 1/16/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO011 Rev. No.: 1 
300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. BlakleyA 
300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) ”S bee::: *& 1~~ 
Carbon 
Cobalti7’ 
Cesium 
Europium 
Europium 
Europium 
Tritium 
Nickel 
Nickel 
Prolactiniunr”’ 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Radium 
Strontium 
Technetium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Zinc 
1 9.0 Calculatiori of Adjusted TQ Values (continued) 
2 
3,  CATEGORY 3 TifRESHOLD,QUAK’ll’rl~ ADJUSTED 
C-14 
Co-60 
cs- 137 
Eu- I52 
ELI- IS4 
Eu- 155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-2341~1 
Pti-238 
PU-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-24 1 
Ka-226 
9-90  
Tc-99 
Tb-228 
Th-232 
U-234 
U-235 
U-238 
211-65 
1 .E-03 
5.E-01 
l.E-03 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
5.E-01 
1 . E-02 
I .E-02 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .GO3 
I .E-03 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
I .E-02 
I .E-02 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1.E-03 
I .E-03 
I .E-03 
I . E 4 2  
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E43 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E43 
I .GO3 
1.803 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
I .LO3 
1 .E-03 
1 .E43 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E46 
1 .EO3 
1 .E43 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
;ON APPROPRIATE RESPlRABLE RELEASE FRACTION (1 I 
(Ci) 
3.OE-01 
6.OE+O1 
3.0E+OO 
2.4E+Ol 
I .5E+OI 
I .2E+02 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
2.9E+OLt 
2.1 E+OO 
I .8E+00 
1.8E+00 
9.OE+OI 
6.OE-01 
8.2E-01 
8.9E+01 
1.8E+00 
2.1E-01 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+00 
1.2E+OI 
v. Ig. 
1.5E+02 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
5.9E+03 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg, 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
2.98+02 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
3.OE+01 
2.6E-02 
2.1E+01 
I .6E+02 
I .OE+02 
1 .OE+01 
1 .OE+01 
4.7E+01 
8.3E+02 
2.1 E+03 
1 .OE+03 
3.6E+04 
3.1E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+00 
3.1 E+OO 
2.1 E+OO 
3.6E+02 
5.2E-02 
5.2E-03 
2.IE-01 
2.1501 
2. I E-0 1 
1.6E+02 
1.5E+01 
6.5E+01 
3.5E+01 
4.2E+01 
7.OE+02 
7.68+0 I 
I .7E+06 
5.OE+06 
1.4E+08 
5.9E+03 
7.38+05 
7.5E+05 
2.7E+02 
6.4E+OI 
5.2E-01 
3.OE+03 
2.8E+02 
6.OE+02 
1.0E+02 
8.4E+02 
9.48+03 
1.2E+05 
1.2E+05 
5.4Ei-04 
1 .SE+03 
6.2E-01 
5.2E-01 
S.2E-01 
3.2E+01 
1.2E+01 
1.6E+02 
5.8E+03 
1 .OE+OO 
1 .OE+02 
4.2E+OO 
4.2E+OO 
4.2E+00 
6.0E+02 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev1 lCalc (21) Adj TQ (Noncombust) 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
Element 
4 
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Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
Adjusted ,vate,~l Adjusted Direct'" 
inhalation ~ x p ~ ~ ~ ~  y:i; RV"' RV 
(Ci) (Ci) 
Food'2' 
(Ci) 
ISOtOpC Rep;'' RVHA Ingestion RV lngestion RV fngestim RV 
(Ci) (Ci) 
1 9.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Valtics (continued) 
2 
5 COMBUSTIBLE LIQUID 
61 Americium IAm-241 
7 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
8 
Carbon 
Cesium 
Europium 
Europium 
Europium 
Tritium 
Nickel 
Nickel 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Radium 
Radium 
Strontium 
Teclinetium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Uraiiium 
Zinc 
cob~it"' 
C-14 
co-60 
cs-I37 
Eu- 152 
Eu-I54 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234m 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
PU-240 
Pu-241 
RFI-226 
Ra-228 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
Th-228 
3%-230 
111-232 
U-234 
U-235 
U-238 
211-65 
l.E-03 
5.E-01 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .GO2 
I .E-02 
5.E-01 
I . E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
I .  E-03 
1.E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E02 
1 E 0 2  
i .E-03 
I .LO3 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1.E-03 
I .E-02 
I .E-02 
I .  E-02 
1 .E-02 
I .  E-02 
1 .E-02 
I .E-02 
1.E-02 
1.E-02 
12-02 
1 E02 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
I.E.02 
I. E-02 
1 .E-O2 
I .E-02 
1.E-02 
1 .E42  
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
I .E-02 
1.E-02 
1.E-02 
3.OE-01 
6.OE+01 
3.OE+00 
?.4E+01 
1 SE+O 1 
1.2E+02 
5.98+02 
2.7E+02 
2.98+04 
2. I E+OO 
1.8E+00 
1.8E+00 
9.OE+01 
6.OE-01 
6.OE-01 
8.2E-Ol 
8.9E+01 
1.8E+00 
1.2E+00 
2.1E-01 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+00 
3.0E+00 
I .2E+01 
3.OE-02 
6.OE+OO 
3.OE+00 
2.4E+01 
I.SE+01 
1.2E+02 
S.OE+02 
2.7E+02 
2.9EiQ3 
2.1 E-0 I 
1.8E-01 
1.8E-01 
9.OE+M) 
6.OE-02 
6.OE-02 
8.260 1 
8.9E+01 
I .8E-O1 
I 28-01 
2.1 E-02 
3.OE-01 
3 .OE-0 1 
3 .OE-0 1 
1.2E+01 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
S.9E+03 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v, Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
1.5E+02 
2.9E+02 
3.0E+0 I 
2.6E-02 
2.IE+Ol 
1.6E+02 
I .OE+02 
1 .OE+0 1 
1 .OE+01 
4.7P+OI 
8.3E+02 
2.1 E+03 
1 .OE+03 
3.6E+04 
3.lE-02 
2.6B02 
1.6E+00 
3.1E+00 
5.2E+00 
2.1 E+@ 
3.6E+02 
5.2E-02 
3.1 E-02 
5.2E-03 
2.18-01 
2.1E-01 
2.1 E-01 
1.6E+02 
2.68-02 
2.6E-03 
l.lE+03 
1.6E+01 
1 .OE+02 
l.OE+OI 
I.OE+OI 
4.7E+01 
4.2E+04 
2.  I E 4 3  
1 .OE+03 
3.6E+03 
3.1 E-03 
2 . 0 3  
2.6E-03 
1.6E-01 
3.1 G O 1  
5. 2E-0 1 
2.1 E+OO 
3.6E+02 
5.2E-03 
3. I E-03 
5.28-04 
2.1 E-02 
2.1E-02 
2.1 E-02 
1.6E+02 
5.2E-02 
3.08+03 
2.88+02 
6.OE+01 
2.OE+02 
2.OE+02 
9.4E+02 
1.2E+05 
1.2E+04 
5.4E43 
1.5E+03 
6.28-02 
5.2E-02 
5.2E-02 
3.2E+00 
1.2E+00 
I .2E+00 
1.6E+O 1 
1.8Ei-03 
1 .OE-0 1 
6.2E-02 
1 .OE-02 
4.2E-01 
4.2E-01 
2.4E+02 
4.E-01 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-RevlKalc (22) Adj TQ (CornLiquids) 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
4 
5 
6 
h;, 
0 
0 
Adjusted Watep Inhalation Adjusted Direct'" 
Inhalation E~~~~~ 
(Ci) RV'" RV 
(Ci) (Ci) 
Fuod'2' 
(Ci) 
Element Lsotolx ~ E p i l )  RVliA Ingestion RV Ingestion F d ' "  Rv Ingestion RV Rv" 
(Ci) 
(Ci) 
NONCOMBUSTIBLE LIQUID 
Americium I Ain-24 I 
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7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
1 9.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values (continued) 
2 
Carbon 
Cobalt'" 
Cesium 
Europium 
Europium 
Europium 
Tritium 
Nickel 
Nickel 
Protactinium'" 
Pluroniiirn 
Plutoniuin 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Radium 
Radium 
Strontiuni 
Technetiuin 
Thorium 
Thoriunt 
Thorium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Zinc 
c-14 
co-60 
cs- 137 
Eu-152 
Ell- I54 
Eu- I55 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234m 
PU-238 
h-239 
Pu-2x) 
PU-24 I 
Ita-226 
Ka-228 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
Th-228 
Th-230 
Th-232 
U-234 
U-235 
U-238 
Zn-65 
I .E-03 
5.E-OI 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-02 
1 .E42 
1 .E42 
I .E52 
5.E-01 
I .LO2 
1 .E42 
I .E-03 
1.503 
1 .Em03 
1 .LO3 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
I .E-03 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
I .E42 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.503 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
3.0E-01 
6.OE+01 
3.OE+00 
2.4E+OI 
1 .5E+01 
1.2E+02 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
2.9E+04 
2. 1E+00 
1.8E+W 
1.8E+00 
9.OE+OI 
I 
6.OE-0 1 
6.OE-01 
8.2E-01 
8.9E+01 
1.8E+00 
1.2E+00 
2.IE-01 
3 .OE+OO 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+OO 
1.2E+01 
1.5E-01 
3.OE+O 1 
I .SE+O I 
1.2E+02 
7.SE+O I 
6.OE+02 
3.OE+03 
I .4E+03 
1.5E+04 
l.lE+oO 
9.OE-01 
9.OE-01 
4.5E+OI 
3.OE-01 
3.OE-01 
4.1 E+W 
4.5E+02 
9.OE-01 
6.OE-01 
l.lE-01 
1 .5E+00 
1 .5E+00 
1.5E+00 
b.OE+OI 
v. Ig. 
1.5E+02 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
5.9Et03 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
2.9E+02 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
3.OE+O I 
2.6E-02 
2. I E+01 
1.6E+02 
I .OE+O2 
1 .OE+OI 
I .OE4 I 
4.7E+01 
8.3E+02 
2. IE+03 
I .OE+03 
3.6€+04 
3.1 E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+00 
3.1E+OO 
5.2E+00 
2. I E r n  
3.6Ec02 
5.2E-02 
3.1E-02 
5.2E-03 
2.1 E-0 I 
LIE-01 
2.1501 
1.6E+O? 
1.3E-02 
5.3E+03 
S.OE+O 1 
5.OE+02 
S.OE+O I 
!i.OE+Ol 
2.48+02 
2.1E+05 
l.lE+04 
5.OE+03 
1.8E+04 
l.6E-02 
1.3E-02 
1.3E-02 
8.0E-01 
1.6E+00 
2,6E+00 
1.1E+O 1 
I .8E+03 
I .6E-02 
2.6E-03 
l.lE-01 
l.lE-01 
1.1E-01 
8.OE+02 
2.6E-02 
1.5Ei-0 1 
6.5E+OI 
3.SE+01 
4.2E+01 
7.OE+02 
7.6E+O I 
I .7E+06 
S.OE+06 
1.4E+08 
5.9E+03 
7.3.E+05 
7.58+05 
2.78+02 
2.7E+02 
6.4E+01 
2.6E-01 
3.0E43 
2.8E42 
3.0Ei-02 
7.0E42 
8.4E42 
4.7E+03 
I .2E+O5 
5.9E+04 
2.7E+04 
1 .5E+03 
3.1 E-0 1 
2.6E-01 
2.6E-01 
I .6E+0 1 
6.0E+Oo 
6.0E+oD 
8.2E+01 
5.8E+03 
5.2E-01 
3.1E-01 
5.28-02 
2.1 E+OO 
2.1E+00 
2. IE+W 
6.0E+02 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc (23) Adj TQ NonComLiq 
w 
0 
0 m 
Originator: N.D. Clapper /v;oc Date: 1/16/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO011 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley &% Date: ! / l ~ ~ ~  1 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 'heet  No.: 2 of-% a 
1 9.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values (continued) 
2 
3 The following notes apply to the TQ adjustment tables for soil, drums, combustible and noncombustible wastes. 
4 
5 Notes: 
6 
7 v. Ig. lndicates that the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much s e a t e r  than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
8 
-- indicates that no ganima rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted h a w  ganma  ray encrgies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air. No releasc 
value for clie direct cxposure pathway was calculated (EPA, 1989). 
11 
1 2 ( I )  As reportcd in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulernaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprchcnsive Environmental 
13 Response, Compcnsation, and Liability Act: Radionuclides", EPA Contract 68-03-3452,02/89 
14 (2) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rcm via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters Cram 
15 the point of release. Dispersion based on extrapolation of ground levcl data for stability class D and 1 d s e c  windspeed (WQ = 0.072 sec/m3). 
$6 (2) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of rclease, Contact time = 
1 7  9 days. independent of the airborne relcasc fraction. 
18 (4) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dosc of 0.5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters from the point of release. Dispersioll based 
19 on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 d s e c  windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m3/sec) and average breathing rate (2.7E-4 m3/sec). 
20 
21 (5) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. Indepcndcnt of airborne release fraction. 
22 (6) TQ = 20 x the minimum value of ((Food RV x REPAIRHA), Water RV, (Inhalation RV x REp,JRSA), or Direct Dose RV}. The value of 20 is used because the RV produces a 
23 whole body dose equivalent of 0.5 rem, whereas the 1027 Category 3 TQs are based on a dose of 10 rem (i-e., [ O S  rem,, x 2 0  = 10 rem,,& 
24 (7) The most restrictive value from EPA ( I  989) is direct exposure. 2 0  tirnes this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more restrictive value 
25 of 280 Ci is uscd. 
26 (8) The TQ for Pa-234ni was calculared using REPA and RV values for Pa-234. 
27 (9) The most restrictive value of these three isotopes has been used because the cxact isotopic composition is unknown. 
28 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev1 /Calc (24) Adj TQ (Notes) 
anford, LLC. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
IO 
I 1  
I 2  
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
‘18 
I 9  
ZO 
21 
22 
23 
24 
CD 
E 
8 
618-3 SOIL INVENTORY 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide Estimated I 
Concentration inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJusTm 
isotope (pCiigj2 (Ci) (cil3 (Ci)4 M T i O  
Am-24I5 6.99E+00 1.49E-C 1 5.2E-01 5.2E+02 2.87E-04 
CO-60 2.50E-01 5.34E-03 2.8E+02 2.EE+02 1.91 E-05 
CS-137 I .I 5E+00 2.45E-02 6.OE+OI 1.3E+03 1.89E-05 
Ra-226 1.08E+00 2.29E-02 1.2E+01 I .2E+04 1.91 E-06 
P ~ - 2 3 8 ~  4.6lE-01 9.84E-03 6.2E-01 6.2E+02 I .59E-05 
Pt1-239~ 3.92E+OI 8.37 E-0 1 5.2E-01 5.2E+02 1.61 E-03 
Pl1-241~ 3.92E+01 8.37E-0 1 3.2Ec01 3.2E+04 2.61 E-05 
Sr-90 5.40E+00 I .15E-01 I .6E+01 1.6E+05 7.03E-07 
Th-228 2.38E+00 5.07E-02 1 .OE+OO 1 .OE+03 4.87E-05 
U-234 8.48E+02 1.81 E+01 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 4.31 E-03 
U-235 7.81 E+Ol 1,67E+00 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 3.97E-04 
U-238 8.48 E+02 1.81 E+01 4.2E+00 4,2E+03 4.31 E-03 
Zn-65 5.OOE-01 1.07E-02 2.4EcO2 6.OEt02 1.78h05 -
TQ = Threshold Quantity SUM OF RATIOS = 1 . I  I E-02 
w 
0 
0 
C h  
Date: 111 7/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 
Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. B l a k l e y h  
Originator: N.D. Clapper /ul’Qc 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
i Rev. No.: 
0ate:l 8 
Sheet No. : *  1 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(29) (61 8-3 Soil) 
N 
0 
0 
o\ 
I O  
II 
P 
N 
4 
Am-24I5, 6.99E-t-00 3.03 E-04 5.2E-01 1 .OE+OO 2.92E-04 
CO-60 2.50E-0 1 1.09E-05 2.8E+02 2.8E-t-02 3.88E-08 
CS-137' 1.15E+00 4.99E-05 6.OE+01 1 .2E+03 4.1 6E-08 
I 
12 P ~ - 2 3 8 ~  
13 Pu-23g5 
Originator 
Project: 
Subject: 
4.61E-01 2.00E-05 6.2E-01 1.2E+00 1.61 E-05 
3.92E+01 1.70E-03 5.2E-01 1 .OE+OO 1.64E-03 
N.D. Clapper @C Date: 111 7/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 
300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley 
300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
_ _  
21 
22 
Rev. No.: 
Date: 
Sheet No.: 
- I _ _ _  I 
Zn-65 I 5.OOE-01 1 2.17E-05 I 2.4E+02 I 6.OE+02 3.62E-08 
TQ = Threshold Quantity SUM OF RATIOS = 1.09E-02 
I I 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 618-3 
3 Combustible Volume: 487 LCM 
4 Soft Waste Density, g/cc' : - 8.92E-02 g/cm3 
5 
6 61 8-3 COMBUSTIBLE SOLIDS INVENTORY 
71 1 1 Estimated 1 102; CATEGORY,3 1 8 Concentration Inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTED Radionuclide Combustible 
. - .  
?nt U-238 I 8.48E+02 I 3.68E-02 I 4.2E+00 I 8.4E+00 I4,.38E-03 I
23 
24 Calculations 
25 Estimated inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cc/LCM x g/cc))/l .OE+12 pCilCi 
26 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = El/1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
27 Notes: 
28 ' Assumed to be an average value throughout the site. Density is based on Miller & Wahlen (1987) 25 lb/4.5 ft3. 
29 2The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. 
30 30riginal TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
31 4The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 20. 
32 5Added based on recent sampling results from 61 8-2, 61 8-3 and 61 8-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 4. 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev1/Calc(30) (61 8-3 Combustible) 
ashington Closure 
9 
i n  
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
Estimated Estimated 1027 CATEGORY 3 
RadiOnuclide Noncombustible Noncombustible I I 
N.D. Clapper flDc Date: 1/47/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO01 I Rev. No.: 
Checked: T.M. Blakley J- Date: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 
300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) Sheet No.: 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated inventory (Continued) 
Site ID: 61 8-3 
Noncombustible Concrete Volume: 43 LCM 
LCM Noncombustible Steel Volume: 89 - 
Concrete Sludge Density, g/cc: 1.96 g/cm" 
Steel Scale Density, g/cc: 3.6 g/cm3 
28 Calculations 
29 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x l.OE+06 cc/LCM x g/cc))/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
30 RATIO (CATEGORY 3j = Ei/1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (ci) 
31 Notes: 
32 'The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. 
33 *Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
34 3The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 21. 
35 4Added based on recent sampling results from 618-2, 618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 4. 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(31) (61 8-3 Noncombust) 
N 
0 
0 m 
lnven tory 
Washington anford, LLC. 
TQORIG~NAL TQADJUSTED 
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
(Ci) (Ci) - 
N.D. Clapper nlbC Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 
300-FF-2 Remediatio n Job No.: 14655 Checked: 
300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation 1TQ Adjustment) 
(Ci)’ RATIO 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory 
2 Site ID: 618-3 
3 Number of Drums: 228 
4 Drums of uranium oxide powder: 52 (Drum Types 1&2) 
5 Drums of oil coated metal 176 (Drum Type 3) 
6 tailings, fines and sludges: 
7.30E-01 
2.34E-01 
1.91 E-03 
7 618-3 DRUM INVENTORY- 
a 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
4.2E+OO 4.2E+01 1.74E-02 
4.2E+00 4.2E+OI 5.57E-03 
4.2E+OO I .4E-01 1.37E-02 
267 
201 U-238 Metal I 2.80E+05 I 28 
211 U-238 Oil I 1.OOE+O6 I 64 
221 
Number of 
drums 
jionuclides in 
52 
176 
;176 
--- 
52 
176 
176 . .  - 
52 
176 
176 
0300X-CA-NO01 I 
T.M. Blakley&.& 
(Continued) 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Estimated 
1.13E-02 I 4.2E+OO I 1.4E-01 18.05E-02 I 
1027 Category 3 Drum Sum of Ratios:] 2.54E-01 I 
23 Calculations 
24 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x kgldrum x 1000 glkg x number of drums)/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci for powder and metal 
25 Estimated inventory =(pCi/L x Udrum x number of drums)/l .OE+12 pCilCi for oil 
26 WTIO (CATEGORY 3) = El/1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
27 Notes: 
28 ‘The concentrations from 61 8-4 are used as analogous site data. 
29 *The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
Rev. No.: 
Date: 
Sheet No.: 
0300#-CA-N001 I-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(32) (61 8-3 Drums) 
P w 
0 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
I O  
Washington Closure anford, LLC. 
4027 CATEGORY 3 
Estimated 
Inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
isotope (Ci) (Ci) (ci)* RATIO 
Radionuclides in Liquid 
Am-241 I .00E-05 5.2OE-0 1 5.20E-02 1.92E-04 
CO-60 1.00E-05 2.80E+02 2.80E+02 3.57E-08 
I 
Originator: N.D. Clapper hjnc Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley , & l h ~  Date: 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Catenorization Calculation {TQ Adjustment) Sheet  No.: 
22 Calculations 
23 Estimated Inventory is based on MOC-2005-0002 
25 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = El/1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
26 Notes: 
27 ’ All liquids are conservatively assumed to be combustible. 
28 2The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 22. 
29 ’ Pu-241 is very conservatively assumed to be the same inventory as Pu-239 based on presence of Am-241 and age of burial ground contents. 
24 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(33) (61 8-3 Liquid) 
N 
0 
0 
cr\ 
7 
a 
9 
Originator: E. Gonsalves Date: 7/31/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remedigtion JObNo.: 1' 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide Estimated 
Concentration Inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
Isotope (pCilg)* (Ci) (ci13 (Ci)4 RATIO 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazar 
4655 Checked: T.M. Blakley&@ 
,d Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
251TQ = Threshold Quantitv I 
26 Calculations 
27 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cm3/LCM x g/cm3))/1 .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
28 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = El/1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
29 Notes: 
30 Assumed to be an average value throughout the site 
31 'The soil from 61 8-4 is used as analogous site data. 
32 Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
33 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 18. 
34 5Added based on recent sampling results from 618-2,618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
35 'Assumed that 10% of the thoria trench Th-232 inventory is in the north trenches due to cross contamination. 
Rev. No.: 2 
Sheet No.. 
0300X-CA-NOOI I -300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 2.xls/Calc(30) (61 8-7 Soil) 
ashlngton Closure 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
s 
8 
CO-60 2.50E-01 2.17E-05 2.8E+02 2.8E+02 7.75E-08 
CS-137 1.15E+00 9.98E-05 6.OE+01 I .2E+03 8.32E-08 
Ra-226 1.08E+00 9.33E-05 1.2E+01 2.4E+OI 3.89E-06 
Sr-90 5.40E+OO 4.69E-04 1.6E+01 3.3E+02 1.43E-06 
Pu-23fI5 4.61E-01 4.00E-05 6.2E-01 I .2E+00 3.23E-05 
Pu-23g5 3.92E+01 3.40E-03 5.2E-01 1 .OE+OO 3.27E-03 
w 
0 
0 rn 
24 
25 
Originator: E. Gonsaives [)!3- Date: 1111 6106 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO011 Rev. No.: 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakleyc.,?mg 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
I 
SUM OF RATIOS =I 2.24E-02 
TQ = Threshold Quantity 
iination 
waste is the same as the I radionuclide 
(Nov 15,2006) 0300X-CA-N0011-3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 4.xls/Calc(31) (618-7 Combustible) 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
h, 
0 
0 
a\ 
v 
w 
w 
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
Date: 11/14/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO01 I 
300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley&.O 
300-FF-2 Final Hazard Cateaorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
Rev. No.: 4 
Date: 
Sheet No.: 32 of 49 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 61 8-7 Northern Trenches with minor amounts of thorium cross-contamination 
3 Noncombustible Concrete Volume: a6 LCM 
4 Noncombustible Steel Volume: 177 LCM 
5 
6 
7 
_ _ _  
Concrete Sludge Density, g/cm3: 1.96 g/cm3 
Steel Scale Density, g/cm3: 3.6 g/cm3 
8 618-7 NORTHERN TRENCHES NONCOMBUSTIBLE SOLIDS INVENTORY 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 P ~ - 2 3 8 ~  4.61E-01 7.80E-05 2.94E-04 
18 Pu-23g5 3.92E+01 6.64E-03 2.50E-02 5.75E-04 
19 Pu-24I5 3.92E+01 6.64E-03 2.50E-02 5.75E-04 
20 Th-228 2.38E+00 4.02E-04 1.51 E-03 
21 Th-232 1.06E-03 1.06E-03 
22 U-234 8.48E+02 1.44E-01 5.41 E-01 
23 U-235 7.81E+OI 1.32E-02 4.98E-02 
24 u-238 a.48~+02 1.44E-01 5.41 E-01 
25 Zn-65 5.OOE-01 8.46E-05 3.19E-04 
26 
2i  
1027 CATEGORY 3 
1 1 
1 TQORIGINAL I TQADJUSTED 1 
28 
29 Calculations 
30 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1.OE+06 c&/LCM x g/cm3))/1.0E+12 pCi/Ci 
31 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
33 Notes: 
34 ’ The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. It is assumed that the radionuclide concentration in the concrete and steel is the same as the radionuclide 
35 concentration in the soil. 
36 ‘The discrete item is added based on 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
37 Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
38 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 21. 
39 Added based on recent sampling results from 618-2, 61 8-3 and 61 8-8 and historical research for thoria per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
32 
(Oct 30, 2006) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 4.xls/Calc(32) (61 8-7 Noncombust) 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Originator: Date: 8/9/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remedlatlon Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. B l a k l e h , q  Date: 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Cateaorization Calculation (TQ Adiustment) Sheet No.: 33 of 49 
Mass or 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide Volume of 
C h c .  (PCilg) Drum (kg) for 
for metal and metal and Estimated 
powder, (PCilL) powder, (L) Number of Inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTE~ 
Isotope for oil' for oil drums (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) RATIO 
Radionuclides in Drums 
U-234 Powder 5.26E+04 267 20 2.81E-01 I 4.2E+00 4.20E+01 6.69E-03 
U-234 Metal 4.75E+04 28 66 a.78~-02 1 ~ . ~ E + o o  ~.~OE+OI 2.09~-03 
U-234 Oil 1.70E+05 64 66 7.18E-04 I 4.2E+00 1.40E-01 5.13E-03 
U-234 Depleted U Scrap 1.11E-01 I 4.2E+00 4.20E+01 2.64E-03 
i 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determlnatlon of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 
3 Site ID: 61 8-7 Northern Trenches (with minor amounts of thorium cross-contamination) 
19 
20 U-235 Powder 
Number of Drums: 859 
Drums of uranium oxide powder: 20 (Drum Types 1&2) 
Drums of oil coated metal 
tailings, fines and sludges: 66 (Drum Type 3) 
Drums filled with Zircaloy-2: 773 (Drum Type 4) 
2.10E+03 267 20 1.12E-02 4.2E+00 4.20E+01 2.67E-04 
21 
22 
U-235 Metal I 3.20E+03 28 66 5.91 E-03 4.2E+00 4.20E+01 I 1.41 E-04 
U-235 Oil 1 1.20E+04 64 66 5.07E-05 4.2E+00 1.40E-01 3.62E-04 
U-235 Depleted U Scrap 1 1.02E-02 4.2E+00 4.20E+01 2.43E-04 
24 
25 
26 
U-238 Powder 3.10E+05 267 20 1.66E+00 4.2E+00 4.20E+01 3.94E-02 
U-238 Metal 2.80~+05 28 66 5.17E-01 4.2E+00 4.2OE+Ol 1.23E-02 
U-238 Oil 1 .OOE+06 64 66 4.22E-03 4.2E+00 I .40E-01 3.02E-02 
U-238 Depleted U Scrap ! 8.44E-01 4.2E+00 4.20E+01 
I I 
29 
30 
31 Calculations 
32 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x kg/drum x 1000 g/kg x number of drums)/l.OE+l2 pCilCi for powder and metal 
33 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/L x L/drum x number of dnrrns)/l.OE+12 pCilCi for oil 
34 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
35 
36 Notes: 
37 ' The concentrations from 618-4 are used as analogous site data. 
38 *The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
39 
40 
41 
2.01E-02 
0300X-CA-N0011-3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 3.xls/Calc(33) (618-7 Drums) 
27 
28 
Th-232 Powder 1370 0.3 4.52E-02 1 .OE-01 1.04E+00 4.35E-02 
1027 Categoy 3 Drum Sum of Ratios: 1.63E-01 
N 
0 
0 m 
4 1027 CATEGORY 3 
5 Estimated 
6 Inventory TQQR~G~NAL TQADJUSTED 
7 Isotope (Ci) (Ci) (c112 RATIO 
8 Radionuclides in Liquid 
9, Am-241 I 1.00E-05 I 5.20E-01 I 5.20E-02 I 1.92E-04 , 
P 
w 
VI 
I O  
11 
I 2  
13 
14 
15 
(Continued) 
CO-60 1.00E-05 2.80E+02 2.80E+02 3.57E-08 
CS-’l37 I .00E-05 6.00E+OI 6.00E+01 I .67E-07 
Eu-155 1.00E-05 9.40E+02 9.40E+02 I .06E-08 
Sr-90 1.00E-05 I .60E+01 1.64E+01 6. I OE-07 
Pu-238 1.00E-05 6.20E-01 6.20E-02 I .61 E-04 
Pu-239 1 .OOE-05 5.20E-01 1 5.20 E-02 I .92E-04 
0300X-CA-NO01 i 
T.M. Blakley & 
Rev. No.: -t 
Date: $ / b  I*, 
Sheet No.: 48-&%3- 
22 Calculations 
23 Estimated Inventory is based on MOC-2005-0002 
25 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EV1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
2 7  ’ All liquids are conservatively assumed to be combustible. 
28 *The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 22. 
29 ’ Pu-241 is very conservatively assumed to be the same inventory as Pu-239 based on presence of Am-241 and age of burial ground contents. 
24 
26 NGteS: 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(38) (61 8-7 Comb Liquid) 
!? 
B 
% 
0 
cf 
N 
0 
0 cn 
7 
8 
9 
IO 
11 
13 
I 2  
P w cn 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Estimated 
Inventory' T Q O R ~ G ~ N ~  TQADJUSTEDS 
Isotope (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) RATIO 
Radionuclides in Non-Combustible Liquid 
- Th-232 I 2.09E-03 I 1.00E-01 I 5.2OE-02 I 4.02E-02 
1027 Category 3 Sum of Ratios: 4.02E-02 
anford, LLG. 
Originator: E. Gonsalves /& Date: 7/31 106 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO01 I Rev. No.: 2 - - -  
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Ca lculation (TQ Adiustment) Sheet No.: '%"of 49 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 2.xls/Calc(35) (61 8-7NonCombLiq) 
ashington Closure Hanford, LL 
7 
8 
9 
Originator: 
ProJect: 
Subject: 
1027 CATEGORY 3 Radionuclide Estimated 
Concentration Inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
Isotope ( p Ci/g )* (Ci) ( ~ i ) ~  (CiI4 RATIO 
E. Gonsalves Date: 
300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 
300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
IO 
I 1  
I 2  
7/31/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 
14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley J 4 L 3  
Am-24I5 6.99E-01 5.38E-03 5.2E-01 5.2E+02 1.03E-05 
CO-60 2.50 E-02 1.92E-04 2.8E+02 2,8E+02 6.87E-07 
CS-137 1.15E-01 8.85E-04 6.OE+01 1.3E+03 6.81 E-07 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 618-7 Thoria Pit 
3 Soil Volume: 3.563 LCM 
13 
14 
Ra-226 1.08E-01 8.27E-04 1 1.2E+01 1.2E+04 6.89E-08 
P ~ - 2 3 8 ~  4.61 E-02 3.55E-04 I 6.2E-01 6.2E+02 5.72E-07 
15 
16 
17 
I 8  
Pu-239' 3.92E+OO 3.02E-02 5.2E-01 5.2E+02 5.8OE-05 
Pu-24I5 3.92E+00 3.02E-02 3.2E+01 3.2E+04 9.43E-07 
Sr-90 5.4OE-01 4.16E-03 1.6E+01 1.6E+05 2.53E-08 
Th-228 2.38E-01 I .83E-03 1 .OE+OO I .OE+03 I .76E-06 
19 
20 
21 
Th-2325s6 -- 2.61 E-03 I .OE-01 1 .OE+02 2.51 E-05 
U-234 8.48E+01 6.53E-0 1 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 1.55E-04 
U-235 7.81E+00 I 6.01 E-02 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 1.43E-05 
22 
23 
24 
Rev. No.: 
U-238 8.48E+01 6.53E-01 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 1.55E-04 
Zn-65 5.00E-02 3.85E-04 2.4E+02 6.0E+02 6.41 E-07 
TQ = Threshold Quantitv SUM OF RATIOS = 4.24E-04 
25 
26 Calculations 
27 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cm3/LCM x g/cm3))/1 .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
28 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EV1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
30 Notes: 
31 ' Assumed to be an average value throughout the site 
32 2The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. 
33 Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
34 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 18. 
35 5Added based on recent sampling results from 618-2,618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
36 10% of the Thoria Pit Soil Th-232 inventory calculated in 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 6 is assumed to be adhered to the soil. 90% is adhered to hardware. 
29 
0300X-CA-NO01 I -300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 2.xls/Calc(36) (61 8-7 Soil) (2) 
B 
7 
8 
9 
cr‘ 
8 
Estimated 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide Combustible 
Concentration Inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
Isotope (pCi/g)* (Ci) ’ (ci13 (ci14 RATIO 
v 
w 
00 
16 
17 
:e: 11/16/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO01 I Re 
P~1-239~ 3.92E+00 6.14E-05 5.2E-01 1 .OE+OO 5.9OE-05 
Th-228 2.38E-0 1 3.72E-06 1 .OE+OO 2.1 E+OO I .79E-06 
20 
21 
22 
151 P~1-238~ I 4.61E-02 I 7.22E-07 I 6.2E-01 I 1.2E+00 I 5.82E-07 
_ _  _ _  - _ _  .. - .  
U-235 7.81 E+OO 1.22E-04 4.2E+00 8.4E+OO 1.46E-05 
U-238 8.48E+01 1.33E-03 4.2E+00 8.4E+OO 1.58E-04 
Zn-65 5.00E-02 7.83E-07 2.4E+02 6.OE+02 1.30E-09 
18 Th-232’ 1 __  I 2.35E-03 I 1.OE-01 I 1.OE+02 1 2.26E-05 
19 U-234 I 8.48E+01 I 1.33E-03 I 4.2E+00 I 8.4E+00 I 1.58E-04
231TQ = Threshold Quantity I SUM OF RATIOS =I 4.25E-04 
24 
25 Calculations 
26 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cm3/LCM x g/cm3))/1 .OE+12 pCilCi 
27 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = E111027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
28 Notes: 
29 ’ Assumed to be an average value throughout the site. Density is based on Miller & Wahlen (1987) 25 lb14.5 ft3. 
30 2The soil from 61 8-4 is used as analogous site data. It is assumed that the radionuclide concentration in the soft waste is the same 
31 as the radonuclide concentration in the soil. 
32 Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
33 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 20. 
34 5Added based on recent sampling results from 681-2, 618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
35 ’ There are 2.607E-2 Ci of contaminated soil and hardware. 10% is adhered to the soil. 90% is adhered to the hardware. 
It is assumed that 10% of the hardware is contaminated with Th-232 is combustible. 
(Nov 15,2006) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 4.xls/Calc(37) (61 8-7 Combustible (2) 
N 
0 
0 
o\ 
9 
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Originator: E. Gonsalves {A Date: 11/14/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: 4 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley Date: L/QL 
Subject: Sheet No.: 38 of 49 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
Estimated 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Noncombustible Estimated Discrete I 1 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 61 8-7 Thoria Pit 
3 Noncombustible Concrete Volume: 16 LCM 
4 Noncombustible Steel Volume: 32 LCM 
5 Concrete Sludge Density, g/cm3: 1.96 g/cm3 
6 Steel Scale Density, g/cm3: 3.6 g/cm3 
7 
11 Radionuclide Concrete Noncombustible k m s  
Concentration' Inventory Steel Inventory (Type D)2 TQORIGINA? TQADJUSTE; 
Isotope (pCUg) (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) RATIO 
12 
13 
14 
15, 
Am-24I4 6.99E-01 2.1 3E-05 8.04E-05 1.08E-05 5.2E-01 5.20E-01 2.1 6E-04 
CO-60 2.50E-02 7.63E-07 2.88E-06 2.8E+02 2.8E-t.02 1.30E-08 
CS-I37 1.15E-01 3.51 E-06 1.32E-05 6.0E+01 6.OE+02 2.79E-08 
Ra-226 , 1.08E-01 . 3.28E-06 , 1.24E-05 , . 1.2E+01 . 1.2E+01 . 1.30E-06 . 
16 
17 
26 
27 Calculations 
28 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cm3/LCM x g/cm3))/1 .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
29 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = El/1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
30 Notes: 
31 ' The soil from 61 8-4 is used as analogous site data. It is assumed that the radionuclide concentration in the concrete and steel is the same 
32 as the radionuclide concentration in the soil. 
33 * Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
34 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 21. 
35 Added based on recent sampling results from 681-2, 618-3 and 618-8 and historical research for thoria per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
(Oct 30,2006) 0300X-CA-NO01 I-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 4.xls/Calc(38) (61 8-7 Noncombust) (2) 
Sr-90 5.40E-01 1.65E-05 6.21 E-05 I 1.6E+01 1.6E+02 4.79E-07 
P ~ - 2 3 8 ~  4.61E-02 1.41 E-06 5.3OE-06 5.75E-05 I 6.2E-01 6.20E-01 1.04E-04 
h, 
0 
0 cn 
Originator: Date: 7/31/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: 2 
Project: Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley +$& Date: *- 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Catenorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) Sheet No.: 39 of 49 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 
3 Site ID: 618-7 Thoria Pit 
4 Number of Drums: 86 
5 Drums of uranium oxide powder: 2 (Drum Types I &2) 
6 Drums of oil coated metal 
7 tailings, fines and sludges: 7 (Drum Type 3) 
8 Drums filled with Zircaloy-2: 7 7 4 )  (Drum Type 
9 Drums Filled with Thorium Oxide: 3 
to  
11 618-7 THORIA PIT DRUM INVENTORY 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 Calculations 
34 Estimated inventory =(pCi/g x kg/drum x 1000 glkg x number of drumsfll .OE+12 pCi/Ci for powder and metal 
35 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/L x Lldrurn x number of drums)/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci for oil 
36 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = E111027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
37 
38 Notes: 
39 ’ The concentrations from 618-4 are used as analogous site data. 
40 *The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
OF 
c-, 
w 
4 
0300X-CA-NO01 I-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 2.xls/Calc(39) (61 8-7 Drums) (2) 
N 
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0 
c3\ 
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5 
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7 
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9 
ashington Closure anford, LLC. 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Estimated 
1 nve n tory TQORIG~NAL TQADJUSTED 
Isotope ( Ci ) (Ci) ( Ci ) ' RATIO 
Radionuclides in Combustible Liquid 
Am-241 I 1.00E-06 I WOE-01 1 5.20E-02 I 1.92E-05 1 
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
I O  
Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 
Job No.: 18 
VPC 
In 
CO-60 1.00E-06 2.80E+02 2.80E+02 3.57E-09 
I I I I 
0300X-CA-N0011 
T.M. Blakley 6 4  
I 1  
I 2  
13 
CS-I37 1.00E-06 6.00E.t.01 6.0OE+Ol I .67E-08 
Eu-I55 1.00E-06 9.40E+02 9.40E+02 I .OEE-09 
Sr-90 1.00E-06 1.60E+01 1.64E+01 6.lOE-08 
14 
15 
1 
Pu-238 I 1.00E-06 I 6.20E-01 6.20 E-02 1.61 E-05 
Pu-239 I 1.00E-06 I 5.20E-01 1 5.20E-02 1.92E-05 
22 Calculations 
23 Estimated Inventory is based on MOC-2005-0002 
I Rev. No.: 
Date: 
Shee t  No.: 4&+!3- 
40 Q f s ?L& 
24 
25 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EV1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED r"Q (Ci) 
26 Notes: 
27 'The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 22. 
28 2Pu-241 is very conservatively assumed to be the same inventory as Pu-239 based on presence of Am-241 and age of burial ground contents. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(44) (61 8-7 CombLiquid) (2) 
h, 
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h, 
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Estimated 
Inventory' T Q O R I G ~ N ~  T Q ~ J U ~ T E D ~  
Isotope (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) RATIO 
Radionuclides in Non-Combustible Liquid 
ashin 
Date: 7/31106 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: 2 Originator: E. Gonsalvesp /+ 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley r& r, 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation fTQ Adiustmentl 
1 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 
3 Site ID: 618-7 Thoria Pit 
4 
12 
13 
5 618-7 THORIA PIT NON-COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS INVENTORY 
61 I 1 1027 CATEGORY 3 1 
Th-232 I 2.09E-02 I 1.00E-01 I 5.20E-02 I 4.02E-01 
1027 Category 3 Sum of Ratios:l 4.02E-01 
i41TQ = Threshold Quantity 
16 Calculations 
17 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = E111027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
15 
18 
19 Notes: 
20 ' Estimated Inventory is based on material at risk calculation #0300F-CA-N0003 
21 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 23. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Revision 6 (page IO). 
0300X-CA-NOOI I -300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 2.xls/Calc(41) (61 8-7NonCombLiq) (2) 
WCH-137 
Rev. 0 
12 
13 
14 
15- 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. i 
1980 Percent of U 1980 
Conc. Activity Enrichment) Conc. 
Isotope (g/g ) (Cilg) (pcilg) 
Uranium Specific (Natural Radionuclide 
Originator: N.D. Clapper /'$oL Date: VI7106 Calc. No.: 0300XGA-N0011 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley Date: ;/k b 
16 
17 
18 
19 
U-234 2.12E-03 6.26E-03 0.0055 7.3E+02 
U-235 2.12E-03 2.16E-OS 0.72 3.3E+OI 
U-238 2.12E-03 3.36E-07 99.2745 7.1 E+02 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Radioactive Decay: 
Radiological data from Metcalf (1 980) (October 31, 1980) was decayed to March 2003 using the following equation: 
A = &,e-" where: 
A = Final Activity (Ci) 
& = Initial Activity (Ci) 
e = base of natural logarithm (2.718 ...) 
t = elapsed time (Assumed to be 2.24 years) 
h = decay constant (O.693iTjn) 
T,2 = half life of nuclide (Half life information was obtained from Table A-I, HNF (1 998) 
The U-235 concentration from the letter was added to the U-235 concsntration determined by distributing the total uranium 
(above). 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
December 2006 
0300X-CA-NOOI I -300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev1 ICalc(46) (61 8-8) 
D-43 
N 
0 
0 
c3\ 
Y 
Radionuclide Estimated 
10 Concentration Inventory 
11 Isotope (pcilg) (Ci) 
Washington losure Hanford, LLC. 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
~ Q O R I G I N A L  TQADJUSTED 
(ci)* (ci13 RATIO 
Originator: N.D. Clapper ,h'(!: Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO011 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley IIA-?t Date: !,I '/ [ ] , I t  
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Catenorization Calculation (TQ Adiustment) = Sheet No.: ' a taFSS- -  '33!,-1'$ 
1 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 
3 Site ID: 618-8 
4 Total Soil Volume: 1 7 9  3 - LCM 
5 (North Area and Parking Lot) 
32. Radioriuclides in Soil 
14 CS-437 1.37E-01 5.31 E-03 6.0€+01 I .3E+03 4.09E-06 
15 
16 
17 
18 
l9  
20 
21 
22 
-- -I_.- .I 
P ~ - 2 3 8 ~  4.61 E-01 1.78E-02 6.2 E-0 1 6.2E+02 2.88E-05 
Pu-23g4 3.92E+01 1.52E+00 5.2 E-0 1 5.2E+02 2.92E-03 
Pu-24I4 3.92 E t 0  I__, -_ ___I_ 1.52E+00 3.1 E+OI 3.2E+04 4.74E-05 
Ra-226 6.73E-01 2.61 E-02 I .2E+01 1.2E+04 2.1 7E-06 
Sr-89/905 2.49Et01 9.62E-01 1.6E+01 I .6E+05 5.87E-06 
Th-228 2.97 E-04 1. I 5E-05 1 .OE+OO I .OE+03 I .I OE-08 
U-234 7.30E+02 2.82E+O 1 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 6.72E-03 
U-235 4.73E+01 1.83E+00 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 4.35E-04 
------- 
"5 Caiculations 
26 Estimated itiventory -(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cc/LCM x g/cc))/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
27 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EV1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
28 NA = Not Applicable 
29 Notes: 
30 ' Assumed to be an average value throughout the site 
31 'Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
32 'The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 18. 
33 4Added based on recent sampling results from 681 -2,618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
23 
24 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev1 ICalc(47 (61 8-8 Soil) 
U-238 I 7.07EtO2 I 2.74Et-01 I 4.2E+00 I 4.2E+03 1 6.51E-03 
TQ = Threshold QGantitv SUM OF RATIOS = I 1.72E-02 
J 
N 
0 
0 
o\ 
8 
9 
IO 
7 
R 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide Estimated 
Concentration inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
(Ci) (Ci ) ( Ci ) RATIO lsoto p e (p Cil g) 
ton Closure 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(48) (61 8-8 Combustible) 
h;, 
0 
0 
c3\ 
14 
15 
16 
Washington 
Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: 
14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley 9-d Date: Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) Sheet No.: 
Originator: N.D. Clapper NDcL 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 
3 Site ID: 618-8 
Radionuclides in Soil 
Am-24I3 6.99E+00 I .60E-04 ' 6.03E-04 5.2E-0_1 5.20E-01 I .47E-C3 
CS-137 1.37E-01 3.1 5E-06 1.19E-05 6.OE+Gl 6 .OE+02 2.50E-08 
Noncombustible Concrete Volume: 12 LCM 
Noncombustible Steel Volume: 24 
17 
18 
Concrete Sludge Density: 1.96 g/cni' 
Steel Scale Density: 3.6 g/cm3 
Pu-238' 4.61 E-01 ' 1.06E-05 3.98 E-05 6.2E-01 6.20E-01 8.12E-05 
Pu-23g3 3.92E+01 8.98E-04 2.38E-04 5.2 E-0 1 5.20E-01 2.19E-03 
9 618-8 NONCOMBUSTIBLE SOLIDS INVENTORY 
stimate 1027 CATEGORY 3 "  11 I Radionuclide I Noncombu:ible Istimate I No fcornbu:ible I 1 I 
21 
22 
23 
Sr-89/904 2.49E+01 5.70E-04 2.1 5E-03 I .6E+01 1.6E+02 1.66E-05 
Th-228 2.97E-04 6.8OE-09 2.56E-08 1 .OE+OO I .OE+OO 3.12E-08 
U-234 7.3i)E+02 1.67E-02 6.30E-02 4.2E+00 4.2E+00 1.00E-02 
25 
26 
3.92E+OI I 8.98E-04 I 2.3 8 E -04 3,20E+01 I 3.55E-05 I 3.2E+01 I 
6.73E-01 I 1.54E-05 5.81 E-05 I 1.2E+01 I 1.2E+01 I 6.13E-06 
J 
U-238 I 7.07E+02 I 1.62E-02 1 6.1 1 E-02 I 4.2E+00 1 4.2E+OO 1.84E-02 
SUM OF RATIOS = 4.09E-02 TQ = Threshold Quantity 
I 
241 U-235 I 4.73E+01 I 1.08E-03 I 4.08E-03 I 4,2E+00 I 4.2E+OO I 1.23E-03 1 
27 Calculations 
28 Estimated lnventcry =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cmYLCM x y/cm3))/1 .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
29 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EV1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
30 NA = Not Applicable 
31 Notes: 
32 'Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
33 'The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 21. 
34 'Added based on recent sampling results from 681 -2,618-3 and 61 8-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
35 4The more restrictive TQADJ value for Sr-90 has been used. 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(49) (61 8-8 Noncombustible) 
anford, LLC. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
t4 
0 
0 
o\ 
Radionuclide 
Conc. (pcilg) 
for metal and 
powder, (pCilL 
lsotoae for oil’ 
Originator: N.D. Clapper “DC Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO01 I Rev. No.: I 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley A, *9 Date: 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) Sheet No.: 
TQoRlGlNAL 
(Ci) 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
TQADJUSTED 
(Ci)2 RATIO 
2 
3 
Site ID: 618-8 
Number of Drums: 118 
4 Drums of uranium oxide powder: 27 (Drum Types 1 &2) 
5 Drunis of oil coated metal 91 (Drurn Type 3) 
6 tailings, fines and sludges: 
7 618-8 DRUMS INVENTORY 
Mass or 
Volume of 
Drum (kg) for 
metal and 
powder, (L) 
for oi l  
Number of 
drums 
121 Radionuclides in 
Estimated 
Inventory 
(Ci) 
rums 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
~ 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 Calculations 
24 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x kgldrum x 1000 g/kg x number of drums)/l .OE+I2 pCi/Ci for powder and metal 
25 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/L x Udrum x number of drums)fl .OE+12 pCi/Ci for oil 
26 RATIO {CATEGORY 3) = Elf1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
27 Notes: 
28 ‘The concentrations from 61 8-4 are used as analogous site data. 
*The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(50) (61 8-8 Drums) 
h, 
0 
0 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
anford, LLC. 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Estimated 
Inventory TQOR~G~NAL TQADJUSTED 
Isotope (Ci) (Ci) (Ci)’ RATIO 
Radionuclides in Liauid 
11 
I 2  
91 Am-241 I 1.00E-05 I 5.20E-01 I 5.20E-02 I 1.92E-04 I 
CS-137 1.00E-05 6.00E+01 6.00E+OI I .67E-07 
Eu-I55 I .00E-05 9.40E+02 9.40E+02 I .06E-08 
101 Co-60 I 1.00E-05 I 2.80E+02 I 2.80E+02 I 3.57E-08 I 
Rev. No.: 1 
Date: :// &io c>
Sheet No.: +I-of?B 
+ 7 - ~ ~ + 7  
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
22 Calculations 
Estimated Inventory is based on MOC-2005-0002 
RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = E111027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
Notes: 
’The adjusted TU valbes are calculated on Sheet 22. 
* Pu-241 is very conservatively assumed to be the same inventory as Pu-239 based on presence of Am-241 and age of burial ground contents. 
35 
36 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values~Revl/Calc(51) (61 8-8 Liquid) 
x 
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l .4 
0 
0 cn 
ford, 
Originator: Edward Gonsalves Date: 7/31/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NOOl l Rev. No.: 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation' Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley 0 Date: 7,; b 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) SheetNo.: 4 of49 
- 
i 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
3 Site ID: 61 8-1 3 
4 Soil Volume: 2,815 LCM 
5 Density, g/cc': 2.16 g/cm3 
6 
7 61 8-1 3 SOIL INVENTORY 
2 
9 81 
22 Calculations 
23 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cc/LCM x g/cc))/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
24 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EM027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
26 Notes: 
27 ' Assumed to be an average value throughout the site 
'28 The soil from 61 8-4 is used as analogous site data. 
29 30riginal TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
30 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 18. 
25 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 2.xls/Calc(48) (61 8-1 3 Soil) 
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ashington Closure 
618-13 COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS INVENTORY 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Estimated 
Inventory TQORE~NAL TQADJUSTED 
Isotope (Ci) (Ci) (Ci)’ RATIO 
Radionuclides in Liquid 
Am-241 1.00E-05 5.20E-01 5.2OE-02 1.92E-04 
CO-60 1.00E-05 2.80E+02 2.80E+02 3.57E-08 
CS-137 I .00E-05 6.00E+OI 6.00E+01 I .67E-07 
Eu-155 I .00E-05 9,40E+02 ~ ~ _ _ _ _  9,40E+02 1.06E-08 
Sr-90 1.00E-05 1.60E+01 1,6LSE+Ol 6.10E-07 
Pu-238 1.00E-05 6.20E-01 6.20E-02 1.61 E-04 
Pu-239 1.00E-05 5.20E-01 5.20E-02 1.92E-Q4 
Pu-24I2 I .OOE-05 3.20E+01 3.20E+00 3.13E-06 
U-234 I .00E-04 4.20E+00 4.2OE-01 2.38E-04 
U-235 I .00E-04 4.20E+00 4.20E-01 2.38 E-04 
Zn-65 , 1.00E-05 2.40E+02 2.40E+02 4,17E-08 
U-238 1 .OOE-04 4.20E+00 4.2OE-01 2.38E-04 
1027 Category 3 Sum of Ratios: 1.26E-03 
Calculations 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(53) (61 8-1 3 Liquid) 
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FROM THE DESK OF: Kelly E. Cook 
Design Engineering 
372-9363 H9-02 
TO: Frank Corpuz HO- 17 
Robert Hynes €30-1 8 
Joel Arana HO-26 
Matt Haass L6-06 
DATE: April 1,2003 
SUBJECT: 618-8 ANOMOLOUS DATA 
Gentlemen: 
Please find attached several items for your reference regarding radiological data currently being 
discounted as part of the inventory of 618-8 Burial Ground. Included are the following: 
m 
# 
Copy of original data report 
Email record of decision to discount the data 
Copy of design drawing 03OOX-DD-COO55 
a Blow UP of 0300X-DD-COO55 
The drawings show the approximate location of test pit number 7, as referenced in the analytical 
report. 
December 2006 D-5 1 
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October 31, 1980 65452-80-204 - 
R.  E ,  Nheeler S. G. Metcalf 
Env. Analysis & Moni tori ng Dept Ana1ytica.l Process Unit 
202-S/Rm. 104/200 West 222-S/200 lies t 
3-1213 . 
Analysis o f  618-8 Burial Ground Soil. 
H.A. Talvitie, Anal. Chem.'G, 1827 (1971) Ref: 
Two soil samples from the 618-8 burial ground were analyzed i n  duplicate. 
One sample was from t e s t  hole .7 (taken a t  a depth o f  5 fee t )  and the . 
other was labeledwest side (taken a t  a depth o f  1 foot ) .  See attached 
map. 
Gamma Ener 
quantify ?'U, 23tfih,726Ra, and 137Cs. See Table I .  Protactiniuni 234-14, 
a 228U daughter, was identified b u t  could not  be quantified. 
shown ref lects  counting errors Drily, a t  a 95% confidence level. 
Analysis. (GEA) ( w i t h  no sample treatment) was used t o  
The error 
Table I 
GEA' RESULTS 
Sample 23513, pci/g 228Th pci/q 
Test Hole 7 2.92 2 4.5% 0.98 2 18% 0.68 2 17% 0.23 2 25:: 
;Jest Side  14.3 f 1.2% 0.51 29%' 3.38 t, 25% ,.0.12 
Typical background levels of 137&s and total  U in our area a re  approximately 
. 0.5 pci/g of so i l .  
Analytical methodology t o  compl'etely d i  ssolve the samples was developed by 
Process Analytical U n i t  on an emergency basis. 
solutions were analyzcd for  *9-90Sr, 2-39Pu, and total uranium by Analytical 
Laboratory personnel. I n  the past, soi 1 samples were acid leached rather 
than  dissolved. This can lead t o  serious errors when isotopes o f  interest  are 
strongly bound to  or trapped in soi l  particles.  
utilized H C I ,  HfJO and HF, and  i s  patterned a f t e r  one reported in the open 
1 i tera ture ( R e f e r h e ) .  After di ssol uti on, the ssmpl es were s p i  ked w i  t h  ; : ' *S i " ,  
; I JbPu ,  and uranium t o  determine chemical yields. 
After dissolution, the resul t i iq  
The dissolution method 
December 2006 D-52 
R. E. Wheeler 
Page two 
October 31 , 1980 
Strontium-89-90 was isolated by a ser ies  of precipitation steps and 
quantified by total. beta counting (laboratory procedure SrC03B03). 
resul ts  a r e  shown i n  Table 11. 
The 
TAB.LE 11 . . 
WCH-137 
Rev. 0 
U, and 239Pu Results 
Total Uranium 239Pu 
8 9- 9 OSr Spi ke Spike* Spike 
Sampl e Pci /g So? 1 Recovery gU/g Soil Recovery pci /g  RecoverL 
1 c9 93 66.3% . 2.39 x N/A 2366 683: 
1 5.86 71.5% 3.03 x IVA 36.85 24% 
2 42.6 64.1% 2.12 x W A  77.1 3% 
2 25.7. 62.4%. 7.14 x N/A 14.43 13% 
*Not available u n t i l  approximately 11/3/80. 
The usual 8g-goSr background level is  approximately 0.2 pci per gram o f  so i l .  
The 85Sr spike recoveries for  duplicates agree w i t h i n  several per cent while 
the 89-90Sr values found i n  the duplicates d i f f e r  by up t o  a factor of 2. 
T h i s  may be due to sample inhomogeneity. 
determined. A t  this point, the soil  i n  the west side sample appears to  
contain significantly more 89-90Sr than that  of test hole 7 ,  No estimate 
of the overall precision of the method was made due to the very short lead 
ti tne a1 1 owed - 
I f  desired, the cause can be 
Sol vent extraction w i t h  tri -n-octyl phosphi ne oxide separated the urani um 
from the samples. Quantification was accomplished by fluorometry. See 
Table 11. The agreement between duplicates was w i t h i n  a factor  o f  two, 
while the west side sample contained nearly ten times more U than d i d  the 
hole 7 sample. GEA also showed the west side sample 235U ac t iv i ty  to be 
nearly 10 times tha t  o f  ho&e 7. T h i s  areas natural uranium background level 
i s  approximately 1.5 X 10 g o U]g o f  so i l .  Again, no precision s ta te -  
m e n t  can be made. Samples spiked w i t h  U are  awaiting analysis by AL 
personnel. 
December 2006 D-53 
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Page three 
October 31 , '1980 . .  
The 239Pu values obtained are unreliable. The 236Pu spike recoveries 
were e r ra t ic ,  ranging from 68% to  3%. A d i s t u r b i n g  note is  tha t  the 
sample having the best spike recovery (68%) had a h i g h  239Pu act ivi ty  
(2366 pci/g). The method used i s  c o m n  t o  many labs. After acid 
dissolution, plutonium i s  isolated by anion exchange and quantified 
by alpha energy analysis. 
. . 
I am confident that  given adequate funding  and lead time, a viab1e23?u 
method can be developed. Normally, development o f  low level analytical 
procedures require approximately one half man year. Less than one half 
man month could be devoted to thjs ent i re  project. 
Please contact me if  you wish to  continue this project. A t  t h a t  time, 
we can rescope the'project.  
$.A. 
s. G. 
Chemi s t 
SGM: g i  w 
cc: L. C. Brop 
D. A. D o d d a  
R. B. Gelman 
R. J . Mur kows k i  
. 1b 
December 2006 D-54 
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* Cook. KelIv E 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
cc: 
Subject: 
Corpuz, Franklin M 
Tuesday, April 01,2003 10:45 AM 
Larson, Andrew R; Maxson, Michael F; Lehrschall, Ronald R 
Hynes, Robert T; Arana, Joel D; Cook, Kelly E; Schwab, Michael R; Haass, Matthew J; 
Carlson, Richard A; April, John G; Corpuz, Franklin M 
Path Foward for IWS (RE: RE: 618-8 Burial Ground Data Review) 
Andy, Ron and Mike - 
Based upon below historical and process evaluation from Mike Schwab, and as a follow up to our conversation, the 
Inactive Waste Site (IWS Nuc Safety) categorization documentation for 618-8 should continute to use the original MAR 
calculuation assumption for the nominal presence of Pu239 at lg. This is about 0.05 Ci as opposed to the - 16 Ci (noted 
as "unreliable") in the referenced documenation. 
As always, the project is committed to the MOC process as remediation proceeds. A U R A  and contingency planning 
discussions are in progress with Radcon and Waste Management. Any questions/clarifications, please contact me. 
Thanks 
Frank Corpux 
531-0625 
---Original Message--- 
From: Schwab, Michael R 
Sent: 
To: 
cc: 
Subject: 
Tuesday, April 01,2003 8:30 AM 
Corpuz, Franklin M; Cook, Kelly E; Arana, Joel D; Hynes, Robert T; Maxson, Michael F; Lehrschall, Ronald R; Ludowise, John D 
Haass, Matthew J; Dietz, Linda A; April, John G 
RE: RE: 618-8 Burial Ground Data Review 
Frank, 
Please correct my input re Steve's thoughts on the presence of Pu in the 300 Area ca 1954; I misunderstood 
his response to my observation. Steve's long history has been with the 200 Area chemistry, mostly at 222s 
Labs. 
Mike 
-----Original Message--- 
From: Corpuz, Franklin M 
Sent: 
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: RE: 618-8 Burial Ground Data Review 
Tuesday, April 01,2003 242 AM 
Cook, Kelly E; Arana, Joel D; Hynes, Robert T; Maxson, Michael F; Lehrschall, Ronald R; Ludowise, John D 
Corpuz, Franklin M; Haass, Matthew J; Dietz, Linda A; April, John G; Schwab, Michael R 
AII - 
Thank you to Mike Schwab for the quick thorough work. 
Forwarding below to BHI radcon, waste management, and resident engineer as relevant information for 
project-contingency planning. 
Kelly could you please forward a marked up site plan, identifying the location/depth of the suspect-discounted 
hit, relative to the FF2 design boundaries laid out on design drawings COO51 andlor C0055. Recipients: 
Arana, Hynes, Haas, Corpuz 
Thanks 
1 
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Frank Corpuz 
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WCH- 137 
Rev. 0 
----Original Message---- 
From: Schwab, Michael R 
Sent: 
To: Corpuz, Franklin M 
cc: 
Subject: 
Monday, March 31,2003 4:55 PM 
Dietz, Linda A; Lehrschall, Ronald R; Maxson, Michael F; Cook, Kelly E; Metcalf, Steven G; Teel, D a d  D 
618-8 Burial Ground Data Review 
Frank, 
Ref: Memo, 6542-80-204, S .  G. Metcalf to R. E. Wheeler, "Analysis of 618-8 Burial Ground 
Soil," dated October 31,1980. 
* I called Steve Metcalf at the 2223 Labs and then faxed him the reference memo. I asked if hc 
could recall any followup to his recommendations to develop a suitable analytical procedure 
or if he recalled any additional actions for these samples collected adjacent to the 618-8. He 
could not recall the memo but agreed to look into it for us. I stressed the urgency and 
thanked him for any help he might provide. 
The samples were collected from soil outside the boundary of the 618-8 Burial Ground 
(verified with Linda Dietz). They do not represent the 618-8 BG. 
he analytical procedure used for the reference memo work was an early use and stele 
Metcalf' stated that the results were unreliable. He recommended procedure developmefll 
if these sample results required further evaluation. 
DELETE: I informed Steve of the operating period for the 618-8 Burial Ground as 
time. B e  confirmed what others have said on this subject]. Email 4/1/03. 
e 
* 
954. He agreed there was no significant amounts of plutonium in the 300 Area at thot 
"I have reviewed the October 31, 1980 memo that I wrote on the analysis of 618-8 Burial 
unreliable. No funds were received Ground Soil. As stated in the memo, the plutonium data is 
for additional method development, thus work on the development was halted. I recommend that the 
plutonium 
significant amounts plutonium being in the 300 Area 1954, that is beyond my b o  wledge 
and expertise and I can't reliably c o m e n t  on that. 
data not be used for any decision making. Concerning the possibility of 
Regards, 
Steve 
0 Again, the only way there could have been Pu in the locations identified in the reference 
memo is if it was disposed there after about 1958-1959 (I'm guessing when the 308 Bldg and 
PRTR (309 Bldg) Pu fuel development work started). 
Since the 618-8 BG was closed (and paved over) before the availability of Pu (except in 
spent fuel as met samples, etc), there should not be any inventory of Pu assigned to 618-6. 
There may be some other sites near the 618-8 BG that could have Pu but not based on these 
sample results that were cautioned as unreliable. 
I confirmed with Rich Weiss that early Pu procedures were difficult and frequently unreliable 
due to the complex sample preparation and subsequent analytical processes. 
In short, I believe we should not use this data as inventory information for 618-8. We 
should accept the "unreliable" quotation of the author and accept that the samples 
were not within the boundary of the 618-8 Burial Ground. 
e 
o 
e 
* 
&kc = 1 t x ! L 4 ~ c , ? F  io- ". 
*,..,.a 
&'-A,.,-# 
*-.-,a L . 
DOL2 
Rctr. 
2 
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I will pass on any feedback that Steve Metcalf might find. 
E you need more in€ormation, please call me at 372-9407. 
regards, 
Mike 
3 
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43. E. Poremba 
.Waste Management Process - Engineering Group 
2750E/D- 124/2OOE 
*.F. A,. Ruck, 111, 
*Technical Base1 i ne Unit 
- 1201 Jadwin/16/1100 
6-9048 
Subled: -Amount o f  Plutonium in Waste Sites 618-1, 618-2, 618-10, 618-11 
Ref: (a) Meeting Minutes, August 26, 1986, M. T. Jansky, 
"P1 utoni urn Inventory in 300 Buri a1 Sites' 
A meeting (Ref. [a]) was held on August 26, 1986 to resolve the 
differences in plutonium (Pu) amounts between the draft Hanford 
Defense Waste - Environmental Impact Statement (HDW-EIS) and the 
Hanford Inactive Site Survey (HISS) data base for the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 
The differences arose in the Pu inventories in some of the 300 Area 
(618) burial sites. 
Mr. R. B. Half, of the estinghouse Hanford Company, verified that 
instead o f  kilogram quantities for the 618-1 and 618-2 burial sites 
as reported in the draft WDW-EIS, these sites contain zero to gram 
quantities of Pu. The amount o f  Pu contained in waste site 618-11 
was determined to be the same as the quantity reported in the draft 
HDW-EIS. The Pu quantity for waste site 618-10, as reported in the 
Waste Information Data System (WIDS) data base, was determined to be 
the correct amount, Listed below are the correct Pu quantities that 
are to be used for the 618-1, 618-2, 618-10, and 618-11 waste sites: 
J 
Waste Site 
618-1 
618-2 
618-10 
618-11 
Amount Pu, q 
1 
0 
200 
10000 
If there are any questions, please calf me at 6-9048. 
F. A. Ruck, I11 
Senior Engineer 
F&R/l rc 
4-4. G .  Jasen 
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